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The Politics of Ethnicity in the Fiji Islands: 
competing ideologies of Indigenous paramountcy and 





Politics in the Fiji Islands is characterised by competitive processes that draw on and reshape 
ethnic cleavages.  Indigenous Fijians and Indian indentured labourers were incorporated separately into the 
colonial state and political economy under British rule.  Institutionalised ethnic divisions were not 
significantly restructured during Fiji’s negotiated independence in 1970.  In the process of building a 
national polity, these institutions embody a tension, being both a means to integrate ethnic groups into the 
state and a means to perpetuate ethnic cleavages. 
Throughout the Twentieth Century, ideologies of Indigenous paramountcy and individual equality 
have competed in Fiji’s political dialogue.  They represent different conceptions of political rights for ethnic 
groups and individuals; differences not yet resolved into a conception of common national citizenship with 
wide acceptance.  The ideology of paramountcy and its ostensible incompatibility with equality has 
structured the rhetorical shape of military and civilian coups overthrowing democracy in 1987 and 2000.  
This political instability has severely impeded Fiji’s social, political and economic development. 
This thesis focuses on contests between ideologies of Indigenous paramountcy and individual 
equality in political dialogue in Fiji.  It asks whether the concepts are necessarily incompatible.  In showing 
that they are not, it seeks mutual ground on which to base a conception of shared citizenship of an inclusive 
national polity.  This search invokes the idea that the centrality of paramountcy and equality to existing 
political identities means political inclusiveness may be better achieved by building on these concepts, rather 
than dismissing either.  The thesis argues that notions of paramountcy and equality contain the potential for 
an inclusive national polity that respects all its citizens and is attuned to the importance of protecting 
Indigenous culture and socio-economic wellbeing. 
Although many political actors in Fiji share this vision, ethnic polarisation in the wake of the 2000 
coup enabled extremism to triumph in the 2001 national elections.  The thesis draws its analysis from this 
election campaign, as an intensified debate on paramountcy and equality.  It emphasises the inter-
connections between political dialogue and historical, cultural and socio-economic contexts.  In particular, 
the state threatens to impede social forces towards political inclusiveness.  Its increasing role in advancing 
individual economic and political opportunities according to ethnic membership is fostering an Indigenous 
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GLOSSARY OF FIJIAN LANGUAGE TERMS 
Adi  Title for Indigenous female chiefs. 
Confederacy  Alliances of matanitu based in Eastern Fiji, forged immediately prior to 
colonial rule.  Burebasaga is based in Southeast Viti Levu, Kabuna in 
Northeast Viti Levu and Tovata in the Eastern Islands including Vanua 
Levu and Lau. [See Figure 1] 
Matanitu  Large political units forged through alliance or warfare from groups of 
vanua in Eastern Fiji (unknown in Western and Central Viti Levu).  
There were seven major matanitu by the advent of colonial rule. 
Mataqali  Groups of several families within a yavusa.  Families were hierarchically 
ordered as chiefs (turaga), executives (saturaga), diplomatic 
speakers/masters of ceremony (mata-ni-vanua), priests (bete) and 
warriors (bati) (model based on Eastern Fijian societies). 
Ratu  Title for Indigenous male chiefs. 
Taukei  Landowners; true people of the land; original inhabitants. 
i Tokatoka  Closely related households living in defined areas of villages, 
cooperating for communal tasks and comprising the subdivisions of the 
mataqali (model based on Eastern Fijian societies). 
Vanua  (1) Political units comprising several villages, formed from groups of 
yavusa for strategic protection or social and economic reasons.  The title 
of paramount chief of a vanua became hereditary in the leading yavusa 
(model based on Eastern Fijian societies). 
  (2) The land and the people; a group of people closely bound by common 
values, land or authority. 
Vanua Levu  The second largest island in Fiji, comprising 30.1% of its land and close 
to 15% of its population. 
Viti Levu  The main island in Fiji, comprising 56.5% of its land and approaching 
80% of its population. 
Vulagi  Visitor or guest; stranger or foreigner. 
Yavusa  Clans claiming descent from a legendary founding ancestor to which all 
Indigenous Fijians belong (model based on Eastern Fijian societies). 
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REFERENCE GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY ACRONYMS 
AIM – Justice and Freedom Party 
Formed for the 2001 election with an Indo-Fijian support base. 
Extreme platform promoting Indo-Fijian rights. 
 
BKV – Bai Kei Viti Party 
Split from PANU for the 2001 election with a Western-Fijian support base. 
Extreme platform promoting the interests of Western/Indigenous landowners. 
 
DNT – Dodonu Ni Taukei Party 
Split from FAP after 1999 with an Indigenous support base. 
Extreme platform promoting the interests of Indigenous landowners. 
 
FAP – Fijian Association Party (Soqosoqo Ni Taukei) 
Split from the SVT in the early 1990s with an Indigenous support base. 
Moderate platform to uplift all Indigenous Fijians within a multi-racial society. 
 
FLP – Fiji Labour Party 
Formed in 1985 with multi-racial leadership but primarily Indo-Fijian supporters. 
Non-racial platform fighting class politics. 
 
GHP – Girmit Heritage Party 
Formed for the 2001 election with an Indo-Fijian support base. 
Extreme platform promoting rights for Indo-Fijians displaced by 2000 violence. 
 
GVP – General Voters Party 
Established party representing the General Electors. 
Moderate/Extreme platform promoting the disadvantaged and Indigenous rights. 
 
LFR – Lio ‘On Famör Rotuma Party 
Established party representing Rotuman people. 
Extreme platform promoting Rotuman (and Indigenous) rights. 
 
MV – Matanitu Vanua (Conservative Alliance) 
Formed for the 2001 election with a Northeastern-Fijian support base. 
Extreme platform promoting Indigenous rights. 
 
NFP – National Federation Party 
Established in the early 1960s with an Indo-Fijian support base. 
Moderate platform promoting Indo-Fijian rights within a multi-racial society. 
 
NLUP – New Labour Unity Party 
Split from the FLP in 2001 for the election, with urban multi-racial support. 
Non-racial platform fighting class politics. 
 




NVTLP – Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party 
A coalition originating from 1970s ethnic nationalists, with Indigenous support. 
Extreme platform promoting Indigenous rights. 
 
PANU – Party of National Unity 
Formed for the 1999 election with a Western-Fijian support base. 
Moderate platform to uplift (especially Western) Indigenes in multi-racial 
society. 
 
POTT – Party of the Truth 
Established party with an Indigenous support base. 
Extreme Christian platform promoting rule according to Christian principles. 
 
SDL – Soqosoqo Duavata Ni Lewenivanua (United Fiji Party) 
Formed from the 2000 military-appointed cabinet with Indigenous support. 
Ostensibly multi-racial but with extreme promotion of Indigenous rights. 
 
SVT – Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei Party 
Formed by the GCC following the 1987 coups with Indigenous support. 
Moderate/extreme promotion of Indigenous rights within a multi-racial society. 
 
UGP – United General Party 
Established party representing the General Electors 
Moderate platform promoting the disadvantaged within a multi-racial society. 
 
VLV – Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito (Christian Democratic Alliance) 
Initiated by the Methodist Church for the 1999 election with Indigenous support. 
Extreme Christian platform promoting rule according to Christian principles. 
 
 
Note – The Fijian names of parties do not make sense as English translations.  Parties with 
English names listed in brackets provide these names as alternatives (they are not translations).  
Parties without these brackets reject the need for English names.  The FAP is commonly known 
by its English name, thus the Fijian name is placed in brackets. (Pers.Comm. Lal 12/04/02) 
 




INTRODUCTION: PARAMOUNTCY AND EQUALITY 
IN POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
A.  Development and the Struggle for an Inclusive National Polity 
On the 19
th of May 2000 radio broke news that armed men were holding Fiji’s 
parliament hostage, ousting its first ethnic Indian Prime-Minister in the name of Indigenous 
rights.  Many were apparently resigned to the idea that government overthrows had just 
become politics-as-usual in Fiji.  Citizens could draw on experiences from two coups in 1987 
to determine their immediate responses.  The political crisis in 2000 arrested Fiji’s attempt to 
construct an inclusive national polity based on the fundamental equality of all citizens.  This 
attempt was initiated with negotiations to bring in the 1997 Constitution, amending beyond 
recognition the 1990 Constitution that had guaranteed Indigenous paramountcy through 
political leadership and a parliamentary majority.  The 1987 military coups leading to this 
1990 Constitution had themselves halted Fiji’s previous attempt to build a multi-ethnic polity, 
from independence in 1970.  Oscillations between attempts to form an inclusive polity and 
counter-attempts to privilege Indigenous Fijians have characterised Fiji’s independence.  
These inter-ethnic tensions and political instability contrast starkly with popular images of Fiji 
as a tropical paradise of some 320 islands in the Southwest Pacific [Figure 1].  Before its 1987 
exile from the Commonwealth, Fiji was even upheld as a model of a viable multi-ethnic polity 
(Rothschild 1981:12). 
Following British colonisation in 1874, Fiji has struggled to resolve contests played 
out in political dialogue between claims to paramountcy by Indigenous Fijians and claims to 
equality by Indo-Fijians.  In his definitive history Broken Waves, Lal (1992:16) writes: 
The problem of reconciling these competing, indeed, incompatible, interests – paramountcy for 
Fijians, parity for Indians, and privilege for Europeans – is a central theme of the history of Fiji 
in the twentieth century. 
Over time, these claims have represented changing conceptions of political rights and been 
deployed in unfolding contexts for different purposes.  Discursive claims to ‘European’ 
privilege as trustees for the Indigenous population have been marginalized in the post-
independence period, obscuring the continued strength of largely Australian capital in the 
economy.  Remaining are  contests between Indigenes whose interests the British held 
paramount, and descendents of Indian indentured labourers promised equality.This thesis 
explores contests between ideologies of Indigenous paramountcy and individual equality in 
contemporary political dialogue
1 in Fiji.  It questions the necessary  
                                                 
1 Political dialogue refers to public exchanges of ideas in political contests, dominated but not determined by elites.  It 




















Figure 1: Map of the Fiji Islands 
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incompatibility of the concepts, demonstrating their significant common ground on which to 
base a conception of shared citizenship.  This invokes the idea that the centrality of these 
concepts to existing political identities means that building on them, rather than dismissing 
either, may better serve political inclusiveness.  The thesis argues that paramountcy and 
equality can form a foundation for an inclusive national polity that respects all its citizens and 
is attuned to the protection of Indigenous culture and socio-economic wellbeing.  The 2000 
political crisis, however, involving fear and violence unparalleled in Fiji’s contemporary 
history (Lal 2001:1), has strengthened extremism: Indigenous political supremacy 
undermining equal participation by non-Indigenes; and narrow individual political equality 
undermining recognition of Indigenous cultural rights and socio-economic disadvantage.  
Fiji’s state poses a further threat to inclusiveness.  Its increasing role in advancing economic 
and political opportunities for individuals according to their ethnic membership, fosters 
Indigenous middle and elite classes reliant on and promoting values of Indigenous privilege 
and political exclusion. 
Underpinning this thesis is the belief that exploring political dialogue is important to 
understanding political forces (Newman 1991:467).  This does not assume ideological debates 
determine political forces.  It is well established that the overthrow of Fiji’s Labour 
government in 2000 reflected a convergence of interests behind popular Indigenous 
disaffection, including defeated and financially crippled Indigenous politicians, Indo-Fijian 
capital, church elements, and a military faction (Review 2001:18).  Amid the struggles for 
political power and resource control, however, is a critical role for ideology.  It shapes the 
form taken by these forces, offers justifications for political acts, and affects the commitments 
of actors on all sides of politics.  Even as a rhetorical cloak, ideology both reflects and affects 
processes restructuring the political identities of potential supporters.  Political dialogue, 
filtered through particular information channels, interacts with people’s experiences to 
become a source of beliefs, values and attitudes.  Rather than dismissing ideology against 
some perceived ‘truth’, its importance arises from its potential to be believed, acted upon and 
constitutive of political identities.  As a former President of Fiji suggested of a definitive 
Indigenous historical account  The Façade of Democracy, ideologies must be understood 
because they capture widely held views (Ganilau 1991:vii).  As a window onto intensified 
contests in political dialogue directly attempting to shape political identities, this thesis 
focuses on Fiji’s 2001 election campaign. 
Forging a common conception of political rights as the basis for citizenship of an 
inclusive polity is critical for n ational development (Premdas 1993a:30).  The violence, 
dispossession and dislocation associated with Fiji’s coups may be minor relative to ethnic 
conflict elsewhere (Norton 1990:1), but the instability has severely impeded development.  In 
human development terms, for some it has detracted from enjoyment of equal political 
participation, security of person and property and self-respect (Durutalo 1999:428; UNDP 
1990:iii,10).  For economic growth, per capita GDP only recovered to its 1986 level in the 
late 1990s, before contracting again by over 8% in 2000 (RBF 2001:10).  Its prospects have 
been seriously damaged by stagnant investment since 1987.  Public and private institutions 
have been severely weakened by human resources loss through accelerated emigration of 
skilled workers.  The emigration of over 13% of the population since 1987 can be considered 
a form of state disintegration (Naidu and Pillay 2001:3,8).  National institutional integrity has QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 13 
 
 
also been damaged, particularly that of the military, police  and judiciary.  Democratic 
institutions have been repeatedly destabilised.  As long as radical conceptions of political 
rights offer justifications for destabilising acts, social, economic and political development is 
threatened.  This makes vital the construction of a sustainable, inclusive national polity. 
B.  The Context of Political Dialogue in the Fiji Islands 
The roots of Fiji’s fractured political identities lie in the differential incorporation of 
racial categories into the colonial state, initiating the construction of ethnic groups (Naidu 
1996:1-2).  In 1874 high chiefs ceded Fiji to Britain, which then needed to establish authority 
with limited resources and personnel, and in the face of deep distrust.  These imperatives 
combined with officials holding paternalistic and racist philosophies to form a ruling ideology 
of British protection of Indigenous social, economic, political and land institutions.  These 
Indigenous interests were generally held paramount against settler demands and dissenting 
colonial officials seeking to modernise Indigenous society.  To preserve Indigenous social 
structures, plantation labour was sourced from India from 1879.  Post-indenture, the Indian 
government played a critical role in securing promises of equality for Indians.  These events 
established two critical foundations: first, the combination of settler capital, Indigenous land 
and Indian labour in the economy; secondly, the combination of European privilege, 
Indigenous paramountcy and Indian equality at the discursive level.  Economic segmentation 
typically reinforced ethnic cleavages in political dialogue.  Fiji’s negotiated independence did 
little to restructure colonial institutions, including the separate (Indigenous) Fijian 
Administration and land ownership that are now emblematic of Indigenous paramountcy.  
Also untouched was the structure of the colonial commodity-export economy, historically 
controlled by foreign interests in sugar, copra, gold, trading and emerging tourism (Britton 
1987:125). 
Changing ethnic demography and inter-ethnic inequality provide another important 
context for political contests (Carroll 1994:319).  A measles epidemic at cession killed one 
quarter of Indigenes, whose population continued to decline until the 1920s (Howard 
1991:25).  Colonial officials and the press routinely assumed Indigenous Fijians were in 
danger of extinction (Lawson 1991:88), a consciousness of threatened societal and cultural 
survival reconstructed in the contemporary global context, aided by the plights of Indigenous 
peoples elsewhere.  With Indo-Fijians outnumbering Indigenes from the 1940s, their claims to 
equality were easily construed as threats to the paramountcy of Indigenous interests.  
However, changing population growth rates and increased Indo-Fijian migration, from 
political uncertainty and overseas opportunities, removed the disparity by 1988 (Mohanty 
2001:58).  Emigration doubled after the 1987 coups, nearly 90% of migrants being Indo-
Fijian, with the 2000 coup a further contributor to their population share heading towards 
40% (Naidu and Pillay 2001:3-4).  The Indigenous majority will undoubtedly reconfigure 
future political contests.  Socio-economically, Indigenous Fijians have the lowest average 
income, with significant inequalities existing among Provinces, and between urban and rural 
areas (UNDP 1997:24-5).  Intra-ethnic inequality, which far exceeds inter-ethnic inequality, 
accounts for Indo-Fijians experiencing the highest poverty, at one third of households.  A 
massive socio-economic divide among Fiji’s minorities - Europeans, Part-Europeans, Chinese QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 14 
 
 
and other Pacific Islanders – is masked by their composite category as ‘Others’.  These data 
are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Selected Socio-economic and Demographic Indicators 
  Indigenous Fijians  Indo-Fijians  Others  National 
Weekly per capita 
income ($F)a  38  50  67  45 
Gini Coefficient 
for income  0.42  0.53  0.59  0.49 
Households below 
basic needs (%)b  28  33  26  25 
Population 








Sources: UNDP (1997:25,27,39) [Data: Fiji Government 1990-91 Household Income and Expenditure Survey]; and 
Prasad et al (2001:4) [Data: Fiji Government 1996 Census]. 
a) £1 buys $F3-$F3.50. 
b) A different poverty line is calculated for each ethnic category according to their cost of basic needs, hence the 
national proportion can be lower than any sectional proportion. 
The intensity and importance of political competition in Fiji is magnified by an 
institutional context, little altered from colonial design, characterised by ethnic segmentation.  
Nearly 90% of the land area is inalienable, owned by Indigenous communities.  Indigenous 
Fijians comprise 99% of the military, 90% of Permanent Secretaries and 75% of police 
(Prasad et al 2001:5), non-national institutional characters vital to democratic instability.  
Indo-Fijians, particularly free-migrants from Gujarat, dominate the professions and visible 
face of commerce in small and medium-sized enterprises (Norton 1990:24).  Expatriate 
control of finance and large capital is not reflected in popular frameworks of Indigenous and 
Indo-Fijian economic dichotomies.  Fiji’s typically multi-racial unions are characterised by 
political opponents as vehicles for Indo-Fijian interests.  Christian churches are almost 
entirely Indigenous Fijian, with Hindu and Muslim organisations entirely Indo-Fijian.  
Despite gradual consolidation, most primary schools remain ethnically segmented (Naidu 
1996:21).  These reinforcing divides of ethnicity, Indigenousness, religion and economic 
occupation provide formidable obstacles to common political identities, particularly because 
ethnic closures in alternative competitive institutions intensify contests in the political sphere. 
Constitutional and electoral frameworks provide final important elements o f the 
context of political dialogue (Horowitz 2000:628).  The foundations laid for an inclusive 
polity by the 1997 Constitution were challenged but not dismantled by the 2000 political 
crisis.  Following the 19 May 2000 civilian coup purporting to abrogate the Constitution, the 
military assumed control on 29 May and also purported constitutional abrogation (Williams 
2001:77).  In March 2001, the evidence of civil society-led pro-democracy protests enabled 
the Court of Appeal to rule that the military-appointed cabinet had not become a legitimate 
government because it failed to achieve the acquiescence of the population (Republic of Fiji v 
Prasad 2001:29).  Fiji is unique for having usurpers submit to judicial authority and accept 
the result: the 1997 Constitution remains and elections were called under it (Williams 
2001:73-4).  This Constitution shapes an inclusive polity based on fundamental individual 
equality and affirmative action principles to realise equality of opportunity.  Indigenes are QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 15 
 
 
protected by  Great Council of Chiefs nominees to the upper house holding veto power on 
legislation affecting Indigenous rights (1997 Constitution:Sect.6,38(1),44(1)).  In the 71-seat 
lower house, members elected by common roll hold the balance of power, the remaining 46 
seats being divided between historically entrenched communal rolls.  Preferential voting was 
intended to encourage moderate political platforms and multi-ethnic coalitions (Reeves et al 
1996:310).  The 2001 election did not, however, accord with the promise of this framework.  
Political moderates interpreted the 1999 electoral route of the incumbent multi-ethnic 
coalition as the ‘outbidding’ of moderation (see Premdas 1993:18).  Separate party campaigns 
and post-election coalitions in 2001 replaced pre-election coalitions, demonstrating that even 
‘inclusive’ electoral designs can be insufficient to forge multi-ethnic cooperation (Stewart and 
O’Sullivan 1998:26).  The Constitution was also treated as a variable in the campaign 
dialogue.  The same interaction is true for the historical, demographic and institutional 
contexts discussed above: each shapes political dialogue but is also partially constructed 
within or affected by that dialogue. 
C.  Researching Political Dialogue in the Fiji Islands 
My focus on paramountcy and equality arose from the awareness I encountered in Fiji 
in 2000, that lack of resolution between these concepts continues to undermine Fiji’s 
development.  Although socio-economic cleavages crosscut ethnic boundaries in Fiji, political 
identification evinced by voting is predominantly ethnic (Norton 2000a:63-8).
2  Theoretical 
frameworks of ethnicity offer appropriate foundations to analyses of political dialogue in Fiji 
give the ethnic base of political identities.
3  As Chapter II details, my research approached 
ethnicity as socially constructed in particular historical, cultural, economic and political 
contexts.  My fieldwork covered ten weeks before and including the August 2001 elections, a 
brief episode, but one capturing an intense period of political dialogue and building on my 
experience in Fiji during the 2000 political crisis.  The constructivist approach to ethnicity 
suggests a multi-dimensional analysis of ethnic politics.  Historical, anthropological and 
socio-economic statistical accounts are thus incorporated as contexts for my focus on political 
dialogue.  The latter was explored through political manifestos, newspapers and more than 30 
interviews with senior party candidates, former political actors, academics, and officials from 
the Great Council of Chiefs, Fijian Administration, military, unions, business associations, 
churches and non-governmental organisations.  These were complemented by numerous 
informal political discussions and observations from campaigning and voting.  Life 
experiences also helped put the election in context: people typically turned first to sports in 
their newspapers; and one village friend frustrated with frequent elections exclaimed, “Who is 
governing now?  Why can’t they stay?” 
My approach to research is detailed in the Appendix.  Briefly, it drew on the insights 
of interactionist theory to recognise that research is, to some degree, a process of generating 
                                                 
2 See Young (1993:25-6) distinguishing socio-economic cleavages from class-consciousness. 
3 I use ‘ethnic’ rather than the ‘race’ terminology that characterises common parlance to de-emphasise the immutability of 
these socially constructed divisions. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 16 
 
 
meaning (Foddy 1993:19-21).  This aspect remains in tension with the extent to which 
research accesses existing perspectives of respondents.  I addressed this tension by attempting 
to remain critically aware of how respondents’ constructions of me and my research purpose 
might influence their selective articulation of particular views from their broader l ife 
experience.  Political actors with non-racial platforms probably constructed me as identifying 
with their values and struggles to replicate ‘my’ liberal democracy.  To ethnic nationalists, my 
being Australian (with ‘insensitive’ foreign policies) and researching from Britain (causing 
Fiji’s multi-ethnic dilemma) was probably not conducive to their anticipating sympathy.  My 
outsider status, however, also provided access to a broader range of elite actors than many 
locally situated students could have sought.  Additionally, being young and even female 
encouraged respondents to cast me as a student receptive to help, not a foreigner seeking to 
dictate (Razavi 1992:158).  The evidence produced by my research should be read in this 
light.  My English-language restriction did not prove problematic for this short-term research 
aimed at national political dialogue.  My writing of ‘Indigenous Fijians’ and ‘Indo-Fijians’, 
rather than the ‘Fijians’ and ‘Indians’ of common parlance, implies my bias that all Fiji 
citizens are entitled to a common political identity. 
The following chapter outlines the theories of ethnicity applied by other political 
analysts to Fiji and explores why the constructivist approach is useful in my research.  
Chapter III provides a historical overview of the political deployment of ideologies of 
paramountcy and equality, including the demographic, institutional and political economy 
contexts of their formation and salience.  The chapter also demonstrates how constructions of 
history support different political rights claims.  The fourth chapter focuses on the 2001 
election campaign to analyse the spectrum of meanings attributed to paramountcy and 
equality, by whom and how they are manifest in policy prescriptions.  It draws mainly on 
political manifestos, campaign speeches and newspaper reports, but is also informed by 
perspectives from formal and informal interviews.  Chapter V then explores areas of 
incompatibility and potential overlap between these concepts in political, cultural, socio-
economic and resource spheres.  Its analysis draws largely on formal interviews. 
These elements are brought together in a final chapter drawing out the conclusions of 
the thesis.  It argues that there is potential for compatible interpretations of paramountcy and 
equality to underpin common citizenship of an inclusive national polity in Fiji.  Given their 
centrality to political identities, commensurate meanings of these concepts should be 
emphasised as a resource for building common political identities.  Repudiating either will 
foster exclusivity.  Paramountcy can acknowledge common citizenship, while focusing on 
protecting Indigenous culture and language, and remedying Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage.  Enabling Indigenes to benefit from their land ownership is also crucial to their 
inclusion in economic development.  Equality can underpin conceptions of common 
individual political rights, while respecting group rights to culture and language protection.  It 
must, however, extend beyond formal political equality to equality of opportunities to socio-
economic wellbeing.  Intra-ethnic fragmentation evident in contemporary political contests, 
maligned by ethnic leaders, can be a resource for forging multi-ethnic platforms in political 
dialogue.  These must accommodate ethnic identities, however, rather than denying them.  
Divisive elite interests and the state’s increasing role in differentiating ethnic group 
opportunities are not the only factors impeding political inclusiveness in Fiji.  Non-elites QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 17 
 
 
rationally identify with institutions that have historically mobilised their support and currently 
represent or symbolise their interests.  It is toward these institutions that reconstruct ethnic 




THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
APPLIED TO THE ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN FIJI 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter analyses the approaches to ethnicity that academics apply to politics in 
Fiji.  It relates these to the theoretical literature on ethnicity, to identify their foundations, 
insights and limitations.  This broader literature has arisen from recognition that ethnicity 
presents a persistent phenomena growing in importance worldwide.  Liberals and Marxists 
alike have thus had to confront their assumption that the ‘residual primordial tie’ of ethnicity 
would disappear when exposed to modern political, social and economic systems (Lonsdale 
1994:132).  The spectrum of academic approaches to ethnicity in Fiji corresponds to Young’s 
(1993:22-4) theoretical schema: instrumentalism, primordialism and constructivism.  
Applications frequently combine aspects from different theories, however, and the theories 
themselves are not discrete but merely characterise varied and overlapping frameworks.  This 
chapter shows the constructivist approach to be a useful framework for analysing the 
deployment of paramountcy and equality in political dialogue in Fiji, appropriately 
elucidating the role of political actors.  Specific attention is given to theories of the role of 
ideology in ethnic politics, and core aspects of Indigenous and human rights ideologies are 
introduced.  It argues that to understand adherence to ethnic ideologies, their historical and 
contemporary contexts need exploration.  Constructivism underpins the methodological 
approach of subsequent chapters, relating political dialogue in Fiji to its historical, social, 
cultural, economic and institutional contexts. 
B.  Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnicity in Fiji 
Instrumentalists analyse ethnicity as an effective tool in competition for social, 
political and economic resources in contemporary state structures (Rothschild 1981:2).  Its 
neo-Marxist strand pervades academic writing on Fiji, emphasising class over ethnic divisions 
and focusing on the mobilisation of ethnic sentiment by elites in their own interests.  Howard 
(1991:5-6) describes his approach as focusing: 
…on the economic basis and political manipulation of communalism in relation to intra-class 
and inter-class collaboration and rivalry…Fiji’s ruling oligarchy has sought to promote 
communalism in an effort to undermine threatening class cohesion from below…[It provides] 
an example of very successful conscious manipulation of a polity. 
Similarly, Lawson (1991:279,282) describes the 1987 overthrow of Bavadra’s Labour 
coalition: 
[R]ace…has been used deliberately to incite fear and insecurity amongst Fijians by playing on 
their ignorance and, no doubt, in many cases, their existing prejudices…Bavadra’s coalition 
had, to some extent, been successful in opening up a new kind of discourse by changing the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 19 
 
 
emphasis from race to issues concerning socio-economic class, social justice, and commonality 
of interests between races. 
These academics reject ‘myths’ of communal homogeneity and focus their analysis on intra-
ethnic divergences of interest, attempts to form multi-ethnic class coalitions and elite counter-
attempts to undermine them (Lawson 1990:795).  Neo-Marxists also draw attention to the role 
of foreign capital in Fiji’s political economy, obscured by Indigenous/Indo-Fijian dichotomies 
(Samy 1976b:27). 
Neo-Marxist instrumentalism is valuable for deconstructing political discourse 
according to underlying economic and political interests.  It is excessively dismissive, 
however, of the rationality of non-economic social, cultural and institutional determinants of 
ethnic identities (Connor 1984:8-10).  It is also weak at explaining why non-elites repeatedly 
respond to ethnic appeals, beyond assertions of their ‘ignorance’.   An alternative 
instrumentalist framework offers some answers, analysing ethnic groups as effective ‘tools’ 
for the pursuit of  group interests in economic competition within states sensitive and 
responsive to ethnic claims
4 (Roosens 1989:14; Despres 1975a:91).  Melson and Wolpe 
(1970:1115) and Nagel and Olzak (1982:127) identify aspects of modernising states and 
economies that are conducive to the emergence of competitive ethnic interests, emphasising 
urbanisation and an expanded state role in society.  In extreme, the approach regards ethnic 
groups simply as interest affiliations (Bell 1975:142,169).  The framework offers several 
insights, including exploring how elites generate ideologies and manipulate cultural resources 
to mobilise supporters and legitimate ethnic claims (Brass 1991:8,15).  Ethnic groups also are 
appreciated for their potential to integrate communities into broader society (Rothschild 
1981:258).  Analysing ethnicity as the pursuit of group interest can obscure intra-ethnic 
differences, however.  It typically replaces problematic neo-Marxist explanations of 
adherence based on false consciousness with equally problematic explanations based on 
individuals rationally choosing advantageous identities (Glazer and Moynihan 1975:16).  The 
state is typically treated as an arbiter of claims, rather than a material and symbolic resource, 
or competitor in its own right (Newman 1991:460).  Both Neo-Marxist and interest-group 
instrumentalism are limited by taking the ethnic group as a given, when it requires 
explanation. 
C.  Primordialist Approaches to Ethnicity in Fiji 
Primordialism focuses attention on understanding the psychological and cultural 
dimensions of ethnicity to explain the ‘unaccountable’ emotive force of its affective tie 
(Geertz 1973:259).  It is manifest in approaches essentialising ethnic groups, epitomised by 
Ravuvu (1991:56-8), describing Indigenous and Indo-Fijians: 
                                                 
4 See Mayer (1963:1-2) for an early application to Fiji of theories of competitive ethnic groups divided by differential state 
incorporation, race, religion and culture.  See also Kapferer (1962), Mamak (1978) and Naidu (1979:9) for sociological 
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[T]heir world views are antithetical to one another.  The two communities are culturally 
different in values, beliefs, and aspirations.  Fijians are by nature very accommodating and this 
quality has been enhanced by adopting Christianity…[Indians] have been very insensitive and 
indifferent to Fijian feelings and to Fijian aspirations to again become masters of their country. 
Its insights are into the strength of ethnic sentiment and the beliefs and values that underpin 
ties within ethnic groups.  It seeks cultural origins for political claims, and probes why 
supporters identify with ethnic leaders.  It recognises the importance o f non-economic 
dimensions of ethnicity, particularly competition for social symbols of prestige, inter-group 
status and political legitimacy (Horowitz 2000:131; Gurr 1970:24).  Primordialism also 
explores the cultural material with which elites reinforce essentialist notions of selves and 
others, an essentialism characterising the worldviews of a significant proportion of Fiji’s 
population.  Ravuvu (1991:57) accurately depicts the reciprocal negative stereotyping of the 
other and positive valorisation of the self that Fiji citizens employ daily.
5  Indigenous Fijians 
typically valorise themselves as carefree, generous and preferring to redistribute than 
accumulate; whereas Indo-Fijians denigrate them as lazy, pound-foolish and unable to think 
beyond today.  Indo-Fijians typically valorise themselves as smart, frugal and able to plan for 
tomorrow; whereas Indigenes denigrate them as crafty, greedy and calculating.  Toren 
(1999:36) argues that Indigenous cultural constructions of these ideal dichotomies grew from 
Indigenous/European oppositions to now refer to ‘Indians’. 
Primordialist theory fails to delineate heterogeneity within ethnic groups, and the 
associated divergences of interests, values and worldviews.  It instead focuses on identifying 
foundations for  group solidarity, including religion, race, language, history and common 
descent
6 (Geertz 1973:261-73).  This impedes its capacity to explain the differential intensity 
of sentiment among group members, or contemporary ethnicities unrelated to any primordial 
features (Bayart 1993:51).  It also explores cultural foundations for political claims without 
recognising that representations of culture are selective and constructed in particular political, 
social and economic contexts.  Cultural bases of political ideologies are instead presented as 
ahistorical or timeless, as in Ravuvu’s (1991:82) description of Indigenes ceding Fiji: 
[T]hey were of one mind to put their trust in the British Crown to rule Fiji fairly and justly.  
They did this in the fervent hope that one day they would be in a much better position to hold 
the reigns of government in their own country once again. 
Yet ‘tradition’ can be imposed on history as much as history reveals tradition.  Even the 
notion of tradition itself can change, with ethnographer Toren (1999:45,63) arguing that the 
Indigenous equivalent cakacaka vakavanua is literally ‘acting in the manner of the land.’  
Politicising tradition as if from an immutable past contradicts cakacaka vakavanua, which 
accepts change if it embodies culturally appropriate behaviour.  Primordialism shares with 
instrumentalism failure to question the existence of ethnic groups (Young 1993:23).  It takes 
ethnic ties as givens and seeks in social contexts the factors that activate them, typically an 
increasingly impersonal modernity that prompts a search for security and belonging (Geertz 
                                                 
5 See Despres (1975a:106) for similar observations of daily disparaging ethnic stereotyping in Guyana. 
6 See Horowitz (2000:53), Smith (1981:66) and van den Berghe (1978:405,409) on how kinship forges mutually exclusive 
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1973:258-60; Smith 1981:53).  Horowitz (2000:64,131), for example, emphasises their 
ascriptive nature, penetration into every realm of life, and importance in competition for 
symbols of prestige and status to account for their potency. 
D.  Constructivist Approaches to Ethnicity in Fiji 
Young (1993:23) labels as constructivist approaches positing ethnicity as a cultural 
and historical  process, akin to Anderson’s (1991:6) conception of nations as ‘imagined 
communities’.  Without refuting instrumentalist or primordialist insights from enquiring what 
ethnicity does or is, constructivists ask a different question: how do politically mobilised 
ethnic identities come to exist?  Corresponding with this framework is Lal’s (1992:3) 
historical treatment of ethnicity in Fiji, examining processes forming ethnic groups, 
reconstructing them over time and redefining ethnic consciousness.  These include first, the 
interests and characters of ideologues and political actors who continually mobilise and 
redefine ethnic groups.  Second, the cultural resources and memories that these redefinitions 
draw on and transform.  Third, the social, economic and belief-system contexts in which 
adherents identify with ethnic groups.  Fourth, the formation of ethnically structured 
institutions and ideologies that propel and constrain ethnicity in the future.  Other 
constructivist analyses depict how colonial designations of ethnic categories initiated the 
formation of not-previously-existing ethnic groups, and trace the redefinition of group 
boundaries over time (Naidu 1996:1-2; 1988:398-403).  Thomas (1992a:213-5) details the 
processes by which particular aspects and practices of culture are objectified and made 
emblematic of a whole life-way in encounters with cultural others.
7  These selective processes 
are governed by the context of encounters, including the power configurations between 
different actors that are notably unequal in colonial and capitalist encounters.
8 
These applications to Fiji reflect the broader constructivist literature.  Vail (1989:6), 
for example, argues for an approach relating ethnic ideologies and their constructions of the 
past to the current realities experienced by supporters.  He identifies how ideological 
frameworks articulated by intellectuals and linked to practice by political actors become 
relevant to the experiences of adherents ( ibid:11).  The approach questions how the 
experiences of supporters facilitate their perceiving their ethnicity as systematically affecting 
their place in society.  Bayart (1993:51,56) analyses the process of identity formation as 
contested, with ethnic elites both reflecting and affecting supporters.  Analysis thus looks 
beyond elite constructions to re-appropriations by adherents (Ranger 1994:24-7).  Lonsdale 
(1994:131-137), for example, identifies how changes in inter-group relations, markets, 
colonial states and language codification affected the reconstruction of African ethnicities.  
                                                 
7 Thomas does not restrict objectification processes to colonial encounters – cultural ‘others’ encountered in pre-colonial 
Pacific trade, warfare and migration ensured an extensive pre-colonial history of identity-formation processes.  Additionally, 
objectification can occur against environmental ‘others’ and along internal axes of difference, including gender, age, kinship 
and region (Linnekin 1983:250). 
8 See also Roosens (1989:12) and Brass (1991:25) on how objectifications selectively define groups, objectifications that by 
definition do not encompass the entire culture. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 22 
 
 
He distinguishes between intra-group ‘moral ethnicities’ arising from daily social practice and 
inter-group ‘political tribalism’ competing in wider political and economic spaces.  Norton 
(1990:4-5; 1993:188) approaches Indigenous Fijian ethnicity similarly, distinguishing the 
identity sustained within Indigenous society through daily enactment of cultural meanings and 
practices, from the identity defined in competitive opposition to other groups.  He regards the 
strength of the former as mitigating aggressiveness in the l atter, particularly because 
Indigenous chiefs both embody internal cultural identities and mediate the Indigenous 
interests they represent in the wider political economy.  Thus, chiefs both symbolise and 
restrain Indigenous ethnicity.
9 
Constructivism explains adherence to ethnic elites without resorting to false-
consciousness or assuming homogeneous group interests.  Instead, it recognises that ethnic 
identities are continually reconstructed to accord with the social, institutional and economic 
experiences and beliefs of supporters.  Both material and ideal interests contain imperatives 
shaping adherents’ political identifications (Norton 1990:4).  It recognises intra-ethnic axes of 
difference
10 and avoids essentialism, raising the ire of ethnic elites promoting essentialist 
identities (Roosens 1989:18).  Treating ethnicity as a social construct does not attempt to 
undermine the immediacy of ethnic consciousness for adherents or, necessarily, the 
conviction of ethnic elites.  It does not reduce ethnic identities to ‘inventions’ (Ranger 
1983:212), but analyses the processes by which they have developed (Thomas 1992b:71-3).  
Constructivism is useful for analysing political dialogue in Fiji because it recognises how the 
formulation of ethnic political claims is both constrained and enabled by changing social, 
economic and institutional contexts.  It also acknowledges that political dialogue both draws 
on and reworks cultural constructs, providing a framework that encompasses the role of 
ideologues.  Appropriately f or this study, it emphasises the importance of analysing ethnic 
ideologies to understand ethnic politics (Newman 1991:467). 
E.  The Role of Ideology in Ethnic Politics 
Breuilly (1993:13,54) argues that ideology provides a mode of perception that 
connects people’s experiences to society as a whole: “a conceptual map which enables people 
to relate their particular material and moral interests to a broader terrain of action.”  Analysing 
ethnic ideology involves exploring how notions of the ethnic community are translated into 
ideological forms, simplified, rendered symbolically, and resonate with adherents.  Ethnic 
ideology emerges from ongoing interactions between existing cultural material, political 
rendering and the experiences of supporters with which the products must be relevant (Vail 
1989:11).  Given that ethnic ideologies are formulated in and for the purposes of the present, 
                                                 
9 See also Linnekin and Poyer’s (1990:12) distinction in the Pacific between understandings of ethnic identity from daily life 
and understandings of ethnicity in the political sphere.  The former are based on consocial personhood – the person as a node 
in social relationships – where the latter are based on Darwinian personhood – defined by blood descent. 
10 Gender differences are particularly important for ethnic group construction, not only because of the construction of gender 
roles in socialising the young, but because genders are often ascribed different capacities to pass on group membership, thus 
being critical to defining group boundaries (Sapiro 1993:40-2). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 23 
 
 
understanding the context of these processes is vital.  Ethnic ideologies can resonate with 
adherents because they draw on existing beliefs and practices.  However, the selective process 
transforming and politicising culture means popular accord is not guaranteed (Breuilly 
1993:68-9).  Rather, control over symbolic resources is contested, potential adherents may 
challenge and even reject reified aspects of their culture, and alternative reifications by 
counter-elites are always possible.  Adherents also hold the power to  interpret ideologies 
deployed by elites (Thomas 1992a:223; Brass 1991:75,293).  If aspects of culture become 
emblems of whole life-ways during encounters with cultural others, the existence of such 
encounters at non-elite levels in Fiji’s contemporary society offers numerous loci for 
competing ideological constructions (Thomas 1992a:212). 
A focus on domestic actors and contexts should not obscure the broader intellectual 
sphere from which ideas are drawn, or the international arena in which sub-national claims are 
articulated (Nagel and Olzak 1982:138).  Ethnic ideology mirrors nationalist ideology in its 
capacity to become ‘modular’ and shift to new contexts where it interacts with local ‘political 
and ideological constellations’ (Anderson 1991:4).  The ideal of popular sovereignty 
underpinning political legitimacy has become an intellectual foundation for ethnic self-
determination claims.
11  The process whereby abstract intellectual concepts are incorporated 
and imbued with meaning in local practice is illustrated in Fiji by the interpretation of 
Indigenous self-determination rights as rights to political priority.  The ideal that popular 
sovereignty of all citizens legitimises rule, with which Indigenous self-determination contests, 
has vastly different implications in Fiji (Connor 1973:5-6).  Both sovereignty of peoples 
(underpinning Indigenous self-determination) and of citizens (underpinning democracy), exist 
in tension with individual and minority group rights conceived from a liberal concern to limit 
popular sovereignty (Mamdani 1990:361).  Contemporary dialogue in Fiji is characterised by 
selective interpretations of i nternational rights discourses to legitimise local political 
aspirations.
12  It exemplifies what Mamdani (1990:359) describes as the formulation of the 
content of rights in particular historical and social contexts of perceived oppression.  In Fiji, 
analysts must go beyond identifying where group rights may be used to subordinate 
individual members, rather than governing relations with majority groups or the state 
(Thompson 1997:787-8; Kymlicka and Straehle 1999:77).  It is also necessary to identify 
where Indigenous group rights subordinate non-Indigenes, and universal individual rights 
promote sectional interests. 
                                                 
11 Connor (1973:11) argues that following the anti-colonial deployment of self-determination, ethnic groups re-appropriated 
it against newly independent states.  Self-determination was recognised as a human right of peoples in the 1966 International 
Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural, Rights, when Socialist and developing states dominated 
UN membership.  Though a principle of the 1945 UN Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, composed 
when Western states dominated the UN, did not provide for it (or indeed, any collective rights). (Cassese 1986:303; Bedjaoui 
1987:94) 
12 See D.S. Moore (2000:655-6) on the reworking of global concepts in local political struggles. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 24 
 
 
F.  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework for analysing political dialogue in 
Fiji, approaching ethnicity as a social construct.  It has argued that to understand the relevance 
of ethnic ideologies to supporters, the context of political dialogue must be investigated.  This 
entails exploring the historical construction of ethnic groups and the social, cultural, economic 
and institutional contexts within which ethnic ideologies resonate with the experiences of 
group members.  Analysing ethnic political dialogue involves focusing on political actors who 
construct ideologies from cultural resources and memories, and promote a consciousness 
among supporters that privileges ethnic identities in political action.  Ethnic identities are thus 
constructed as political from among numerous potential axes of difference in peoples’ broader 
social lives, including class and region (Norton 1990:76; Despres 1975b:193).  Chapter III 
provides a historical analysis of the formation, deployment and transformation of ethnic 
ideologies of paramountcy and equality in Fiji.  According with the constructivist approach, it 
relates political dialogue to broader historical processes constructing and redefining the 
boundaries of ethnic groups, and to the demographic, institutional, and economic contexts in 
which these dialogues unfold.  To offset the emphasis on elite dialogue, it explores resistance 
and support for ethnic elites.  Chapters IV and V then focus on contemporary ethnic 
ideologies and their compatibility with a common national identity.  They demonstrate 




THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE 
ON PARAMOUNTCY AND EQUALITY IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
A.  Introduction 
Historically, political dialogue in Fiji has been characterised by contested meanings of 
paramountcy and equality, deployed by shifting constellations of actors.  This chapter 
analyses the history of these ideological constructs, focusing both on the interests they have 
legitimised and the political identities they have shaped (Ratuva 1998:53).  The paramountcy 
of Indigenous interests was entrenched during early colonial rule, but multiple understandings 
of the ‘interests’ held paramount have coexisted and oscillated in strength over time.  Indo-
Fijians have also deployed multiple meanings of equality, in changing historical contexts.  
Recently, Indigenes have re-oriented equality for their socio-economic claims.  The chapter 
follows the methodological implications of constructivist approaches to ethnicity, by 
analysing political dialogue in its social, cultural and institutional context, paying particular 
attention to how meanings of paramountcy and equality have been forged through intersecting 
ideological and political economy forces.  In focusing on the historical origin of paramountcy 
and equality, the chapter demonstrates how ethnically differentiated political identities have 
been constructed around these ideologies.  It thus underpins the central concern of this thesis 
of whether these concepts, crucial to existing political identities, offer foundations for a 
common conception of citizenship and an inclusive national polity. 
B.  Transition to Early Colonial Rule: 1874 to 1910s 
Unconditional cession to the British Crown in 1874 represented a strategic manoeuvre 
for Fiji’s Eastern high chiefs (Lawson 1991:56).  Intense nineteenth-century power struggles 
between leading political units ( matanitu) in Eastern Fiji drew resources from and were 
manipulated by European traders, planters and missionaries.
13  Cession was motivated by 
instability from these struggles and their related failed governance attempts, ‘sales’ of land 
and labour to planters and financial pressures (Lal 1992:9-11).  Indigenous ideologues 
interpret cession as a chiefly sacrifice protecting Indigenous lands and people against 
encroaching settlers; otherwise, leading chief Ratu Cakobau feared, “Fiji will become like a 
piece of driftwood in the sea, and be picked up by the first passer-by.” (Cited in Ravuvu 
1991:14)  Persuaded of Fiji’s strategic and economic potential, Britain accepted.
14  Sections 4 
                                                 
13 Traders operated in Fiji from the early 1800s; the first missionaries arrived in 1835 (Lawson 1991:47).  Thomas 
(1992a:220) argues that the conversion of Eastern and coastal Viti Levu chiefs occurred only after Christianity became 
congruous with Indigenous political strategies and imagined futures. 
14 Britain had, in fact, rejected an 1862 cession offer.  However, strategic considerations relating to Panama Canal routes, 
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and 7 of the Deed of Cession provided Crown proprietorship of lands not alienated and 
neither occupied nor required by a ‘tribe’, and recognition of the rights and interests of the 
high chiefs party to the Deed (Lal 1992:29).  These provisions did not guarantee Indigenous 
ownership of u noccupied lands or paramountcy for the Indigenous people, provisions 
‘inextricably associated’ with the Deed after cession and echoing through subsequent political 
history (Lawson 1991:59). 
The paternalistic colonial orthodoxy established under Fiji’s first Governor, Sir Arthur 
Gordon, emerged from a convergence of factors.  Gordon’s 1875 arrival found the rudiments 
of indirect rule already instituted in the interim by the New South Wales Governor.  Ruling 
through Indigenous power structures was expedient for the new regime facing severe finance 
and personal constraints (Howard 1991:25).  Reinforcing chiefly hierarchy and Indigenous 
land ownership also fostered chiefly cooperation and popular acquiescence in an environment 
pervaded by distrust and insecurity during the 1975 measles epidemic (Ratuva 1998:55-6).  
Philosophies of racial and cultural superiority provided the Crown with moral legitimacy as 
trustee of the Indigenous people, respecting chiefly reliance in the Deed “on the justice and 
generosity of H er Majesty in dealing with the subject people, to promote civilisation and 
Christianity.” (Cited in Lal 1992:11)  Gordon had himself demonstrated a predisposition for 
defending the vulnerable in Governorships of Trinidad and Mauritius (Lawson 1991:61; Lal 
1992:12).
15  These forces converged in Gordon’s mission to uphold the paramountcy of 
Indigenous ‘interests’, defined as preserving the traditional values, livelihoods and political 
structures of a romanticised communal society.  Indigenes were to be insulated from ‘modern’ 
competitive and ‘dehumanising’ pressures; their institutions used to manage their affairs, 
preserve their ‘self-respect’ and avoid their ‘suspicion’ (Lal 1992:14).  Gordon found 
conservative sympathies among his officials, notably Ratu Cakobau’s previous advisor 
Thurston who entrenched the orthodoxy as Governor from 1888-1897 (Howard 1991:29). 
Colonial favour empowered the voices of Eastern chiefly males, with whom 
Europeans had interacted for decades, in the dialogue that codified Fijian society for state 
purposes (Thomas 1992a:221-2).  Eastern chiefs have subsequently retained privileged 
control over cultural meanings, with important power implications (see Keesing 1987:165).  
Although well aware of regional differences in customs, officials privileged Polynesian-style 
rigid social and political hierarchies typical of the Eastern islands and coastal Viti Levu, and 
amenable to colonial rule (Chapelle 1976:483; Kaplan and Kelly 1994:131).  An Eastern 
missionary-developed dialect became the lingua franca ‘Fijian’, and codified ‘Indigenous’ 
social structures were applied as administrative units (Lawson 1991:67-8).  These processes 
systematically disadvantaged Western and central regions isolated from Eastern political 
units, not party to cession and partially subjugated by force.  Their more egalitarian customs 
and smaller, decentralised political units were subordinated (Norton 1990:20; Linnekin and 
Poyer 1990:10).  Fluid land-holdings responsive to forces of demography, alliance and 
                                                                                                                                                        
commercial potential, a sense of civilising mission and even humanitarian protests in London over the Pacific labour trade, 
altered the decision in 1874 (Lawson 1991:49-55). 
15 In Mauritius, however, Carroll (1994:318-9) argues that the vulnerable Gordon defended against planters were indentured 
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warfare were frozen and made inalienable to mataqali social groupings, provisions intensely 
contested in intra-Indigenous debates (Thomas 1992a:222).
16  Gordon attributed to the Deed 
of Cession a convention providing Indigenous ownership of unoccupied lands, fixing 83% of 
Fiji’s territory under Indigenous control.
17  Lal (1992:14) argues this degree of protection of 
Indigenous lands, institutions and customs was unparalleled in the colonial world.  
Preservation existed in tension with reform, however.  The latter predominated where 
Indigenous traditions or practices were unacceptable to Christian principles or European 
standards.  Gordon also maintained the ambiguity that paramountcy was temporary protection 
to stabilise Indigenous society before transition to modern life (ibid:15-6).  Divorced from the 
imperatives generating it, however, paramountcy as the preservation of traditional chiefly, 
communal and land structures became orthodoxy.  Its assumed cultural homogeneity provided 
a unifying force for chiefs constructing an Indigenous identity (Lawson 1991:90). 
Contests over paramountcy within the administration and against settlers helped define 
its various meanings.  Dissenting officials criticised colonial reinforcement of chiefly power 
and communal production, arguing it encouraged exploitation, hampered enterprise and was 
based on fallacious stereotypes of lazy, thriftless Indigenes (Howard 1991:25).  Mixing 
evidence with individualist ideologies, they sought to redefine paramountcy as the promotion 
of Indigenous interests by advancing the socio-economic development of all Indigenes (Lal 
1992:21-31).
18  Governor Sir Everard im Thurn (1804-1809) reduced chiefly exactions and 
communal control of labour, against resistance from administrative chiefs defending 
Gordon’s orthodoxy (Chapelle 1976:482).  His attempts to alienate unoccupied land were 
revoked by the Colonial Office under the influence of Gordon, now in the House of Lords 
(Howard 1991:38).  Dissatisfied planters also contested colonial regulation of Indigenous 
labour and land.  Conservative interpretations of paramountcy were strengthened by their 
deployment against planters, at a time when the Crown also used its Indigenous trusteeship to 
reject European demands for responsible government (Lal 1992:36).  The tension between 
conservative and reformist approaches to paramountcy continued throughout colonial and 
independence history.  The resulting compromise involved no serious reorientation of policy 
or restructuring of established institutions (Lawson 1991:116; Lal 1992:69).  What allowed 
for the separation of state revenue needs from capital interests in Indigenous labour was 
Gordon’s introduction of Indian labour in 1879 (Norton 1990:36).  When the Indian 
Government halted indenture in 1916, 62,837 Indians had come to Fiji, approximately 60% 
remaining as settlers (Mayer 1963:14).  Their political future was ill considered. 
The foundation for Indian political rights claims to equality was laid by their separate 
incorporation into the colonial state.  Administered, settled and eventually educated apart 
from Indigenous Fijians, their status derived from their economic role, completing the 
analogy of Fiji as a ‘three-legged stool’ supported by European capital, Fijian land and Indian 
                                                 
16 In several regions of Fiji, land had been held by family groups (i tokatoka) or even by individuals (Chapelle 1976:481). 
17 Much of the best agricultural land had already been alienated, but about half of it was returned to Indigenous owners by a 
Native Lands Commission established to investigate purported ‘sales’ (Mayer 1963:10). 
18 An Acting Governor in 1922 said, “So far he [Indigenous Fijian] is said to have been happy to remain in his old groove.  
Will he remain so as the world progresses around him?  I doubt it.” (Cited in Lal 1992:68) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 28 
 
 
labour (Norton 1990:41).  Enduring considerable violence, with indentured women 
particularly vulnerable, they initially lacked educational facilities and political representation 
(Lal 1992:42-3).  Colonial guarantees of protection were made only to secure the flow of 
labour, particularly as I ndian Government investigations revealed systematic abuses and 
eroding cultural and religious practices (Mayer 1963:20-1).  An 1875 despatch from Secretary 
of State for Colonies, Lord Salisbury, had assured India that labourers completing contracts 
and remaining in the colonies would be ‘free men’ with ‘privileges no whit inferior’ to other 
Crown subjects (Lawson 1991:130-1).
19  The Salisbury despatch has ‘echoed’ through Fiji’s 
history as a charter of Indian rights, founded on equality (Lal 1992:16).  Indenture living 
conditions virtually shattered caste occupational and social organisation, acting as a 
‘merciless leveller’ of hierarchy and forging a social experience amenable to equality (Lal 
1992:40).
20  Political deployment of equality was motivated by economic exploitation, and 
social and political exclusion (Lawson 1991:72).  It arose in the 1910s era of re-emergent 
social and political consciousness following the dislocation of indenture.  Homogenous 
treatment by the state and a  lingua franca of debased  Hindi did not, however, forge 
unanimity.  Leaders from India who spearheaded the establishment of schools and religious 
institutions also provided the impetus for distinctions between majority Hindus and minority 
Muslims,
21 and reformist (Arya Samaji) and orthodox Hindus (Mayer 1963:43-4).  Later 
arriving South Indian recruits suffered discrimination by North Indians.  Free settlers from 
Gujarat and the Punjab remained socially aloof, resented in their business professions by 
indentured Indians who largely remained in cane farming (Jayawardena 1980:437).  In the 
expanded political space of the post-indenture period, these cleavages have shaped Indian 
rights struggles. 
Indian political consciousness and agitation began in this context of emergent social 
organisation.  Leaders attacked racist social and legal discrimination, sought political 
representation and claimed equal status with Europeans as Crown subjects (Norton 1990:40).  
From 1904 the Legislative Council had included six elected Europeans and two Indigenes 
nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), created by Gordon as the highest advisory 
body on Indigenous affairs (Lawson 1991:85).  Whereas the Crown had previously deployed 
paramountcy to deflect European claims to responsible government, Europeans now re-
oriented paramountcy to deflect Indian threats to European racial and political privilege.  At 
the same time, Indigenes were oriented against Indians (Carroll 1994:307).  Europeans 
constructed the ‘immigrant race’ as threatening Indigenous paramountcy while their race, not 
merely the Crown, protected it (Norton 1990:37-8).  These changing contexts of social, 
political and economic competition impelled redefinitions of paramountcy and equality 
throughout the colonial period. 
                                                 
19 The Indian Government rejected the purpose of the despatch – its assistance with recruiting indentured labourers – and did 
not refer to this provision in its future agreement to indenture labour for Fiji.  The Salisbury Despatch thus holds little legal 
weight as a basis for Indian rights.  The 1910 Colonial Office Sanderson Report, however, wrote of Fiji: “The present 
administration fully recognises the value of Indians as permanent settlers, and is willing to concede them the enjoyment of 
equal civil rights.” (Cited in Lawson 1991:131) 
20 An attempt to reconcile the virtue of caste in India (valorised as based on mutual respect and religious hierarchy) with 
Indian claims to equality against discrimination in Fiji (denigrated as based on wealth and colour) is found in the press of the 
time (The Indian Settler March-April 1917, reproduced in Lal 1992:49). 
21 Hindus comprise 78% of Indo-Fijians, with Muslims comprising 16% and Christians 6% (Carroll 1994:305). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 29 
 
 
C.  Colonial Rule: 1920s to 1950s 
The variety of meanings attached to equality is illustrated by 1920s debates over 
political representation.  Recent migrants, imbued with anti-colonial sentiment, vigorously 
asserted Indo-Fijian rights.  Without municipal representation, agitation  was channelled 
through militant unions and central colonial structures (Mayer 1963:108).  Paradoxically, 
struggles for equal status for Indians, an increasing proportion of whom were Fiji-born, were 
assisted by the Indian Government via the Colonial Office (Lal 1992:74).  One deployment of 
equality demanded racial parity of political representation with Europeans.  The Governor 
reluctantly accepted pseudo-parity in 1929, balancing six communally elected Europeans with 
three communally elected Indo-Fijians a nd three nominated Indigenes.  Once in the 
Legislative Council, Indo-Fijians leaders deployed  individual equality, proposing an 
egalitarian conception of the status of subjects and a common electoral roll (Mayer 1963:42; 
Kaplan and Kelly 1994:139).  This claim encapsulated an ideology of non-discrimination, an 
aim to deconstruct communal segmentation, and strategic advantage for a population 
politically subordinated by Europeans whom they outnumbered more than ten-fold.  It 
fleetingly offered enfranchisement for Indigenous Fijians, and for ethnic minorities excluded 
from three-way racial categorisations.  Fearing the ‘immigrant’ race and opposing commoner 
voting, chiefs allied with the European targets of the claim, deploying Indigenous 
paramountcy against t he common roll and equality (Norton 1990:39).  Indian political 
representation was interpreted as compromising the Deed of Cession, where European 
representation did not (Lal 1992:91).  This reinforced an emerging construction of cession as 
the transfer of sovereignty to the European race, thus excluding other races from government 
(Lawson 1991:140).  Fuelling Indigenous fears in their own interests, Europeans described 
equality as a ‘velvet covering’ for ‘steel claws’ seeking Indo-Fijian control of Fiji (Lal 
1992:92).  This representation was reinforced by the 1936 census, confirming Indo-Fijians 
would soon outnumber Indigenes (Mayer 1963:60).  Muslims and orthodox Hindus also 
opposed the common roll, equating individual equality with domination by majority Arya 
Samajis, divisions also demonstrated in future debates over the meaning of equality (Lawson 
1991:151-3).  Table 2 summarises changes in population and political representation in Fiji in 
the Twentieth Century. 
Indigenous chiefs played critical roles in these political contests.  Paramountcy had 
empowered them vis-à-vis commoners and provided their interest in the colonial state.  
Rebellions in central and Western Fiji occurred from the 1870s onwards, challenging both the 
exploitation of commoners by chiefs and the communal system, and the domination of 
Indigenous society by Eastern chiefs and Europeans (Howard 1991:26-36).
22  Celebrated 
millenarian Apolosi Nawai promoted an alternative understanding of paramountcy as 
economic autonomy and development for ordinary Indigenes (Norton 1990:65).  Although 
opposed by chiefly, church, Crown and capital coalitions, such resistance by Western 
commoners to exploitative ‘traditional’ systems continued to contest the meaning of 
                                                 
22 These movements were also typically ambivalent or opposed to the presence of ‘Indians’ in Fiji, but more directly 
threatened chiefs, European capital and the Crown (Lal 1992:50). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 30 
 
 




Table 2: Historical Summary of Population and Political Representation 
 
Non-Officialc Members of the Legislative Council, 
then House of Representatives from 1970. 
 
1904 6 Europeans (electedd); 
  2 Indigenous Fijians (nominated by GCC). 
 
1916 7 Europeans (elected); 
  2 Indigenous Fijians (nominated by GCC); 
  [1 Indo-Fijian nominatede official member]. 
 
1929 6 Europeans (elected); 
  3 Indo-Fijians (elected); 
  3 Indigenous Fijians (nominated by GCC). 
 
1936 5 Europeans (3 elected, 2 nominated); 
  5 Indo-Fijians (3 elected, 2 nominated); 
  5 Indigenous Fijians (nominated by GCC). 
 
1963 6 Europeans (4 elected, 2 nominated); 
  6 Indo-Fijians (4 elected, 2 nominated); 
  6 Indigenes (4 elected, 2 nominated by GCC). 
 
1965 11 Indigenes (9 elected, 2 elected by GCC); 
  9 Indo-Fijians (elected); 
  7 General Electors (elected). 
 
1970 22 Indigenes (12 communal, 10 cross-voting); 
  22 Indo-Fijians (12 communal, 10 cross-voting); 
  8 Gen. Electors (3 communal, 5 cross-voting). 
 
1990 37 Indigenous Fijians (communal); 
  27 Indo-Fijians (communal); 
  5 General Electors (communal); 
  1 Rotumanf (communal). 
 
1997 23 Indigenous Fijians (communal); 
  19 Indo-Fijians (communal); 
  3 General Electors (communal); 
  1 Rotuman (communal); 
  25 ‘Open’ seats (common roll). 
 
 
Source: Constructed from Prasad et al (2001:4); Lal (1992); Lawson (1991); Norton (1990); 1990 and 1997 Constitutions. 
(a) ‘Others’ includes Chinese, Europeans, Part-Europeans, Pacific Islanders, Rotumans and all others.  Where relevant, 
European [Eur] and Rotuman {Rot} sections within the ‘Others’ category are also noted separately. 
(b) The Indigenous population had been 200,000 before cession in 1861, then 114,748 after the measles epidemic in 1881.  
Its lowest level was 84,475 in 1921. 
(c) The Legislative Council had an official majority until 1966, the first elections under the new 1965 arrangement. 
(d) Before 1970, all ‘elected’ representatives were elected from communal rolls. 
(e) ‘Nominated’ means selected by the Governor; the GCC effectively nominated its own representatives, in practice the 
Governor ‘selecting’ the nominees the GCC placed first on its list. 
(f) Rotuma Island was ceded to Britain in 1879, its people possess a distinct history and culture. 
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backbone of the economy, also supported reforms to obtain alternative cane farmers to 
unionised Indo-Fijians.  High chiefs resisted, alarmed by disorder, declining chiefly authority 
attempted to diminish communal regulations, and constrain chiefly power through direct rule 
(Lawson 1991:91-2).  Australian monopolist Colonial Sugar Refineries (CSR), the backbone 
of the economy, also supported reforms to obtain alternative cane farmers to unionised Indo-
Fijians.  High chiefs resisted, alarmed by disorder, declining chiefly authority and reduced 
village control over labour, particularly women’s (Lal 1992:66).  Oxford-educated 
acknowledged leader of Fijian chiefs Ratu Sukuna, for example, rebuked Nawai for applying 
equality to an Indigenous society ‘bristling’ with inequality (Lal 1992:52).  He successfully 
pressed officials to return to indirect rule and tighten ‘native’ regulations in the Fijian 
Administration under a new Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) (Norton 1990:46).  These restrictions, 
at the close of World War Two, provoked considerable resentment in the more open society 
engendered by media access and foreign military personnel, particularly in the West (Lal 
1992:139).  The strength of chiefly and institutional resistance to reform, however, continued 
to prevent numerous reports criticising chiefs and ‘native’ regulations from being 
implemented (Lawson 1991:108-9).  Mayer (1963:95) argues the concentration of Indigenous 
professionals in the church and state impeded the strength of independent educated public 
opinion to counter orthodoxy.  Middle-level chiefs and commoners advanced in institutions 
aimed to preserve ‘traditional’ Indigenous society and hierarchy; emerging sources of 
authority providing alternatives to chiefly hierarchy thus also became staunch defenders of 
conservative orthodoxy. 
The re-orientation of paramountcy against Indo-Fijian claims to equality in political 
dialogue was paralleled in political economy.  Europeans, previously fighting to access 
Indigenous land, exited plantations after the indenture era and then supported paramountcy to 
protect Indigenous land (Lal 1992:35).  The new tenant-smallholder structure of production 
under CSR pitted Indo-Fijians against Indigenous landowners over lease conditions.  Indo-
Fijians thus became the ‘frontline’ for foreign capital against Indigenous protection (Norton 
1990:36-7).  Political cleavages between Indigenous and Indo-Fijians were deepened as chiefs 
supported the Crown by breaking multi-ethnic strikes in Suva and Indo-Fijian strikes in 
Western cane-fields in 1920-21 and 1959-60.
23  These land and labour contests buttressed the 
representation of Indo-Fijians, from debates over political status, as threatening Indigenous 
paramountcy (Norton 1990:40).  This threat operated via the identity of chiefly interests with 
the state.  By 1940 Ratu Sukuna had convinced Indigenous chiefs to entrust land control to a 
chiefly-dominated Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), controlling unoccupied lands and 
overcoming idiosyncrasies in decentralised leasing (ibid:189).  Norton (1990:48) argues this 
exemplifies the moderating force of high chiefs, playing a dual role as rallying points for 
                                                 
23 The 1920-21 strikes were broken by police constabulary involving Indigenous Fijians (Mayer 1963:36-9).  Chiefs exhorted 
Indigenous workers to obey chiefs rather than taking advice from ‘foreigners’ in Suva’s 1959 multi-ethnic strikes (Lawson 
1991:162).  Fiji’s history of militant union leadership in the West contrasts with moderate union leadership in the urban 
Southeast.  Strikes were more difficult to mount and maintain in urban areas, and Suva’s long tradition of multi-racial social 
organisations motivated union leaders who sought social advance to be moderate.  Fiji’s most militant Indo-Fijian leaders 
have originated in the sugar unions of the West.  As the seat of both radical Indigenous movements and radical Indo-Fijian 
unions, the West, paradoxically, also has a long tradition of friendly inter-ethnic relations based on multi-lingual 
communication and shared social lives (Norton 1990:53-4,70). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 33 
 
 
Indigenous land rights  and mediators of Indo-Fijian tenant and commercial needs.  This 
mediation, however, also represents the compromise of chiefly interests as Indigenous leaders 
to their interests vested in the state and economy as colonial officials (Lawson 1991:122). 
The 1946 Legislative Council ‘Deed of Cession Debate’ represents the culmination of 
the re-orientation of Indigenous paramountcy from opposing European political and land 
claims to opposing Indo-Fijian political and land claims.  Following census evidence that 
Indo-Fijians outnumbered Indigenes, a European moved on the latter’s behalf: 
The time has arrived…to emphasise the terms of the Deed of Cession to assure that the 
interests of the Fijian race are safeguarded and a guarantee be given that Fiji is to be preserved 
and kept as a Fijian country for all time. [Cited in Lawson 1991:59] 
The debate emphasised European-Indigenous cooperation to avert ‘Indian domination’.  It 
also drew together Indo-Fijian claims to secure tenancy and equality as threatening the 
paramountcy of Indigenous chiefs, land and communal living.  It forms part of a dialogic 
process whereby cultural  constructs of chiefly authority and land ownership have become 
emblematic of Indigenous identity.  This depends less on the historical accuracy of colonial-
manifestations of these systems, than on their social significance (France, cited in Ratuva 
1998:56).  Indo-Fijian leader A.D. Patel, while exposing European hypocrisy, agreed that in 
conflicts with Indigenes, Indo-Fijians interests should be ‘subservient’ (Lal 1992:143).  A 
modified consensus motion affirmed the Deed as a ‘Charter of the Fijian people’ (Lawson 
1991:59), reinforcing the construction promoted in contemporary politics of the Deed as a 
guarantor of paramountcy.  The debate did not resolve the meaning of paramountcy; 
conservatism and assisted ‘modernisation’ have persisted in tension. 
D.  Achieving Independence: 1960s to 1987 
International de-colonisation pressures in the 1960s hastened Fiji’s independence, 
against the wishes of leading chiefs (Ravuvu 1991:52-3).  Upholding the Queen as ‘chief of 
chiefs’, they feared independence would weaken Indigenous paramountcy (Norton 1990:26).  
Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara, groomed by colonial officials to be Fiji’s first Prime-Minister, 
initially deployed paramountcy to preserve benevolent European rule, or at least exclude from 
negotiations Indo-Fijians not party to the Deed of Cession (Lal 1992:188).  With 
independence imminent, paramountcy was redeployed to mean Indigenous racial privilege 
vis-à-vis Indo-Fijians in the new nation.  Future Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau 
argued Britain should “return Fiji to the Fijians in the same spirit in which the Fijians gave 
Fiji to Great Britain.” (Lal 1992:189-97)  This understanding of paramountcy was congruent 
with numerous expressions of popular Indigenous consciousness during the colonial era.  The 
young Indigenous society Viti Cauravou had long demanded Indigenous control and advance 
to prevent domination by ‘strangers’ (Lal 1992:72).  The GCC had consistently voiced similar 
concerns, in 1933 rejecting any Indian part in ‘matters affecting the interests of the Fijian 
race’ (Lal 1992:92; Howard 1991:117).  Indigenous chiefs, who had previously moderated 
these popular sentiments for the state interest (Norton 1990:45), now articulated them in the 
contest to form a new state power structure.  They offered extreme positions from which to 
bargain during negotiations (Lawson 1991:158).  Ratu Mara’s philosophy was that intractable QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 34 
 
 
ethnic divisions must be managed by institutionalisation to form an inclusive national polity 
(Lawson 1991:197). 
Indo-Fijian demands for a common roll and shared citizenship during independence 
negotiations were premised on equality defined as an individual right (Lal 1992:198).
24  Indo-
Fijian leader Patel rejected the institutionalisation of ethnic divisions, arguing that colonial 
institutions and communal voting artificially divided a populace with cross-ethnic political 
interests (Lal 1992:196).
25  He also drew on Indo-Fijian contributions to Fiji’s development to 
substantiate equal rights; claims vulnerable to reminders of meagre Indo-Fijian contributions 
to the Second World War and insinuations of loyalty to India (Ravuvu 1991:47; Kaplan and 
Kelly 1994:142).  The platform of Patel’s Indo-Fijian Federation Party, emerging from radical 
cane unions, was of class-based struggle against political  and economic oppression (Lal 
1992:179).  Its campaigns in the 1960s for independence, individual equality and a common 
roll were partially directed to the international arena, to affect the terms of independence 
(Norton 1990:61,76-7).  Indigenes construed the Indo-Fijian majority’s common roll demand 
as a threat to paramountcy (Ravuvu 1991:54). 
Contrary to its colonial practice in Fiji, at independence Britain required that all 
subjects become equal citizens.
26  The 1970 constitution thus provided the possibility for an 
inclusive national polity through common citizenship.  It was built, however, on a history of 
racial ideologies and institutions, many of which it preserved.  Adherents to individual 
equality philosophies interpret these institutions as perpetuating ethnic antagonism through 
division (Prasad et al 2001:4); philosophies recognising ethnic group identities interpret them 
as fostering integration through the security of ethnic institutions (Norton 2000b:83).  Instead 
of a common roll, communal seats were combined with national cross-voting seats
27 to 
comprise a lower house with pre-determined ethnic composition (Lawson 1991:173).
28  
‘Fijians’ and ‘Indians’ held equal numbers of seats, with ‘General Electors’ grossly over-
represented relative to their population share [see Table 2].  Melanesians and Pacific Islanders 
were classified with Indigenes as ‘Fijians’, the other minorities as ‘General Electors’.  Land 
ownership was unquestioned in independence negotiations, however control over lease 
conditions was transferred from the NLTB to Parliament (Norton 1990:83).  Within the 
framework of equal citizenship, the Deed of Cession was recognised as providing Indigenous 
paramountcy, meaning the protection of Indigenous customs and political institutions 
(Lawson 1991:59).  In ‘return’ for receiving equal citizenship, Indo-Fijians conceded powers 
                                                 
24 Muslims rejected the central Indo-Fijian demand of a common roll, as they had in 1929, again indicating the extent of 
intra-Indian divisions (Mayer 1963:134). 
25 Horowitz (2000: 628), however, argues that common or communal rolls are only one factor determining whether electoral 
systems encourage multi-ethnic moderation – the method of voting, constituency boundaries and number of members elected 
per constituency are also vital. 
26 As late as 1965, a Governor was quoted as saying he would not have Fijians “under the heels of an immigrant community.” 
(Cited in Lal 1992:188) 
27 Cross-voting seats specified the ethnicity of the candidate but were elected by a national common roll. 
28 The electoral system was intended to be provisional, to overcome lack of agreement between ethnic leaders during the 
1960s.  Ratu Mara’s government, however, did not implement the recommendations of the subsequent Royal Commission, to 
make cross-voting seats into common roll seats (Lawson 1991:186). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 35 
 
 
for GCC nominees to the upper house (Senate) to veto legislation regarding Indigenous 
regulations, lands, fisheries and political representation (Lawson 1991:189-90).  The separate 
Fijian Administration remained.  The negotiated independence effectively transferred 
leadership from colonial officials to administrative chiefs, rather than representing a serious 
attempt at nation-building (Lal 1992:216).  Both Indo-Fijian  and Indigenous leaders were 
accused of treachery by their respective constituents, whose consciousnesses of their rights 
did not accord with the bargain struck (Norton 1990:105; Ravuvu 1991:73).  Indigenous 
acquiescence reflected Ratu Mara’s stature more than their support for an inclusive polity.  
Faith in the protection of paramountcy rested on his rule rather than protective provisions in 
the Constitution, which was never translated into Fijian (Lawson 1991:254).  It forms one 
example of how linguistic segmentation partially structures access to political knowledge in 
Fiji. 
Significant changes in Fiji’s political dialogue occurred in the early independence 
years, underneath the veneer of continuity offered by Ratu Mara’s Prime-Ministership.  The 
Fijian Association wing of his Malaysian-inspired Alliance, accommodating corporate ethnic 
blocks, was gradually dominated by young, well-educated Indigenes of moderate or non-
chiefly stature (Norton 1990:81).  They rejected protective paramountcy in favour of 
aggressive racial privilege.
29  In 1975, inspired by Uganda’s expulsion of Indians, Alliance 
member Butadroka (cited in Lal 1992:235) moved: 
That this House agrees that the time has come when Indians or people of Indian origin in this 
country be repatriated back to India and their travelling expenses back home and compensation 
for their property in this country be met by the British Government. 
Ratu Mara did not support the motion, instead affirming Indo-Fijian rights and economic 
contributions, but he rejected the National Federation Party’s (NFP) amendment upholding 
full citizenship for Indo-Fijians (Lawson 1991:205).  A widely respected Alliance member 
admitted the motion reflected Indigenous conceptions of their paramountcy, stating it echoed 
the ‘soul’ of the Fijian people (Lal 1992:235).  The Alliance had gained almost 25% of Indo-
Fijian communal votes in 1968 and 1972, largely from moderates, Muslims and particularly 
Gujurati businessmen (Lawson 1991:160).  Following 1975, Indo-Fijian support shifted 
further to the NFP, which increasingly championed Indo-Fijian rights, abandoning the multi-
racial class platform never attracting it more than a few percent of Indigenous votes (Lawson 
1991:177).
30  The success of Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party in the 1977  elections 
exposed the discord between multi-racial political ideals and the political identities of a 
significant proportion of Indigenes.  Opposing chiefs as much as Indo-Fijians (Norton 
1990:116), Butadroka strengthened the legitimacy of paramountcy as p romoting the 
Indigenous race rather than preserving traditional institutions. 
                                                 
29 The Fijian Association admitted that their campaigns for the Alliance during elections involved appealing to Indigenous 
sentiment to unite against ‘Indians’, explaining the multi-ethnic Alliance as a clever device for controlling government 
(Norton 1990:88). 
30 Norton (1990:96) describes some limitations of NFP appeal to Indigenous Fijians as their few campaigners fluent in Fijian, 
their requiring official permission (influenced by chiefs) to enter villages to campaign and their tendency to alienate 
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Socio-economic life also faced continuities and discontinuities.  The dominance of 
foreign capital, Gujurati commercial leadership, commodity-export orientation and lack of 
rural development continued (Samy 1976b:25; Norton 1990:27).  Rapid urbanisation provided 
opportunities for commonality in strong multi-ethnic unions, and also inter-ethnic antagonism 
in employment and housing competition.  The stakes of political competition rose as the state 
increasingly apportioned employment and wealth opportunities; at the same time, a successful 
Indigenous entrepreneurial elite emerged reliant on connections with political incumbents 
(Norton 1990:113-23).  The Fiji Labour Party (FLP) formed from the union movement in 
1985 to offer a non-racial platform based on individual equality and non-discrimination, while 
the Alliance and NFP increasingly relied on ethnic appeals (Lawson 1991:236-7).  The FLP 
aimed to forge political identities overwhelming ethnic affiliations from socio-economic 
cleavages, to promote national and regional socio-economic equality.  Its Western-Fijian 
leader Bavadra articulated an ideology separating chiefly hierarchy from individual equality 
in the political sphere (Lal 1992:263).  Alliance opponents countered by arguing he aimed to 
remove chiefs from politics: 
This will destroy the inseparable link between the Turaga [chiefs] and the Vanua [the land and 
the people].  The Turaga and the Vanua were one – one could not exist without the other – the 
chiefs were a bulwark of security for all and custodians of Fijian identity, land and culture. 
[Cited in Lawson 1991:242-3] 
E.  Political Crises: 1987 to 2000 
The transition to FLP-NFP Coalition government in April 1987 appeared to signal the 
acceptance of democratic succession in an inclusive national polity.  After the election, 
however, protests fearing for Indigenous paramountcy and land under Bavadra’s ‘Indian-
dominated’ government intensified.
31  Led by Western-Fijian radical Apisai Tora,
32 their 
placards implied racial exclusivity – ‘Fiji for the Fijians’ – and religious supremacy – ‘Our 
God, Our Land’ (Lal 1992:273).  In the name of Indigenous rights, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rabuka ousted the Coalition by military coup in May, and declared Fiji a republic in a second 
coup in September.
33  Rabuka drew on the Deed of Cession as a guarantee of Indigenous 
paramountcy.  He defined paramountcy as racial privilege, derived from rights to Indigenous 
self-determination and as God’s ‘chosen people’ for the land of Fiji, with Indo-Fijians their 
                                                 
31 The FLP-NFP coalition gained over 10% of its votes from Indigenes, higher than the NFP ever attained alone, but the 
remaining 90% were Indo-Fijian votes (Norton 1990:136).  The composition of parliament ensures any government is 
ethnically biased: the winner, determined by cross-voting, gains most seats in communal electorates (Lawson 1991:220). 
32 Tora, unionist and agitator, is Fiji’s perennial political opportunist.  In the 1960s he campaigned in the UN for Fiji’s 
independence, then claimed domestically that the best protection of Indigenes was to ‘send Indians away to other countries’, 
before merging his radical Western party with the Indo-Fijian Federation Party in 1969 to fight on a class platform as the 
NFP (Lal 1992:197).  He shifted to the Alliance in 1984, before its defeat in 1987 (Durutalo 1999:432). 
33 In the interim, the Governor-General Ratu Penaia was forging a constitutional solution by appeasing Indigenous aspirations 
expressed in the GCC yet retaining links with the Crown.  His progress with Ratu Mara and Bavadra isolated Rabuka, opened 
the possibility for him to be charged with treason, and dissatisfied organisers of the Taukei movement that had staged the 
protest marches surrounding the coup.  A second coup halted negotiations (Lawson 1991:259-72).  Rabuka maintains that his 
actions pre-empted inevitable inter-ethnic violence [Interview: Rabuka 02/08/01]. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 37 
 
 
‘guests’ (Premdas 1991:542).  He thus brought to the centre of political discourse an ideology 
treated as extreme in 1975.  This conception of paramountcy drew on and fostered the 
construct of Indigenousness.  Whilst the Commonwealth condemned the coups, the GCC, 
Methodist Church,
34 Ratu Mara
35 and other Melanesian countries offered their support (Lal 
1992:286; Lawson 1991:262).  Regardless of the power and wealth interests of conspirators 
(see Lal 1992:273),
36 the coup reflected and affected widely held Indigenous identities based 
on paramountcy (Norton 1990:143).  As Governor-General Ratu Penaia reflected, “we are all 
aiming at the same result, generally, but we are considering different methods of achieving 
this.” (Cited in Lal 1992:278) 
Fiji’s 1990 Constitution reflected GCC proposals and entrenched paramountcy as 
Indigenous racial privilege.  Its preamble explicitly rejected 1970 Constitutional provisions 
for protective paramountcy, affirming the right of Indigenes to “govern themselves for their 
advancement and welfare.”  Section 41 guaranteed an Indigenous parliamentary majority [see 
Table 2],
37 with the Presidency, Prime-Ministership and particular ministerial portfolios 
reserved for Indigenes (Lal 1992:322).  It also redefined Indigenous boundaries, excluding 
Melanesians and Pacific Islanders from a ‘Fijian’ classification, now incorporating only 
Indigenes of male descent registered in the  Vola Ni Kawa Bula book of landowners 
(Sect.156).  Section 21 provided systematic affirmative action for Indigenes in education and 
business, copied from Malaysia’s 1957 Constitution (see Lim 1985:256).  Indigenous leaders 
have promoted parallels with Malaysia, whose Indigenous  Bumiputra
38 also claim ‘special 
rights’ to political control and affirmative action.
39  Fiji’s independence is retrospectively 
interpreted as a bargain, implicitly trading Indo-Fijian citizenship for Indigenous political 
control, broken by the 1987 FLP-NFP victory (Lal 1992:287).  Indigenous protests are 
constructed as warnings of the inter-ethnic violence inevitable if their political and socio-
economic aspirations are not realised, and Fiji has used Malaysian models to increase 
Indigenous capital ownership and enterprise (Ratuva 2001:20).  In response to paramountcy 
as Indigenous racial privilege, FLP and NFP leaders strengthened ideologies of individual 
equality, non-discrimination and human rights. 
In the 1990s Rabuka retreated from paramountcy as Indigenous privilege, founding an 
inclusive polity on protective paramountcy.  His shift reflected a convergence of factors, 
                                                 
34 Pro-Rabuka ethno-nationalist Ministers replaced Rev Koroi, Methodist Church President in 1987 who condemned the coup 
and upheld equality.  Otherwise, a disjuncture may have developed between the political aspirations of the 80% of Indigenes 
who are Methodists, and their religious leadership. [Interview: Koroi 07/08/01; Lal 1992:286] 
35 Ratu Mara joined the May cabinet and became Prime-Minister after an unstable September cabinet (Lal 1992:275). 
36 Norton (1990:138) argues that many Indigenes see the coups as an instrument of Tovata confederacy hegemony, which has 
historically dominated the military and had Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia as its paramount chiefs. 
37 The 37 Indigenous communal seats were gerrymandered against the urban Indigenes who undermined unity by voting 
Labour in 1987.  Being 32.7% of Indigenes, they received only 13.5% of the communal seats (Premdas 1993:999). 
38 Literally: ‘sons of the soil’. 
39 The parallels are numerous: Bumiputra special rights in Malaysia originated in British colonial ideologies of protective 
trusteeship, against the immigrant Chinese (Wyzan 1990:52).  Indigenous Malays construct independence as a bargain of 
Chinese citizenship for Malay political control and economic advance (Alamgir 1994:70-1).  ‘Race riots’ in 1969 have been 
interpreted as evidence of Malay disaffection over socio-economic exclusion, mandating affirmative action ostensibly to 
avoid otherwise inevitable national disintegration (Faaland et al 1990:12-3,25). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 38 
 
 
including Indigenous political fragmentation and economic mismanagement undermining his 
leadership (Durutalo 1999:427; Premdas 1993:998).
40  He argues his understanding of 
paramountcy remained, but he recognised that it required Fiji’s development and thus 
international support (Interview: Rabuka 02/08/01).  The Constitution Review Commission 
(CRC) was required to safeguard paramountcy, defined as the protection of Indigenous rights 
and interests compatible with international human rights standards for individuals and groups 
(Reeves  et al 1996:2).  Protective paramountcy was entrenched in the resulting 1997 
Constitution (Sect.6): Indigenous interests could ‘not be subordinated’ to those of  other 
communities.  As in 1970, it was substantiated by veto powers for GCC Senate nominees over 
specified legislation regarding Indigenous lands and customary institutions (Sect.185).  
Individual equality and non-discrimination were guaranteed (Sect.38), along with mandatory 
affirmative action to promote effective equality of opportunity (Sect.44).  The Constitution 
thus offered foundations for political inclusion, with Indigenous paramountcy compatible 
with individual equality.  Rabuka ‘horse-traded’ with NFP leader Reddy to determine the 
composition of parliament [Interviews: Rabuka 02/08/01; Reddy 03/09/01], increasing the 
CRC recommended proportion of communal against common roll seats (Reeves 1998:226-7; 
see Table 2).  Rejected by most Indigenous Provincial Councils, Rabuka and Reddy 
persuaded the GCC to agree to the Constitution (Norton 2000b:110).  Following this 
outstanding achievement in political moderation, little attention was devoted to public 
education, or the conflict of protective paramountcy with Indigenous expectations of privilege 
‘legitimated’ by the 1987 coups. 
The 1999 election campaign was dominated by two multi-ethnic coalitions, but did not 
realise 1997 Constitutional objectives of rewarding multi-ethnic political moderation.  The 
FLP had increasingly championed Indo-Fijian rights in the 1990s, losing Indigenous votes.
41  
Though multi-ethnic in leadership and ideology, it increasingly came to represent its Indo-
Fijian-dominated constituency. In 1999 it condemned Reddy’s support for the Constitution 
and coalition with the former coup-leader, outbidding the NFP for Indo-Fijian votes (Ratuva 
2000:54; Norton 2000b:94).  Its leader, trade unionist Mahendra Chaudhry, became Prime-
Minister until being overthrown in May 2000 by a civilian coup f ronted by bankrupt 
businessman George Speight.  Protest marches preceding the coup, in which Tora was again 
pivotal,
42 reiterated 1987 slogans and advocated return to the 1990 Constitution (Tarte 
2001:531).  Speight justified his purported abrogation of the 1997 Constitution with 
Indigenous self-determination, deploying paramountcy as both political control and socio-
economic advance ( Times  20/05/00:3).  Prominent Indigenous leaders agreed with this 
meaning during the ensuing months of intra-Fijian power struggles ensnaring a deeply divided 
GCC.  (Tarte 2001:534; Interview: Ganilau 23/08/01).
43  With the Government still hostage 
the military, on whose support the coup mistakenly calculated, assumed control and appointed 
                                                 
40 Norton (2000b:107) argues that a then moderate Methodist Church President also persuaded Rabuka to the change. 
41 Predmas (1993:1007) commented on the 1992 elections that Labour support was not only minimal among Indigenous 
Fijians, but also among urban Indo-Fijians.  The FLP support base was in the Western and Northern cane belts. 
42 Tora had stood for a moderate Indigenous party in coalition with the FLP in 1999, but lost his seat (Tarte 2001:529). 
43 Support for Speight was by no means as wide as support for his conception of Indigenous paramountcy.  The Fijian 
Women’s Organisation (Soqosoqo Vakamarama), for example, addressed the GCC saying, “We [women] are 50% of the 




44  Widespread awareness of the multi-ethnic coalition seeking power and 
wealth behind Speight (Ratuva 2000:56-7; Lal 2000:187), has not detracted from how 
strongly privilege resonates with Indigenous political identities.  It has, however, reinforced 
instrumentalist analyses of ethnicity by Indo-Fijians and Indigenous moderates, who have 
resisted political exclusion using claims to equality. 
Norton (1990:151) argues that Ratu Mara’s return to power after the 1987 coups 
demonstrated that Fiji’s chiefs retained control of the most potent Indigenous ‘cultural 
capital’.  Rabuka’s attempt to govern with a cabinet of middle-ranking chiefs and educated 
commoners proved unstable (Lal 1992:295). By 2000, the situation had changed. Emergent 
victors appointed by the military, were well-educated professional Indigenes of moderate or 
no chiefly rank (Rakuita 2001:7).  They represent an Indigenous middle class that has risen on 
state educational, occupational, entrepreneurial and nepotistic support, intensified after 1987.  
Their alignment with extremist ideologies accords with their political and economic interests, 
dependent on links with an Indigenous-controlled state (Ratuva 2000:56).  Their appeal 
extends to the growing ranks of urban Indigenes living largely outside chiefly hierarchies and 
daily struggling for employment and housing.  Rhetorically, paramountcy supported chiefs 
and tradition; effectively, it advances Indigenous socio-economic interests to benefit elites 
and appease populist disaffection.  The first focus of post-coup interim rulers was an 
affirmative action plan (Vinding 2001:209).  Ideologically, it represents the ascendance of 
paramountcy as Indigenous advance over paramountcy as the protection of tradition.  
Institutionally, it represents an outcome of channelling commoner advance through 
Indigenous institutions and state-sourced ethnic privileges, to which emerging Indigenous 
elites are then allied.
45  Paramountcy as racial privilege, championed by commoners and 
middle-ranking chiefs, has become potent cultural capital. 
F.  Conclusion 
Exploring historical dialogues involving paramountcy and equality ideologies has 
demonstrated how differential ethnic political identities have been constructed in Fiji.  These 
processes have been characterised by contest, both between paramountcy and equality and 
among different meanings of each concept.  In the wake of the 2000 coup, political discourse 
has been dominated by extremes: paramountcy as Indigenous rights to group privilege, and 
equality as a human right to identical individual treatment.  The contested nature of these 
ideologies and range of actors deploying them also offers potential for inter-ethnic cohesion.  
Possibilities for political inclusion are explored in the following chapters, for which this 
historical analysis provides a foundation by emphasising themes that continue to impact on 
                                                 
44 Speight and key political actors he promoted are from the confederacy of Kabuna (Tarte 2001:536).  The military, itself 
dominated by the Tovata confederacy, appointed an Interim Prime-Minister from Tovata.  Military refusal to support Speight 
can be read both as protecting the national interest against the coup, and preventing the political ascendance of Kabuna, home 
to the Cakobau dynasty ceding Fiji to Britain. 
45 Many Indigenes have succeeded on values of individual enterprise separate from Indigenous institutions and state favour, 
but as Lal (1992:302) comments, are more likely to be represented in moderate Indigenous parties or the FLP. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 40 
 
 
contemporary political dialogue through ideologies and institutional structures.  These include 
first, Indigenous interpretations of the 1874 Deed of Cession as a charter of rights for chiefs 
and their people to retain political paramountcy and land ownership, land security identified 
with the NLTB.  Recently, Indigenous rights to self-determination and resource control have 
bolstered this construction.  Secondly, Indo-Fijian rights claims have been based on 
indenture-era promises of political equality, and recently bolstered by international human 
rights discourses.  Thirdly, Indigenes have construed Indo-Fijian demands for secure tenancy 
and political equality as threats to their land and political paramountcy.  Finally, trends toward 
political exclusion and inclusion have oscillated during independence.  The 1970 Constitution 
provided a basis for inclusion with protective paramountcy accommodating equal citizenship 
and open leadership.  The 1990 Constitution reversed inclusion, defining paramountcy as 
Indigenous political control from guaranteed national leadership and a parliamentary 
majority.  The 1997 Constitution reversed exclusion, making individual equality the 
framework within which protective Indigenous paramountcy is accommodated.  This 
Constitution continues to structure Fiji’s political institutions, promoting a polity where 
paramountcy and equality are compatible in a context where political dialogue is increasingly 




PARAMOUNTCY AND EQUALITY AS CONTESTED CONCEPTS: 
PARTY PLATFORMS AND POLICY ISSUES 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter analyses the 2001 election campaign to explore the different meanings of 
equality and paramountcy deployed in contemporary political dialogue.  In March 2001 Fiji’s 
Court of Appeal upheld the 1997 Constitution as the supreme law, undermining the 
legitimacy of the interim regime and prompting new elections (Fiji v Prasad 2001).  The pro-
democracy Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) further sought to de-legitimise the President 
for not recalling the 1999-elected parliament.  Although supported by some union, business 
and political actors, conservative editorials backed the High Court decision against ‘turning 
back the clock’ (Post 12/07/01:8; Interviews: Anthony 24/07/01; Whiteside 23/07/01).  The 
August elections thus proceeded under 1997 Constitutional arrangements: a 71-member 
house, combining 25 ‘open’ seats elected from a common roll, with ‘communal’ seats divided 
between Indigenous Fijians (23), Indo-Fijians (19), General Electors (3) and Rotumans (1) 
[see Table 2].  The preferential system was designed to promote multi-ethnic coalitions 
addressing national issues (Reeves et al 1996:310). 
The campaign proceeded in an atmosphere of grievance, despite a pre-election 
Presidential apology for the instability of 2000: 
Admittedly, we have all suffered from the events of last year but some individuals and 
communities have suffered more than others.  As your President, please join me in extending 
our apology to these individuals and to these communities.  Please accept our sincere apology.  
Fiji is your home and there is enough here for all of us. [Cited in Times 09/07/01:1] 
Disaffected supporters of the 2000 coup, its victims and political actors on both sides were by 
no means reconciled.  Insecurity and distrust were exacerbated by a politicised NLTB 
preventing renewals of expiring 30-year land leases, displacing primarily Indo-Fijian tenants.  
Livelihoods eroded in an economy stagnating with the tourist downturn and manufacturing 
closures induced by Australian-union sanctions (Vinding 2001:208).  Escalating union and 
land disputes aggravated tension.  The integrity of state institutions was considerably 
undermined.  Few doubted the Police Commissioner’s complicity in the coup, or respected 
the singular incapacity of his officers to prevent associated rioting and sporadic rural violence 
(Sun 11/08/01:1; Tarte 2001:533-5).
46  The new Vice-President and several Interim Cabinet 
members had  clearly supported the coup (Tarte 2001:538).  An attempted mutiny 
demonstrated military factionalism against the Commander for opposing Speight; his 
                                                 
46 The Commissioner was cleared of complicity by a closed-door hearing chaired by the Chief Justice, himself highly 
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attempted abrogation of the Constitution also raised the ire of pro-democracy actors 
(Interviews: Koroi 22/07/01; Singh 30/07/01).  The latter queried the impartiality of the 
judiciary, with High Court judges previously advising the President on constitutional 
abrogation now adjudicating it (Interview: Yabaki 30/07/01).  Ethnic nationalists maligned 
the Court of Appeal, comprised of foreign judges (Interview: Tora 06/08/01).  The public 
prosecutor was questioned for his failure to prosecute known coup-supporters (Tarte 
2001:538).  Well beyond its mandate, the appointed interim regime formed the Soqosoqo 
Duavata Ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party to contest the elections.
47  This context, the aftermath 
of the 2000 political crisis, promoted ethnic polarisation in the election campaign. 
Ethnic polarisation was also promoted by memories of the 1999 election.  In the wake 
of  multi-ethnic agreement on the 1997 Constitution, the GCC-created  Soqosoqo Ni 
Vakavulewa Ni Taukei (SVT) forged a multi-ethnic coalition with the NFP.  From their 
electoral route, political actors concluded that multi-ethnic moderation offered irresistible 
‘flank opportunities’ (see Horowitz 2000:411).  The reality, however, was more complex, 
since the victorious FLP was also in a multi-ethnic coalition.  The FLP certainly outbid the 
NFP for Indo-Fijian communal votes however it successfully grafted onto this, moderate 
campaigning on socio-economic issues in open seats.  The willingness of smaller parties to 
use preferences to punish the incumbent SVT cost it ten seats, provided the FLP with three 
and its moderate Indigenous coalition partners five, relative to first-past-the-post counts.
48  
Gaining 33.9% of the vote, the FLP secured 52.1% of seats.  Fearing outbidding, however, 
political moderates avoided multi-ethnic coalitions in 2001 (Interviews: Bogileka 27/07/01; 
Singh 31/07/01).  Parties campaigned alone, shared preferences and anticipated opportunistic 
post-election coalitions (see Horowitz 2000:367-79).  The ethnically-polarised context of the 
election and political memories from 1999 thus obstructed the multi-ethnic moderation 
intended by the Constitution, demonstrating that an electoral system alone cannot cause inter-
ethnic harmony.  Although party manifestos replicated the socio-economic focus thought to 
have assisted Labour in 1999 (People’s Coalition 1999), the campaign was dominated by 
ethnic treatments of land issues, the 1997 Constitution, democracy, affirmative action, 
national reconciliation and political leadership. 
Political fragmentation exacerbated by the 2000 crisis was evident in the record 18 
parties contesting the elections.  Repeated attempts by the Methodist Church to unify the 12 
‘Indigenous’ parties under the SDL, or contest open seats as a coalition to exclude Chaudhry 
from government, failed (Times 04/09/01:1).  Groups sharing preferences were defined as 
much by opposition to the incumbent SDL and powerful FLP, as by platforms.  The SDL was 
opposed by an ethnic ‘nationalist’ group on one side, and a ‘moderates’ group on the other.  
Virtually all parties opposed the FLP to punish Chaudhry and his insensitivity, abrasiveness 
                                                 
47 Its deregistration of the CCF indicated its disregard for civil society criticism (Times 30/06/01:2; Sun 01/07/01:3). 
48 Unless otherwise stated, all electoral evidence has been calculated by the author from data provided by the Fiji 
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and arrogance that allegedly provoked the coup [see Figure 2].
49  Preference distributions 
loosely reflected these associations, but ideological compatibility was often subordinated to 
seat-level opportunism ( Times 12/08/01:16).  The voting system encourages such 
opportunism by allowing voters to let parties distribute their preferences, rather than being 
forced to list their own.
50  The Constitution’s authors, believing only ‘moderate’ parties would 
exchange preferences, were overly optimistic (Reeves et al 1996:316). 
This chapter delineates the meanings of equality and paramountcy deployed in the 
political campaign and how they were translated into policy prescriptions.  It involves several 
complexities.  First, actors deploy concepts in inconsistent ways for political advantage, 
according to context, or from not having thought them through.  Secondly, a party’s 
candidates need not share the same beliefs, thus evidence from their speeches, interviews and 
media quotations frequently conflict party manifestos.  Thirdly, platforms change as voter-
sentiment and the strength of potential coalition partners is gauged from the unfolding 
campaign.  Fourthly, classifying parties according to their use of concepts need not accord 
with the loose coalitions they formed, coalitions also influenced by personalities, opportunism 
and other political issues.  Fifthly, though it derives from political platforms, the classification 
schema is necessarily a simplifying imposition on political dialogue.  Some parties span the 
four categories I delineate; others deploy meanings of equality and paramountcy I have 
separated into different pairs [see Figure 2].  These complexities are treated as opportunities 
for insight into both political dialogue and my analysis of it, with inconsistent platforms and 
ill-fitting categories explored. 
B.  Equality as a Fundamental Individual Human Right, and Paramountcy as a 
Protective Principle Compatible with Equality 
In a first pair of meanings of equality and paramountcy, equality is understood as a 
fundamental individual human right.  It is translated into equal citizenship status, equal formal 
political rights and treatment by the state, and racial, religious and gender non-discrimination.  
It underpins support for democracy and the 1997 Constitution as shaping an inclusive national 
polity based on human rights, where leadership positions and development opportunities are 
available for all citizens.  The FLP (2001a:2), for example, promotes a society assuring 
citizens ‘rights as people of one nation’ and removing ‘all vestiges of discrimination’.  This 
stance was shared by the Indo-Fijian based NFP (2001:2-3), the New Labour Unity Party 
(NLUP 2001a:2), a faction of the FLP rejecting Chaudhry’s leadership, and the United 
General Party (UGP 2001a:2), representing General Electors.  While recognising that 
historical ethnic divisions prevent significant cross-voting and that Indigenes ascribe their 
                                                 
49 ‘Moderates’ were among the most vocal critics of Chaudhry, the NFP campaign launch stating of him, “One man alone can 
destroy a nation.  If there’s a man amongst us, we should get rid of him.” (Times 01/07/01:3).  The New Labour Unity Party 
stated, “I think that a vote for Mr Chaudhry is really a vote to bring back the terrible days of May 19.” (Post 31/07/01:1) 
50 In 1999, 81% of voters voted ‘above-the-line’ for a party, thus delegating their preferences to that party to distribute, rather 
than ranking the candidates ‘below-the-line’ (Williams and Saksena 1999:64).  In 2001, the figure was over 70% (Sun 
07/09/01:4).  Parties are allowed to list their party symbol above the line even in seats where they field no candidates – 
promoting preference trading opportunities and allowing parties to direct ‘donkey’ votes. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 44 
 
 
protection to communal seats, the FLP holds the common roll as an ideal of non-
discriminatory citizenship (Interview: Koroi 22/07/01).  Parties differ in translating equality 
into modes of perceiving society.  The FLP, NLUP and UGP analyse society as comprised of 
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idealises a ‘colour-blind’ society (NLUP 2001b).  Individuals are differentiated by socio-
economic status, which should base political affiliations to redress inequality (FLP 2001c).  
Socio-economic equality thus centres on classes or individuals, not ethnic groups.  
Conversely, the NFP accepts pervasive ethnic identification, analyses society as plural ethnic 
groups, and seeks consociational-style cooperative ethnic representation (Interviews: Singh 
31/07/01; Reddy 03/09/01).  Some Indigenes echo commitments to equality and non-
discrimination, one high chief stating: 
If the people want to have a Fijian, Chinese, Punjabi or Indian Prime Minister, the let it be.  
Who are we to change what the majority of the people in this country want? [Cited in Sun 
02/09/01:1] 
Indigenous support for parties promoting equality exists, but overwhelming support from 
Indo-Fijians reflects the greater resonance of equality with their identities and advantage in 
countering Indigenous claims to priority (see Horowitz 2000:201).
51 
The FLP, NLUP and NFP support the 1997 Constitution’s (Sect.6(j)) definition of 
paramountcy, expressed in the context of negotiations on conflicting interests as: 
[T]he paramountcy of Fijian interests as a protective principle continues to apply, so as to 
ensure that the interests of the Fijian community are not subordinated to the interests of other 
communities. 
They argue the Constitution adequately protects paramountcy, by mandating affirmative 
action for the disadvantaged, providing veto rights for GCC Senate nominees and protecting 
Indigenous resource rights (FLP 2001c; NLUP 2001a:5; Interview: Singh 31/07/01).  They 
construct the political deployment of paramountcy and indigenous rights as instrumental, 
ethnic leaders ‘unscrupulously’ ‘whipping up’ Indigenous sentiment to support multi-ethnic 
elite agendas (FLP 2001b; Interview: Duncan 16/08/01).  Indigenes are ‘brainwashed’ into 
support by misinformation and disaffection from under-development, caused by exploitative 
traditional institutions and previous Indigenous Governments (FLP 2001b; EMD-Chand 
11/08/01).  Grievances are therefore treated as development problems; paramountcy is applied 
to the interests of the ‘masses’ (FLP 2001a:21).  Indigenous paramountcy can thus be 
protected and promoted within a prior framework of individual equality. 
The meanings of these concepts, and the priority of equality in defining limits on 
paramountcy, are manifest in these parties’ approaches to affirmative action, land and 
Indigenous traditions.  The FLP (2001a:14), NLUP (2001a:5), NFP (2001:9-13) and UGP 
(2001a:2) reject affirmative action based on ethnic membership alone; it wrongly includes 
elites and excludes the disadvantaged in other communities, particularly the ‘forgotten poor’ 
                                                 
51 Two marginal Indo-Fijian parties – the ‘Justice and Freedom Party’ (AIM) and the ‘Girmit Heritage Party’ (GHP) – hold 
radical positions on Indo-Fijian rights, demanding British and Australian citizenship and compensation of Indo-Fijians for the 
abuses of indenture and the expiration of land-leases [Interview: Sami 06/08/01; Sun 11/08/01:4].  They do not offer 
alternative understandings of equality for this schema, however.  While the GHP preference distribution was varied, all AIM 




52  Instead, they promote affirmative action for socio-economically disadvantaged 
individuals.  Assistance to Indigenous Fijians is framed in terms of good governance and pro-
poor policies, including infrastructure and utilities for (Indigenous) rural communities, rural 
and eco-tourism development, sustainable use of Indigenous natural resources, wages support 
and urban housing.  These prescriptions recognise that ostensibly non-discriminatory policies 
can have (favourable) differential ethnic impacts according to the geographic distribution of 
ethnic groups, poverty incidence and occupational concentrations.  In other areas the FLP 
denies differential ethnic impacts of ‘non-discriminatory’ policies, exemplified by its defence 
of VAT-free basic foods (Sun 02/07/01:3).  This poor-relief was widely believed to benefit 
urban workers and Indo-Fijians, more reliant on formal markets vis-à-vis subsistence and 
disproportionately buying the selected ‘basic’ items.  One aspect of the attempt by the NLUP 
to become ‘truly’ non-racial was its recognition of the discriminatory potential of non-ethnic 
policies (NLUP 2001c).  In societies pervaded by educational, occupational and wealth-based 
inequalities of opportunity, emphasis on formal political equality can legitimate perpetual 
socio-economic disadvantage, as if proceeding from merit.  Where these inequalities are 
borne disproportionately by ethnic groups, not only ‘non-ethnic’ policies, but also universal 
values like equality can be deployed with sectional advantage.  In Fiji, excessive focus on 
formal political equality, without accounting for its differential socio-economic effects, leaves 
equality open to criticism for perpetuating Indo-Fijian advantage. 
These parties echo reformist colonial ideologies on paramountcy with respect to 
Indigenous lands and customs.  Positing it as an economic resource, the FLP (2001a:12-3) 
argues, “emotional attachment to land is understandable, [but] it does not translate into bread 
and butter.”
53  As well seeking access to unoccupied lands for tenancy, easily construed by 
opponents as threatening Indigenous ownership, the FLP focused on translating land 
paramountcy into better utilisation and returns for owners.  The NLUP (2001d:1) similarly 
focused on Indigenous gains from land paramountcy.  The NFP focused on forging 
cooperative inter-ethnic relations to secure leases for its tenant-based constituency to access 
national land resources (Interview: Singh 31/07/01).  Each party held a similarly modernising 
vision on Indigenous customs, separating ritual from daily practice.  The founding FLP leader 
had articulated this vision with respect to democracy, arguing that chiefly authority could 
remain in ritual spheres, but individual equality prevail in political practice (Lal 1992:263).  
The parties promoted ‘culture’ as a symbolic sphere separable from economic and political 
life: traditions apply in the former and merit government support (for dance, art etcetera), but 
market and democratic principles dominate the latter.  This assumed separability avoided 
consideration of interdependency between the spheres.  The NFP (2001:16) and FLP 
(2001a:7) also offered equal support to other cultural groups, not recognising a special 
national responsibility to Indigenous culture or language.  This demonstrates how 
paramountcy is made compatible with equality by defining it on equal terms with the rights of 
other cultural groups. 
                                                 
52 Over 60% of Melanesian households, for example, live below the poverty line (Prasad et al 2001:8). 
53 This is echoed by the current Chair of the GCC, “Under the old paradigm we regard land as an heir-loom and under the 
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C.  Equality as a Human and Group Right, in Tension with Paramountcy as a Group 
Right of Indigenous Fijians 
A second pair of meanings of equality and paramountcy alters their content and 
priority, and is underpinned by a different mode of analysing society.  This approach is 
typical of moderate Indigenous parties: the Fijian Association Party (FAP) that split from the 
SVT in the 1990s and the Western-Fijian Party of National Unity (PANU), both FLP coalition 
partners in 1999-2000.  It is also evident among moderates within the SVT including leader, 
and former coup-conspirator with Rabuka, Filipe Bole (Lal 1992:271).  His stance may 
indicate an attempt to differentiate the SVT from the SDL and ally with the moderates, as 
much as changed personal conviction.  These parties promote equality but privilege a 
vocabulary of equal respect, justice for all citizens and human rights protection, over vigorous 
political rights claims to fundamental individual equality (FAP 2001a:3; SVT 2001a:2-4).  
They apply equality to racial groups as much as individuals, underpinning their aversion to 
inter-ethnic socio-economic equality.  Their perception of ethnic-based inequalities is 
reinforced by a tendency to view individuals via group membership, analysing society as 
ethnic communities (SVT 2001b).  Difficulties faced by Indigenous individuals in educational 
or occupational competition are derived from their ethnic group  – its culture, history or 
leadership (FAP 2001b; Interview: Bogileka 27/07/01).  Instead of the clear priority for 
equality over paramountcy in the first pair, this platform retains an unresolved tension 
between them. 
The emphasis these parties place on socio-economic equality interacts with their 
understanding of paramountcy.  In translating paramountcy into policies, they do not clearly 
distinguish between whether inherent Indigenous rights or experienced Indigenous 
disadvantages justify special treatment.  The parties accept the 1997 Constitutional definition 
of paramountcy as non-subordination of Indigenous interests, and support its protections for 
Indigenous lands and customs.  Whereas the FAP regards these provisions as adequate 
(Interview: Speed 09/08/01), PANU and the SVT support amendments within the present 
framework to diminish Indigenous insecurity (Post 11/08/01:4; SVT 2001b).  The urgent 
redress of socio-economic inequalities is typically justified by Indigenous disadvantage, 
whereas protection of culture and language flows more from Indigenous rights.  The parties 
differ over paramountcy for Indigenous institutions.  PANU encourages a sensitive approach 
to their symbolic meaning, but regards them as impediments to Indigenous development, a 
higher priority.  Conversely the FAP seeks to strengthen and improve the performance of 
Indigenous institutions, including chiefly leadership, to underpin Indigenous development.  
Moderate SVT candidates argued these meanings of paramountcy and equality are compatible 
(Interview: Vakatale 17/08/01).  Compatibility does not arise from containing one within the 
prior framework of the other, as in the first pair, but by maintaining a tense but negotiable 
coexistence. 
This unresolved tension is manifest in the approaches of these parties to democracy 
and affirmative action.  Each supports democracy as a value in itself, out of respect for 
individual political rights and equal citizenship.  Their analysis of society as plural ethnic 
groups, however, lead the FAP (2001b) and SVT (2001b) to subscribe to a consociational-
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support consultative democracy among representatives of all ethnic communities, 
emphasising cooperation not integration (see Norton 2000b:86).  Their commitment to non-
discrimination leads to their support of equal partnerships between ethnic leaders, and 
openness of national leadership positions to all races (FijiTV 23/08/01).  The FAP, SVT and 
PANU share this consociational model with the NFP, representing Indo-Fijians.  These parties 
attempt to harness ethnic identities to build an inclusive national polity, rather than 
superseding them with socio-economic political identities.  This underpins their support for 
the role of Indigenous representative institutions like the GGC and Provincial Councils, in 
integrating Indigenes into national politics (FAP 2001a:3-4; SVT 2001a). 
Affirmative action policy also illustrates the tension between paramountcy and 
equality.  The FAP (2001a:4-5) and SVT leader (2001b) accord with the FLP in locating 
affirmative action for Indigenous Fijians within a broader concern for good governance: 
extending basic infrastructure to rural areas, assisting landowners to utilise their resources, 
and funding disadvantaged Indigenous education.  By focusing on spheres of Indigenous 
disadvantage and integrating remedies within broader development and education policies, 
these parties make affirmative action compatible with equal state treatment of individuals.  
Rejecting privilege in favour of good governance, the FAP leader stated: 
We are the most privileged and most protected indigenous community in the world.  We have 
had 30 years of indigenous Prime-Ministership for Fijians; we have had all the permanent 
secretaries…but what have we done?  We have 84% of the land.  But I would say that Fijians 
are the poorest community not because of the other communities but because they have not 
been led by the people who care about the Fijian people. [Cited in Post 24/08/01:1] 
This approach remains in tension, however, with their recognition of Indigenous group rights 
to protection and advance.  Even if justified by group disadvantage, these rights are translated 
into prioritising affirmative action for the Indigenous group.  Both the FAP (2001b) and SVT 
leader (2001b) recognise intra-ethnic heterogeneity and emphasise targeting benefits to non-
elites, tempering ethnic affirmative action with socio-economic criteria.  Assistance, however, 
is founded o n perceiving ethnic groups as beneficiaries, a stance both challenged and 
reinforced by the UGP (2001b:4).  The challenge is to using paramountcy to prioritise 
Indigenous affirmative action when minorities among General Electors endure greater 
disadvantage.  The reinforcement is from perceiving disadvantage and claiming remedy in 
terms of ethnic categories.  Each party, however, tries to promote group interests while 
respecting individual equality and non-discrimination principles. 
D.  Paramountcy as Indigenous Political and Cultural Precedence, Subordinating 
Equality as a Minimum Rights Guarantee 
A third pair of meanings of equality and paramountcy was deployed by the incumbent 
SDL and the General Voters Party (GVP).  The SDL effectively adopted the platform of the 




54  They reject protective paramountcy under the 1997 Constitution
55 for a 
meaning drawing on Indigenous rights (GVP 2001:2; SVT 2001a:3).  ILO Convention 169 
concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries (hereafter: ILO Convention 
169) and the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter: UN Draft 
Declaration)
56 were used to support paramountcy as Indigenous priority, contiguous with 
claims in 1987.  Indigenes were argued to hold rights to privilege in cultural and religious 
spheres, and advance in socio-economic spheres.  The parties supported constitutional change, 
the SDL in particular pressing for reforms to reflect “the strongly-expressed concerns of the 
Fijian people,” notably their present unwillingness to accept an Indo-Fijian Prime Minister 
and demands for increased parliamentary representation (SDL 2001a:4-5; FijiTV 23/08/01).  
This made hollow i ts claim, “There is no racial boundary to our desire to serve Fiji.” (SDL 
2001a:2)  The parties differed on Indigenous land paramountcy, the SDL emphasising joint 
state-landowner resource exploitation while the GVP, representing landless vasu
57 and Pacific 
Islanders, emphasised consultation with resource users.  This understanding of paramountcy 
rejected equal treatment of ethnic groups, an understanding imbued by the SDL with 
fundamentalist Christian moral superiority. 
In each of their manifestos, equality  as an individual right is conspicuous by its 
absence.  In its place are guarantees of respect and democratic freedoms for ethnic groups, 
and fairness for all citizens (SDL 2001a:305; SVT 2001a:2; DNT 2001:1).  The GVP 
(2001:6) also emphasised the importance of universal human rights for protecting minorities.  
These references implied guarantees of equal civil liberties and democratic rights to one-
person, one-vote for citizens.  By contemplating entrenching Indigenous parliamentary 
control, the parties did not offer fundamental political equality or one-vote, one-value.  Each 
favoured a consociational approach to democracy, the SDL also requiring Indigenous 
leadership.  Instead of individual political rights, equality and equity referred to inter-ethnic 
wellbeing and underpinned demands to remove socio-economic inequalities threatening 
national stability and provide basic economic rights to Indigenes to participate in development 
(SDL 2001a:6).  Government support was offered to protect the cultural heritages of ethnic 
groups, prioritising teaching Indigenous culture and language in schools (SVT 2001a:9-10; 
SDL 2001a:6).
58  The SDL made no attempt to reconcile its policies of strengthening 
Indigenous power structures to restore respect for chiefs (Post 30/06/01:5), and promoting 
democratic values and gender non-discrimination (SDL 2001a:16).  These uses (and non-
uses) of equality indicate that ethnic groups, not individuals, are the units at which equality 
and paramountcy are applied. 
                                                 
54 Other SVT candidates have established nationalist credentials, both in firmly opposing the 1997 Constitution and in visibly 
supported the 2000 coup (Post 23/08/01:3; EMD-Vunibobo/Samisoni 12/08/01) 
55 The review of the Constitution sponsored by the Interim Cabinet (later the SDL) declared the protective principal an 
‘insensitive treatment’ of paramountcy (Ravuvu et al 2002:58-9). 
56 The content of ILO Convention 169 provides the basis for the UN Draft Declaration, which has been contested in the UN 
Commission on Human Rights since 1994 (Gray 1999:355). 
57 In this context, vasu refers to people with maternal links to Indigenous Fijians (typically Part-Europeans and mixed-descent 
Pacific Islanders).  They are generally not entitled to land ownership. 
58  The GVP (2001:6-8), representing minorities, also emphasised individual as well as group political rights, the socio-
economic disadvantages faced by non-Indigenes and the importance of intra-ethnic inequalities, overlapping with the 
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These meanings are illustrated in the approaches of these parties to affirmative action 
and national reconciliation.  Both inter-ethnic equality and paramountcy underpin Indigenous 
affirmative action policies conceived for the  whole ethnic group (SDL 2001s:6; SVT 
2001a:3).  Assistance for the disadvantaged in other ethnic groups is entertained to convey a 
multi-ethnic impression, but differentiating Indigenes according to socio-economic wellbeing 
is not.  The backbone of the SDL campaign was ‘its’ Blueprint for affirmative action for 
Indigenous Fijians, originally a Senate paper during the 1999-2000 Parliament ( Sun 
13/07/01:6).
59  Assistance covers education, small business, agriculture, tourism ownership, 
statutory bodies, the public service, political leadership and capital ownership (SDL 2001b).  
The document intensifies policies attempted in the 1990s by the SVT, and draws on both local 
Indigenous demands and Malaysian models of affirmative action.  Its necessity is bolstered by 
constructing unrest surrounding the 2000 coup as Indigenous disaffection from having their 
paramount interests in socio-economic spheres ignored (SDL 2001a:6; SVT 2001a:2-3).  The 
SDL used affirmative action to de-legitimise non-Indigene political leadership, its leader 
Qarase reportedly saying, “Indian leaders will not help the development of Indigenous Fijians 
because it is not in their blood.” ( Times  20/08/01:4)  Strongly advocating Indigenous 
paramountcy, the GVP (2001:8) nonetheless questioned assistance that excludes poverty in 
other ethnic groups.  They particularly challenged exclusion of the vasu, participating in 
Indigenous social life, “Yet when it comes to the sharing of the cake like the Blueprint, we are 
left out…” (Sun 23/08/01:5) 
The SDL (2001a:2) distinguished itself on national reconciliation, emphasising 
Christianity as a ‘universal’ foundation for multi-ethnic harmony in Fiji.  Its party logo, a 
dove carrying an olive branch, exemplified the status given to Christian principles for 
promoting peace and ‘national renewal’.  Reconciliation is c onceived not as establishing 
commonality or equality between individuals but affirming difference between ethnic groups, 
before seeking commonality ( ibid:7).  Critically, it seeks first to unify Indigenous Fijians 
before considering inter-ethnic reconciliation, betraying ‘national’ reconciliation as a 
euphemism for bringing under central authority an Indigenous population whose 
fragmentation was exacerbated by the 2000 political crisis.  The emphasis on Christianity 
reflects its potential to unify Indigenous Fijians across dynastic,  vanua, confederate and 
ideological divides, the Methodist Church leading the SDL’s reconciliation strategy.
60  The 
strategy is justified by the erroneous reasoning that only internally unified groups can find 
commonality with other groups (Interview: Kanailagi 07/08/01).  Methodist Church President 
Rev Kanailagi extended his role in ‘national’ reconciliation to unsuccessfully attempting to 
unite Indigenous political parties.
61  The Indigenous FAP, NLUP and SVT leaders refused to 
                                                 
59 The SDL leader Laisenia Qarase, a GCC-appointed Senator in 1999, had led Senate opposition to the FLP’s attempt to 
open up previously Indigenous affirmative action programmes to other ethnic groups (Tarte 2001:530).  For the purposes of 
affirmative action, ‘Indigenous’ includes Rotumans with Indigenous Fijians (see LFR 2001:1-2). 
60 One church leader seeking forgiveness from an Indo-Fijian community terrorised during the 2000 coup stated, “We long to 
see when the Indian and Fijian families can live together peacefully in a village community.  We long for the day when 
Indians and Fijians can attend church services together.” (Post 26/07/01:1, emphasis added) 
61 The SDL has subsequently appointed Rev Kanailagi to the Senate, as it has Indigenous ideologue Prof Ravuvu who chaired 
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engage in this process, however, and former Methodist President Rev Koroi vigorously 
contested this political role: 
Unity for what? Reconciliation involves sorrow, repentance, restitution, compassion, love and 
forgiveness from both parties… Rev Kanailagi…is now a political activist by embracing all 
indigenous political parties but sidelining the other races.  This is racism and apartheid in a 
new form…Racial unity cannot be called Christian unity. [Sun 20/07/01:3] 
The SDL thus strengthened the fusion between f undamentalist Christian superiority and 
Indigenous racial paramountcy, from similar rhetoric during the 1987 coup.  Imbued with 
moral superiority, paramountcy is also increasingly used to reject ‘foreign’ human rights.
62 
E.  Paramountcy as Indigenous Self-Determination, Subordinating Equality as the 
Recognition of Citizenship for the Vulagi
63 
A fourth set of meanings of equality and paramountcy are those deployed by 
Indigenous nationalists.  The Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP), a successor to 
Butadroka, is now in the curious position of having lost its radical constituency, given the 
mainstreaming of its platform after the 1987 coups.  Its platform is discernable in the SDL 
and SVT manifestos, and shared by emerging ethnic nationalist parties.  These include the 
Christian Democratic Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito (VLV), the extreme faction of the 
FAP Dodonu Ni Taukei (DNT), the extreme faction of PANU Bai Kei Viti (BKV) led by the 
indomitable Tora, and the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (MV).  MV candidates 
incorporated seven coup-conspirators including Speight, then incarcerated awaiting trial for 
treason (Sun 20/07/01:1).
64  Styling itself as bearer of the Fijian ‘cause’ articulated in the 2000 
coup, it is reported as stating it made a political manifesto of what Speight sought by violence 
(Post  21/07/01:8).  These parties deploy paramountcy as the Indigenous right to self-
determination, both over their natural resources and destiny (DNT 2001:1).  They draw on the 
Deed of Cession as a guarantee of political paramountcy, and seek legitimacy from ILO 
Convention 169 and the UN Draft Declaration, translating self-determination into a Prime-
Minister and parliamentary majority reserved for Indigenous Fijians (MV 2001a:10; NVTLP 
2001:4).
65  They are supported by the SDL’s constitutional review, declaring Indigenous 
rights to “determine their future and their destiny, as well as those of other racial and ethnic 
minorities who have chosen to make Fiji their country.” (Ravuvu et al 2002:58-9).  What 
distinguishes their conception of paramountcy from the previous pair is its overriding concern 
with Indigenous political control, without any semblance of inter-ethnic political equality.  
The 1990 Constitution is upheld as a benchmark for the protection of paramountcy; thus the 
1997 Constitution must be amended because it dilutes Indigenous paramountcy ( Post 
                                                 
62 In the campaign and in the SDL’s constitutional review, non-discrimination on grounds of sexual preference was used as a 
highly inflammatory example of the imposition of ‘foreign’ human rights (see Ravuvu et al 2002:38). 
63 Meaning visitor/foreigner, it applies to non-Indigenes and with taukei (landowner) denotes a host-guest relationship. 
64 Speight won his seat convincingly, exceeding his nearest rival in the first round 3232 to 2415 votes, before losing it due to 
his failure to attend parliamentary sittings.  He was convicted for treason in February 2002, with his death sentence 
commuted to life imprisonment. 
65 The BKV added the idea of granting two votes to landowners in elections (Times 23/07/01:5). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 53 
 
 
30/06/01:5).  This claim is refuted by the Court of Appeal’s assessment that its provisions 
protecting Indigenous rights are watertight (Fiji v Prasad 2001:15).
66  Paramountcy is also 
deployed to mandate school teaching of Indigenous language and culture, and Indigenous 
affirmative action in all socio-economic fields (MV 2001b:12; NVTLP 2001:2-3).
67 
Individual equality or even equal respect and fair treatment of citizens are not included 
in these manifestos.  The MV (2001b:9) mentions human rights, but only to rebuke law 
enforcement agencies, particularly the military (see below).  Instead, human rights are 
reproached for being immoral, of foreign imposition or otherwise inimical to Indigenous 
customs (MV 2001b:3; see also Ravuvu et al 2002:38).  Individual equality is regarded as 
incompatible with traditional chiefly and gender hierarchies.
68  Equal treatment is refuted 
because the ‘playing field’ is not yet level (Interview: Vakalalabure 25/07/01).  The only 
inference for equality is that all people domiciled in Fiji are entitled to citizenship and civic 
freedoms (MV 2001a:11; DNT 2001:1).  Whether an ideological shift or recognition of the 
logic of Fiji’s political economy, respect of Indo-Fijian citizenship represents a recent 
departure from historical Indigenous nationalism.  As citizens, however, non-indigenes must 
respect their ‘guest’ (vulagi) status in relationship to their ‘hosts’ (taukei).  Privileges to 
promote Indigenous security are accorded with the national interest, exemplified in NVTLP 
statement: 
Time has moved on and we value the contribution of foreigners in our land but our stand right 
now is to ensure that the ownership of the land, sea and mineral resources returns to the 
indigenous Fijian.  Give Ceasar what belongs to Caesar.  Give the indigenous Fijians what 
rightly belongs to them and there will be stability in the country.  When the needs of the 
indigenous Fijians are taken care of they will in turn look after the interests of the foreigners 
living in the country. [Sun 08/09/01:2, emphasis added] 
The parties argue that race-blind approaches to Fiji’s society cause instability, because race is 
‘pivotal’ to politics (MV 2001a:11).  They also adopt a consociational model of national 
politics, seeking ethnic group coexistence.
69 
Paramountcy as self-determination is illustrated by Indigenous nationalist positions on 
land, traditional institutions, national reconciliation and religion.  Emphasising the vital 
importance of land ownership to Indigenous identity and status, these parties demand the 
return of Crown lands to Indigenous owners for which, the MV leader cried, “We have been 
waiting for over one-hundred years.” (MV 2001c)  While the MV translate natural resource 
control into greater rental returns through a stronger NLTB, the DNT argues for more 
decentralised control of land in opposition to NLTB paternalism (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01; 
                                                 
66 MV leader Vakalalabure (Interview 25/07/01) argues that the 1997 Constitution diluted Indigenous protection because its 
provision for paramountcy is injusticiable, and the veto rights of GCC nominees to the Senate apply only to specified 
legislation, not new legislation affecting Indigenous lands and customs. 
67 Elements of this understanding of paramountcy are also evident in the GVP manifesto (2001:12). 
68 See Toren (1999:179) for an ethnographic account of how hierarchy actually remains in tension with the antithetical value 
of equality within Indigenous culture. 
69 The MV (2001b:3) argue for proportional allocation of communal seats to intra-Indian ‘ethnicities’ – Hindu, Muslim, 
Gujurati etcetera, perhaps seeking to undermine the capacity of Hindus to dominate Indo-Fijian communal seats. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 54 
 
 
DNT 2001:2).  The parties seek to strengthen traditional institutions, in particular making the 
GCC financially independent of the state (DNT 2001:2).  In addition, reflecting the regional 
bases of these parties, they argue for greater decentralisation of power to Provincial levels.  
The DNT leader argued the GCC should better reflect the power of landowning chiefs in Fiji 
(Interview: Dewa 14/08/01).  This touches on an intra-chiefly struggle between historically 
powerful high chiefs of the Eastern Islands with small landholdings, and less powerful chiefs 
of Viti Levu controlling major landholdings and increasingly valuable natural resources. 
On national reconciliation, these parties accord with the SDL seeking to unite taukei 
(landowners) first, to promote Indigenous paramountcy (MV 2001a:3).  Extreme Christian 
parties, arguing that reconciliation should be through Christ, effectively exclude Indo-Fijian 
Hindus and Muslims from this process (Interview: Tabu 13/08/01).
70  On religion, the MV 
and VLV argue for a Christian State.  They draw on and promote an aspect of Indigenous 
consciousness constructing the state, church and  vanua (land and Indigenous people) as 
inextricably linked (Interview: Vakalalabure 25/07/01).  Extreme Christian parties and the 
Methodist Church imply from a Christian State the necessity of Christian leaders.  When 
queried on its consequent racial exclusion, the Methodist Church President retracted the 
proposition in favour of leadership by Christian principles (Interview: Kanailagi 07/08/01).  
The intense concern of these parties with strengthening the institutions of the family, tradition 
and morality underscores their resistance to external cultural and capitalist forces undeniably 
contributing to rapid changes within Indigenous society.  Supported by numerous 
international examples of the decimation of Indigenous societies and cultures, they represent 
Indigenous Fijians as threatened within the global community, reinforcing an Indigenous 
consciousness of threat.  It underpins these parties’ constructions of political control, land 
ownership, Indigenous institutions and Christianity as bastions against this threat. 
F.  Electoral Results 
The election had three major winners – the SDL, FLP and MV – in what can only be 
described as a victory for ethnic extremism [see Figure 3, Table 6].
71  Despite educational  
 
                                                 
70 This approach is mirrored by the minor Party of the Truth (POTT 2001:1). 
71 All electoral evidence has been calculated by the author from data provided by the Elections Office [see note 3]. 
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campaigns, confusion over the optional preferential voting system left 11.9% of national votes 
informal.
72  Despite being compulsory, only 78.5% of those registered attempted to vote, 
reflecting significant disaffection and apathy, many doubting the results would be respected 
this time (Times 04/08/01:3).
73  The SDL was formed only months before the election without 
party machinery or historical constituency; its success is a dubious tribute to a number of 
factors.  First, the appeal of the promise of Indigenous prosperity in the Blueprint.  Secondly, 
the importance of state resources in electioneering and vote buying (Times 21/08/01:1; Sun 
29/08/01:1).
74  Thirdly, the influence of Indigenous authorities including chiefs, Provincial 
Councils and the Methodist Church, in endorsing candidates and mobilising votes behind the 
incumbent (Post 18/07/01:1; Sun 27/08/01:6).  Fourthly, the effect of threats of instability if 
the incumbent were not returned to office.
75  Finally, perhaps, the ongoing significance of the 
undeclared actors influencing selection of the Interim Cabinet (later the SDL) out of the 
disorder of 2000.  Allegations that vote counting was not credible due to irregularities in 
postal votes ( Sun  07/09/01:1) were not substantiated by the Electoral  Office or 
Commonwealth observer mission (Commonwealth 2001:37).  The SDL gained 78.3% of 
Indigenous communal seats from 50.1% of the vote [see Table 3] and a pitiful 0.1% of Indo-
Fijian communal votes, or 0.6% in the seats it contested.  The strength of the new MV partly 
reflects ethnic nationalist appeal in its region, Eastern Viti Levu and Vanua Levu.  The MV 
also captured anti-establishment emotions ignited during the appalling brutality of the military 
in reasserting its control following Speight’s arrest in Eastern Viti Levu and an army mutiny 
on Vanua Levu (Times 01/07/01:8; 19/08/01:16-7). 
The continued strength of the FLP resulted from its effective party (and union) 
machinery for mobilising votes, its ideological appeal and Chaudhry’s outbidding of the NFP 
as the champion of Indo-Fijian rights, depicting the NFP as a minority South Indian and 
Gujurati party (Sun 01/07/01:4; Interview: Reddy 03/09/01).  His campaign included emotive 
Hindi speeches reflecting his charismatic leadership of Indo-Fijians and sense of vengeance 
for his overthrow in 2000: 
We, as a nation and particularly, the Indo-Fijians have been wronged.  You equally share the 
injustice and mistreatment with the members of my Government, so this election – we have a 
chance to get justice….So I question, why don’t we, Indians have any right?  Why are we 
treated like this – why can’t we have an Indian Prime Minister?  He is a citizen of this country 
and why is an Indian deprived?” [Hindi translation, Post 23/08/01:1] 
Despite its multi-lingual and pictorially multi-ethnic manifesto, FLP success came from Indo-
Fijian support, winning 74.5% of the communal vote and all communal seats [see Table 4].  It 
won only 2.3% of Indigenous communal votes, or 7.3% in the seats it contested.
76  
Punishment by preferences cost the FLP five open seats it won on the first count; in contrast 
                                                 
72 The High Court has ruled that ballots where the voter ticked one candidate below the line (where all boxes should have 
been numbered) clearly indicate the voter’s intention and should be re-counted as valid (Times 15/02/02).  Court contests 
continue, with the FLP expected to gain several seats from the SDL and NFP.  These figures are from the initial count. 
73 Urban Indigenous participation was particularly low, at 72.9%, but only 6.9% of their votes were invalid. 
74 There are no laws prohibiting the use of public funds for electoral campaigning in Fiji (Times 02/07/01:5). 
75 Authorised SDL television advertisements warned against ‘rocking the boat’, while newspaper advertisements depicted the 
chaos inevitable if other parties formed government (See Times 24/08/01:30). 
76 This support was not dominated by urban votes, winning only 6.1% of Indigenous urban votes in seats contested. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 56 
 
 
the SDL made a net gain of seven seats on preferences.  Though it abstracts from other 
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important factors, the electoral failure of the NLUP indicates the extreme difficultly of 
forging multi-ethnic class-based political identities in Fiji beyond an Indo-Fijian union base 
[see Table 6].  If the NLUP, NFP, FAP and SVT did indeed represent forces of moderation, 
they were virtually obliterated; even in open seats the ethnic-bases of the SDL and FLP 
prevailed [see Tables 5 and 6].  This substantiates Horowitz’s (2000:303) claim that the 
coexistence of ethnic and non-ethnic parties assumes another issue axis: in Fiji’s 2001 
campaign atmosphere charged with racial polarisation, there was no effective alternative axis. 
Political commentators expect cross-ethnic voting to be greatest in open electorates.  
Figure 4 explores this idea.  The estimated ethnic composition of the electorate is used to 
predict the number of votes cast by Indigenous and Indo-Fijian voters.  The difference  
 
Party Seats     
(of 23) Votes     %
Seats     
%
SDL 18 50.09         78.26       
MV 5 20.26         21.74       
SVT - 8.56           -           
NLUP - 6.32           -           
BKV - 4.70           -           
PANU - 2.94           -           
NVTLP - 1.44           -           
Other - 5.70           -           
Party Seats     
(of 19) Votes     %
Seats     
%
FLP 19 74.58         100.00     
NFP - 22.10         -           
NLUP - 2.57           -           
Other - 0.75           -           
Party
Seats     
(of 25) Votes     %
Seats     
%
FLP 8 35.20         32.00       
SDL 13 25.66         52.00       
NFP 1 10.09         4.00         
MV 1 9.36           4.00         
SVT - 6.35           -           
NLUP 1 5.36           4.00         
Indep 1 3.12           4.00         
BKV - 1.93           -           
FAP - 1.33           -           
Other - 1.61           -           
Party
Seats     
(of 71) Votes     %
Seats     
%
FLP 27 34.83         38.03       
SDL 32 26.04         45.07       
NFP 1 10.10         1.41         
MV 6 9.91           8.45         
SVT - 5.40           -           
NLUP 2 5.07           2.82         
Indep 2 2.65           2.82         
BKV - 2.17           -           
PANU - 1.16           -           
UGP 1 0.50           1.41         
Other - 2.16           -           QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 57 
 
 
Table 7: Predicted Ethnic Composition of Valid Votes in Open 
Seats
Predicted No. of Voters
OPEN SEAT Votes Indigenes Indo-Fijian
1 TAILEVU NORTH/OVALAU 12,774    11,244        1,123         
2 TAILEVU SOUTH/LOMAVITI 15,348    10,496        4,763         
3 NAUSORI/NAITASIRI 11,930    6,003          5,670         
4 NASINU/REWA 13,014    5,972          6,868         
5 CUNNINGHAM 12,284    7,274          4,317         
6 LAUCALA 11,510    5,904          5,157         
7 SAMABULA/TAMAVUA 11,730    5,828          5,111         
8 SUVA CITY 11,406    6,136          4,040         
9 LAMI 11,860    8,098          2,387         
10 LOMAIVUNA/NAMOSI/KADAVU 13,489    11,221        2,171         
11 RA 13,623    8,834          4,724         
12 TAVUA 12,820    5,629          7,041         
13 BA 14,832    2,546          12,133       
14 MAGODRO 13,099    3,526          9,516         
15 LAUTOKA CITY 12,986    5,326          7,039         
16 VUDA 13,119    3,668          9,252         
17 NADI 14,607    5,489          8,629         
18 YASAWA/NAWAKA 12,650    4,639          7,979         
19 NADROGA 12,579    6,088          6,360         
20 SERUA/NAVOSA 14,242    9,591          4,287         
21 BUA/MACUATA WEST 14,475    8,909          5,247         
22 LABASA 11,445    2,419          8,796         
23 MACUATA EAST 13,404    2,884          10,456       
24 CAKAUDROVE WEST 12,034    8,877          1,726         
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between these predicted votes and votes received by Indigenous and Indo-Fijian parties are 
shown by columns, positive where ethnic parties gained votes in excess of their electorate 
membership.  Net support for the multi-racial NLUP is shown separately.
77  The figure shows 
that in many open seats, Indo-Fijian and Indigenous parties made net gains and losses of votes 
into the thousands, with Indigenous losses divided between Indo-Fijian and NLUP gains.  
Closer examination, however, dampens optimism about significant cross-ethnic voting 
because it is in these electorates that ethnic compositions are generally skewed [Table 7].  
Parties representing the minority ethnicity field weaker or no candidates in expectation of 
loss, thus prompting cross-ethnic voting.  In Southeast Viti Levu, where ethnic proportions 
are more balanced (electorates 3 to 8), contests were fierce and net cross-voting minimal.  
Lack of inter-ethnic cohesion was exemplified following the election, as the SDL formed a 
coalition with the MV to un-constitutionally exclude the FLP from the multi-party 
government mandated by the Constitution ( Chaudhry v Qarase  2002).
78  The SDL 
nonetheless expected all citizens to be ‘well-catered for’ by its 28-member cabinet initially 
comprising 27 Indigenes and one General Elector (Times 13/09/01:2-3). 
G.  Conclusion 
This exploration of the meaning and deployment of equality and paramountcy in the 
2001 election campaign prompts several conclusions.  First, the terms are contested concepts, 
with different meanings and purposes deployed by different actors.  Secondly, the terms are 
related together in different ways.  In the first pair of meanings, equality as an individual 
human right is privileged over protective paramountcy that is made to be compatible with it.  
In the fourth, equality as the recognition of citizenship is subordinated to paramountcy as 
Indigenous self-determination.  Thirdly, the analysis of the deployment of the concepts 
demonstrates potential power implications of the meanings of  both terms.  Paramountcy 
requiring affirmative action for ethnic groups and political hegemony, for example, has 
obvious advantages for Indigenous elites.  Equality requiring non-discrimination by the state 
has advantages for ethnic groups already excelling in economic, occupational and educational 
pursuits.  Fourthly, whilst tension between equality and paramountcy is resolvable within 
                                                 
77 1999 ethnic electorate compositions are used to predict 2001 compositions with the increased number of registered voters.  
The results are divided into an Indigenous plus Rotuman category, an Indo-Fijian category and a General Electors category 
(which cannot be assumed to vote with either main group).  These predicted registrations are used to calculate the predicted 
number of formal votes polled by each category.  Votes received by Indigenous based parties in each electorate (including 
relevant Independents) are combined, as are votes received by Indo-Fijian based parties.  The NLUP is separate because to 
classify it according to the race its candidates would increase the appearance of ethnic voting when it presented a strongly 
multi-racial platform.  To remove the residual of General Electors, the moderate NLUP vote is presented as net of predicted 
General Elector votes.  The columns can then be read as net gains above predicted votes.  For example, 500 excess votes for 
Indo-Fijian parties represents net cross-voting by Indigenous and General Electors. 
78 Proposals for Governments of National Unity accommodating ethnic proportionality have been periodically mooted by 
various parties since independence (Lawson 1991:222-3).  In 1999, the victorious FLP invited the SVT to join its cabinet, 
which the SVT accepted but with so many conditions on ministerial positions and policies that the FLP interpreted it as a 
rejection (Times 01/07/01:3).  In 2001, the FLP accepted the SDL offer unconditionally, but were excluded. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 59 
 
 
these classificatory pairs, the concepts can be incompatible combined across pairs.  For 
example, individual political equality and equal treatment by the state are irreconcilable with 
paramountcy guaranteeing Indigenous national leadership and a parliamentary majority.  
Finally, there are also compatibilities between different meanings of these concepts, which the 
next chapter explores in detail for potential sources of political cohesion.  The two chapters 
combine to understand how different meanings of paramountcy and equality impede and 




PARAMOUNTCY AND EQUALITY TO POLITICAL ACTORS: 
INCOMPATIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL COMMONALITIES 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter explores sources of incompatibility and potential commonality between 
paramountcy and equality ideologies in Fiji’s political dialogue.  Contemporary debates can 
seem fruitless with political actors not engaging with the ideologies of their opponents, 
dialogues apparently lacking a common conceptual framework within which different 
positions can be held.  Actors promoting ideologies perceiving society as a collection of 
individuals, or alternatively as a set of ethnic communities, appear to lack common ground on 
which to debate their respective arguments for individual equality and Indigenous 
paramountcy.  The first section of this chapter places these arguments in a common 
framework, as modes of constructing political rights.  It explores contests over the use of 
cultural, religious and international conceptual resources to legitimate these claims.  The 
major source of difference between the constructions is understood as the different time-
scales on which the justice of political rights is judged.  The chapter then focuses on two 
claims from paramountcy – Indigenous affirmative action and cultural protection – and shows 
how they accord with equality.  Contemporary deployments of paramountcy for elite interests, 
however, detract from the broader validity of these claims.  Finally, the chapter addresses the 
political economy of land, focusing not on what paramountcy means but on what Indigenous 
Fijians are practically able to gain from it.  The rationale for these explorations is that placing 
political claims within common conceptual frameworks is necessary to identify impediments 
and resources for constructing an inclusive national polity.  It shows that these philosophies of 
political rights are not inherently contradictory (contra Carroll 1994:308). 
B.  A Common Framework: Political Rights Constructions 
This section explores how both equality and paramountcy are deployed as political 
rights constructions.  In the common conceptual framework of political rights, differences and 
compatibilities between the positions can be identified.  The previous chapter, investigating 
meanings of equality and paramountcy in contemporary dialogue, underpins the 
appropriateness of this framework by showing that these concepts are translated into rights 
claims in political, cultural, socio-economic and natural resource spheres.  A basis for 
cohesion between all p olitical actors’ constructions of rights is their recognition of the 
citizenship of non-Indigenes.  When Butadroka moved in the 1975 Parliament to repatriate 
Indians, nationally respected Ratu David Toganivalu admitted, “all Fijians consciously, but 
mainly unconsciously, feel at times in terms of what is expressed in the motion.” (Cited in Lal QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 61 
 
 
1992:235)  If these sentiments remain, political parties now separate them from rights claims.  
As well as a concession to political economy logic,
79 this separation r eflects growing 
recognition that inter-ethnic politics is peripheral to the intra-Indigenous contests affecting 
Indigenous wellbeing (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01).  Beyond this vitally important accord on 
rights to common citizenship of a multi-ethnic nation, is contestation. 
Political actors constructing rights from the concept of individual equality promote a 
contemporary assessment of the justice of political rights.  Their ideologies typically perceive 
society as a collection of individuals, whose fair treatment in the contemporary polity requires 
equal status.  Differential individual treatment according to ethnic membership not only 
contradicts equality, but specifically violates the rights of individuals who are members of 
non-recognised minorities or who do not identify with their ascribed ethnicity (Brass 
1991:342).  This deployment of equality interacts with paramountcy, countering Indigenous 
group priority with claims to individual parity (Horowitz 2000:201).  It attempts to undermine 
the perception of society as a set of ethnic groups, to challenge the perpetually inferior status 
non-Indigenes hold within that framework.  Equality is not exclusively linked with 
individualist analyses attempting to transcend ethnic difference.  The NFP advocates group-
based analysis of society, applying equality to ethnic groups cooperating through institutions 
recognising difference (Interview: Singh 31/07/01; Norton 2000b:83).  Former NFP leader 
Reddy (Interview: 03/09/01) argues common identity is a ‘pipe dream’ not realised in any 
multi-ethnic society; differences must be accepted. 
Cultural, institutional, religious and international resources are used to bolster this 
notion of contemporary justice for individuals within society.  Memories of the levelling 
experience of indenture are invoked as a cultural foundation for equality claims among Indo-
Fijians (Lal 1992:40).  Ideologies of Fiji’s historically powerful unions support equal political 
rights and counter ethnic divides with socio-economic cleavages (Interview:  Anthony 
24/070/01).  Offsetting church identification of Christianity with Indigenous hierarchies, 
proponents deploy the Bible to promote equality.  As the FLP President stressed, “We’re all 
the same in God’s eyes.” (Interview: Koroi 22/07/01)  International discourses on human 
rights and democracy are used as resources for reinforcing equal political rights.  The NFP 
leader, for example, invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as definitive of 
acceptable value systems, justifying the 1997 Constitution’s equality provisions.  He argued, 
“In a democracy…your values are all the same, you’re all equal.” (Interview: Singh 31/07/01)  
This claim to contemporary justice is also supported by the practical imperative that Indo-
Fijians have no citizenship entitlements elsewhere, Fiji is home: “We are fourth generation, 
we should have rights too.” (Interview: Sami 06/08/01) 
Political actors constructing rights from the concept of paramountcy promote a 
historical assessment of the justice of political rights.  Indigenousness is critical to these 
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constructions, as original inhabitants connected to the land.  Rabuka (Interview: 02/08/01) 
explains: 
[W]e have the right to say we were first citizens or first occupants of the land, these islands.  
And we have developed our culture and it is rooted to the land we set foot on, this is ours, this 
is mine, and anyone else coming along later is vulagi. 
Being original landowners has become emblematic of Indigenous identity, in opposition to 
‘immigrant’ Indo-Fijian tenants.  Ethnic nationalists translate it into rights to political control, 
Tora (Interview 06/08/01) expounding: 
Taukei means ownership, and we use it as owners of the land and resources and fish.  Our 
attachment to the land is an extension of our soul, our spirit.  It is the abode of our ancestors.  
It is a highly emotional connection.  Only when people understand that can they appreciate 
why we speak of control…This is my country, it is strange when I have to make a case on how 
my country should be ruled…This place should remain forever in Fijian hands. 
Indigenousness is thus used to construct rights for original landowners to hold political power 
over their future, their land and others resident in Fiji.  Others entered Fiji largely under 
colonial, not Indigenous, control; it is constructed as historically just that Indigenes retain 
political power over ‘migrants’ to whose presence they never agreed. 
Historical, cultural, religious and international resources are used and transformed by 
political actors to underpin this notion of historical justice for ethnic groups.  Chapter III 
explored how the Deed of Cession in interpreted as the wise decision of high chiefs to enlist 
the British to civilise and Christianise Indigenes.  British rule is imagined as a temporary 
aberration in Indigenous sovereignty, thus political power should have returned to Indigenous 
chiefs at independence (Interview: Ravuvu 10/08/01).  Historical memories of Indigenous 
sacrifice in the armed forces are deployed as evidence of Indigenous loyalty to Fiji.  In 
contrast, Indo-Fijian refusals to serve once demands for equal conditions with Europeans 
were not met,
80 their high emigration, and Chaudhry’s much-publicised reference to India as 
his ‘motherland’,
81 taint Indo-Fijians as harbouring affinities elsewhere (Post 20/08/01:1; see 
Horowitz 2000:211).  Indigenous political identities are increasingly constructed in terms of 
the relationship between  taukei (landowners, hosts) and  vulagi  (foreigners, guests), thus 
differentiating the political rights of common citizens (Rakuita 2001:6).  Other cultural 
emblems, including the vanua (the land and people) and the inextricable bond between vanua, 
church and state, are deployed to support Indigenous resource, political and religious 
supremacy.  Christianity is increasingly deployed to support these particular political claims, 
bolstering historical constructions of Indigenous rights.  Tora (Interview 06/08/01), for 
example, argued: 
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Different races were allocated particular countries by our Maker from the beginning…this 
country – these 300 islands – is allocated to us: to protect, promote, secure and uphold the 
principles of that protection.  We are prepared to shed blood for that. 
Similarly, the leader of the ethnic nationalist MV argued: 
What we say is, you [non-Indigenes] give us what is rightfully ours.  Our land is a God-given 
right, our control of this country, our sovereignty, those are God-given rights.  Give it to us, 
and let us return it to you in the way that we feel is best, not the way we have been structured 
to return it – where we have been deprived, and have had no say on how it has been used. 
[Interview: Vakalalabure 25/07/01] 
Again, the  taukei-vulagi  relationship underpins differential rights for Indigenes and 
‘foreigners’ and constructs Indigenes as a homogeneous primordial grouping distinct from 
vulagi (Ratuva 1998:58).  It re-orients the pre-cession use of taukei for members of a vanua 
societal group, against vulagi who were in turn the taukei of other vanua (Rakuita 2001:3).  
This reorientation forges a shared identity for all Indigenes.  Teachings that Indigenes are 
God’s people given the land of Fiji are widely attributed to the Methodist Church, whose 
President admits to emphasising ‘the Earth is the Lord’ and thus supporting the identity of 
God, the land and Indigenous Fijians (Interview: Kanailagi 07/08/01).  International 
discourses on Indigenous Rights, particularly ILO Convention 169 and the UN Draft 
Declaration, are drawn on to support Indigenous self-determination and control over natural 
resources (Interview: Vakalalabure 25/07/01).  An MV spokesperson argued: 
The International Labour Organisation and the United Nations have accepted these rights but it 
seems that our past political leaders were deaf, dumb and blind when it came to the 
enforcement of native rights in Fiji. [Cited in Sun 22/08/01:9] 
They not only promote the legitimacy of local political claims, but formulate an ethnic Fijian 
identity linked to a broader global Indigenous consciousness (SVT 2001a: 3; Boxill 1996: 
106).  At its party launch, the MV leader (2001c) exclaimed, “It is not a domestic movement 
but a worldwide organisation.”  International documents also offer universality for Indigenous 
claims, countering Indo-Fijian assertions that international institutions a ccord with their 
values of democracy and equality (FLP 2001c).  Apart from historical, cultural, religious and 
international resources, paramountcy is reinforced daily through language: Indigenes are the 
‘Fijians’, underpinning their claim of “Fiji for the Fijians.” 
These processes constructing Indigenous political rights claims as historically just are 
widely contested.  Respected high chief Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (Interview: 26/07/01) regards 
the Deed of Cession as a tactical surrender, and that to have returned power to high chiefs at 
independence would have presupposed nothing had happened to Fiji’s population in the 
interim.  Indo-Fijian and Indigenous actors challenge the historical construction of Indigenous 
rights with Indo-Fijian equivalents: Fiji’s prosperity is built on Indo-Fijian labour, who thus 
deserve equal recognition in the contemporary polity (Interviews: Bogileka 27/07/01; Speed 
09/08/01).  The NFP Youth Wing, for example, argues, “the role Indians played in the history 
of Fiji will never ever be matched by any other races.” (Cited in Norton 2000b:97)  Others 
emphasise Indo-Fijian cultural and emotional ties to land they expected to lease indefinitely 
(Sami 2001).  Extreme Indo-Fijian political actors, however, merely reinforce Indigenous 
aspirations by translating historical justice for Indo-Fijians into citizenship rights in Britain 
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to bolster paramountcy, arguing it is the Christian and Fijian way to ‘embrace the vulagi’; 
instead of exclusion, “this country is for everybody.” (Interview Vakatale: 17/08/01)  This 
deploys a ‘benevolent’ conception of the taukei-vulagi relationship as between gracious hosts 
mindful of the interests of honoured guests, rather than guests submitting to paramount hosts 
(Norton 2000b: 98).  Former Methodist Church President Rev Koroi (Interview: 07/08/01) 
persistently opposes church attention to Old Testament teachings on the ‘chosen people’ and 
Indigenous Fijians as the ‘new Israel’.  Political actors also challenge the use of international 
resources, emphasising that ILO Convention 169 and the UN Draft Declaration do not stand 
alone, but must be negotiated within the broader human rights framework and read in the 
context of their drafting for Indigenous minorities
82 (Interviews: Madraiwiwi 26/07/01; Singh 
31/07/01; Beddoes 22/08/01; Duncan 16/08/01).  Indigenous rights, they argue, cannot be 
used to suppress the rights of other groups (Spoonley 2001:7). 
Placing equality and paramountcy on common ground as constructions of political 
rights enables a clearer identification of sources of conflict and compatibility between them.  
Their ideologies promote different perceptions of society, either comprised of individuals or 
of ethnic groups.  Whereas the concept of equality underpins a judgement of political rights 
based on contemporary justice for all citizens, the concept of paramountcy underpins a 
judgement of political rights based on historical justice for ethnic groups.  Both acknowledge 
common citizenship, but beyond it they diverge into claims of equal political rights and of 
differentiated rights between taukei and vulagi.  The section has also explored the contested 
nature of processes constructing political rights claims.  Rights claims are important for their 
power implications for various groups and individuals in society, but also as parts of ongoing 
processes reconfiguring political identities.  These identities become resources for future 
political contests.  Indo-Fijian and some Indigenous leaders construe paramountcy claims as 
transitional phases in a destabilising and insecure modernisation process.  By privileging the 
universalist position of individual equality, they attempt to de-legitimise paramountcy as 
particularlistic and backward (see Mamdani 1990:372).  The following sections instead 
consider the content of paramountcy-based claims to affirmative action, cultural protection 
and land showing how particular translations of Indigenous concerns into political claims is 
undermining their own validity. 
C.  The Content of Paramountcy: Claims to Affirmative Action 
Fiji presents a curious case in the Asia-Pacific for the inability of political actors to 
articulate Indigenous rights claims in a manner amenable to international sympathy (Boxill 
1996:98).  The media and governments of Fiji’s major trading partners and significant aid 
donors – Australia, New Zealand and the United States – represent Indigenous Fijians as 
aggressive racists unwilling to acknowledge Indo-Fijian rights to shares of power and land 
(Lal 1992:285).  They build on domestic critiques of Indigenous elites, including by other 
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distinct from majorities in control of the state.  The relationship between minorities and the wider state, he argues, is a crucial 
element in determining the particular rights a minority group can claim. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 65 
 
 
Indigenes, to regard Indigenes as the oppressors rather than the oppressed.  In contrast, Indo-
Fijian based political parties harness values of equality, racial non-discrimination and 
democracy to secure Western sympathy.  Vocal Indo-Fijian diasporas enhance this success, as 
do strong international union affiliations with the Fiji Trade Union Congress, a power-base of 
the FLP (Boxill 1 996:103; Norton 2000b:88).  The inability of Indigenous Fijians to 
successfully articulate their no doubt deeply felt position is a source of frustration and 
resentment.  Western donors, denigrated as ‘immigrant’ nations, are accused of ‘neo-
colonialist’ attitudes and lack of understanding (SVT 2001a:10; SDL 2001a:16).  The local 
English-language media is also accused of treating Indigenous claims with contempt (MV 
2001b:2).  This is not altogether surprising given the appeal of universalist values to these 
typically young, urban, educated journalists working in multi-ethnic environments with 
considerable international exposure.  Indo-Fijian claims that paramountcy makes them 
second-class citizens, provoke angry responses from ethnic nationalists: 
I think that is very wrong.  If you look at the reality of this country, it’s the natives who are 
really second-class citizens.  You just walk around Suva, and you see who is first-class and 
who is second-class.  You go out in the countryside and see who is first-class and who is 
second-class. [Interview: Vakalalabure 25/07/01] 
Though rarely spoken of, Indigenes see themselves as victims of Indo-Fijian racism 
obstructing their employment, housing and inter-marriage by a refusal to ‘share’ women 
(Boxill 1996:105; Sapiro 1993:42).  A Taukei movement spokesperson, resenting perceived 
Indo-Fijian cultural superiority, said: 
We welcome you into our home.  Please learn our customs and culture.  It is four to seven 
generations down the road and there is no reason why you should not. [Cited in  Post 
23/08/01:2] 
Indigenous socio-economic and cultural vulnerabilities, however, exemplify how particular 
translations of deeply felt concerns into political claims undermine their validity. 
Ethnic nationalists counter claims that Indigenous rights do not apply to majority 
communities by correctly arguing that Indigenes are an economic minority in Fiji (Interview: 
Vakalalabure 25/07/01).  Their pursuit of ethnic affirmative action, however, is effectively 
biased towards socio-economic opportunities for urban, educated elites.  The SDL’s (2001b) 
Blueprint recommends funding Indigenous investment corporations, protecting Indigenous 
companies, and reserving for Indigenes major business licences, government contracts and 
shares from privatisation.
83  Ethnic nationalist manifestos support privatising government 
enterprises, offering opportunities for the limited Indigenous elite to capture state resources 
(MV 2001a:14; SDL 2001a:11).
84  The SDL’s  Social Justice Act (2001) tempered these 
demands but reflected the priorities of the Blueprint.  Increasing the role of the state in 
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existing chiefly power structures. 
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structuring socio-economic opportunities for ethnic groups not only enhances the stakes in 
competition to capture the state, it also promotes Indigenous middle-classes and e lites 
emerging on the value of Indigenous paramountcy (Ratuva 2000:56).  There are few reasons 
to suppose they will later renounce the ideological basis of ethnic affirmative action on which 
they have ascended, and which continues to promote their market o pportunities through 
access to the state.  Emerging elites owing their positions to state discrimination as much as 
their own education, will not necessarily promote egalitarian policies or identify with multi-
ethnic classes (contra Smith 1981:189).  Chapter III argued these processes have fostered a 
constituency for ideologies of ethnic privilege starkly demonstrated during the 2000 coup.  
Not only, then, can the valid assistance claims of disadvantaged Indigenes be de-legitimised 
by the systematic way in which elites convert their plight into avenues for elite accumulation.  
Ethnic-based affirmative action can also reinforce and perpetuate ideologies of ethnic priority, 
as sections of the population increasingly depend on state-structured opportunities. 
Alongside the income disadvantage of Indigenous Fijians is a consciousness that their 
culture is antithetical to economic success (Interview: RFMF 29/08/01).  This opposition is 
part of broader dichotomy between Indigenous culture and ‘civilisation’ or ‘modernity’, 
commencing with a religious-conversion process that disaffirmed their pre-Christian past as 
the time of ‘darkness’ relative to civilisation as the time of ‘light’ (Thomas 1992a:221; Toren 
1999:27).  Racist colonial ideologies positing Indigenes as unready either for self-governance 
or ‘modern’ economic competition reinforced the antithesis, and fulfilled their prophesy by 
obstructing Indigenous enterprise.  Colonial-era essentialist dichotomies underline 
contemporary linkages of characteristics amenable to capitalism with Indo-Fijians, and 
characteristics incompatible with it, with Indigenous Fijians.  An Indigenous academic 
reflected this consciousness: 
How do you compete with a race that has thousands of years of what we call civilization?  
When the first Indians arrived in Fiji in 1879, my grandparents were just ten years from eating 
each other. [Cited in Lal 1992:272] 
To justify special assistance, leaders have continued to emphasise the disadvantages inherent 
in Indigenous culture, rather than building on numerous success-stories and seeking economic 
potential in communal relationships.  Consciousness of disadvantage is daily reiterated by 
Indigenes, perceiving communal society as favouring redistribution not accumulation, and 
their contentment with the present as preventing successful business and investment 
(Interview: RFMF 29/08/01).  However much they valorise their generosity, Indigenes see it 
as inherently preventing their economic success in contradistinction to conspicuous Indo-
Fijian accumulation.  Affirmative action justified by disadvantages inherent in Indigenous 
culture merely reinforces Indigenous insecurity and inferiority according to the standards of 
capitalist economics.  It promotes an inverted valorisation of factors perceived to prevent 
accumulation, leaving Indigenous Fijians in opposition to the economic system in which they 
necessarily participate. 
Affirmative action must operate on different foundations if it is to avoid elite capture, 
the state structuring economic opportunities by ethnicity, and reinforcing an antithesis 
between Indigenes and socio-economic success.  Assistance should be justified not by 
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membership of the nation, not an ethnic group.  This approach to affirmative action is not 
only compatible with political equality, but demanded by it.  Democratic participation by 
formally equal citizens requires entitlement to a just share of national resources and 
acceptable level of wellbeing.  Ethnic incidences of disadvantage, regional concentration and 
occupational segmentation enable pro-poor development policies to disproportionately target 
Indigenous Fijians.  Entitlement, however, would emanate from disadvantage not ethnicity.  
The inclusion of non-Indigenes facing similar disadvantages could reduce the significance 
and growing rigidity of Indigenous boundaries, currently excluding the Indigenous maternal 
line not registered in the  Vola Ni Kawa Bula book of landowners (Interviews: Sanday 
09/08/01; Beddoes 22/08/01).
85  Formal political equality should not legitimate inequalities 
and social exclusion generated in the private sector, as if its outcomes are merited and 
affirmative action merely bypasses competitive achievement (contra  Roosens 1989:157).  
This is particularly poignant where ethnic closures, such as trading networks, determine 
private sector opportunities.  As Ratu Mara argued in the 1980s, why should equity apply to 
Indo-Fijian land access but not Indigenous commercial a nd professional access? (Lal 
1992:227)  Universalist claims can mask sectional interests, with Indigenes particularly 
hostile to Indo-Fijian dominated unions: 
When [unionists] hold the sugar industry and Fiji’s economy to ransom through industrial 
actions, they are called heroes of the farmers and mill workers.  When the simplest native 
Fijian pleads to have his rights entrenched in the Constitution, he is called an extremist and a 
racist. [Sun 22/08/01:9] 
Where socio-economic inequity persists, equality should demand alleviation, not impede 
remedies involving differential treatments of individuals and groups.  These principles for 
affirmative action were provided by the 1997 Constitution (Sect.6,45), but their practice is a 
matter for political art not concrete specification (Interview: Vakatora 01/08/01). 
D.  The Content of Paramountcy: Claims to Cultural Protection 
A parallel example to the undermining of valid affirmative action by its translation 
into elite-oriented claims exists with Indigenous cultural protection.  Lack of successful 
articulation of protection claims for international sympathy contrasts with wide recognition 
that Indigenous culture is threatened (Interviews: Vakatale 17/08/01; Sanday 09/08/01).  
Ethnic nationalists again refute the inapplicability of Indigenous rights to population 
majorities by claiming their minority cultural status in the global community (Interviews: 
Vakalalabure 25/07/01; Tora 06/08/01).  Fijian language and local Indigenous dialects are 
becoming hybridised with or entirely replaced by English (Interview: Williams 16/08/01).  
Indigenous belief systems, modes of production and communal redistribution structures are 
changing rapidly with urbanisation, marketisation and encounters with external values.  
Education and wealth provide alternative bases for leadership, diffusing traditional authority 
even within villages (Interview: Madraiwiwi 26/07/01).  Several political actors regretfully 
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suggested that not capitalism or ‘Western values’ but their own churches pose the most 
significant threat to Indigenous culture.  Church leaders increasingly organise daily activities 
of villagers, usurping leadership and funds from Indigenous authority structures and networks 
(see Thomas 1992a:224).
86  Few Indigenes, however, would entertain  the possibility of 
delineating Indigenous from Christian (Interview: Rev Koroi 07/08/01).  State funding for 
Indigenous dance, art and music assumes that ‘culture’ consists of a ritual or symbolic realm 
only (SVT 2001a:9; SDL 2001a:16, FLP 2001a:19, NFP 2001:16).  Indigenous Fijians, 
however, experience change in the systems of power, production and exchange they enact 
daily, but over which they sense little control.  Reactions to these insecurities are manifest in 
attempts to re-introduce customary law courts and legislation, strengthen the Fijian 
Administration, and reject human rights as antithetical to Indigenous rights and 
responsibilities (Interviews: Sikivo 17/08/01; Sadole 29/08/01; Vakatora 01/08/01;  Fijian 
Customary Laws (Recognition) Bill 2001). 
Debate of these micro-level aspects of cultural change was conspicuous by its absence 
in the 2001 campaign.  Strategies to empower Indigenes in the encounter between their belief 
systems and those external to them were not considered.  Nor did political dialogue seriously 
engage with possibilities for negotiating the relationship between formal justice systems and 
customary law, or formal democratic systems and customary authority.  The daily frustrations 
of operating within the separate Fijian Administration were not addressed (Interview: Rasoki 
27/08/01).  Instead, Indigenous nationalists drew on insecurities from micro-level concerns 
and tenuously linked them to symbolic issues of national Indigenous power.  These emotive 
issues appeared to appeal to voters more than discussions of daily concerns (Interview: 
Ganilau 23/08/01).  Indigenous control of a distant state resonated as a panacea for micro-
level frustrations (Interviews: Madraiwiwi 26/07/01; Vakatale 17/08/01).  The UN Draft 
Declaration could, however, be applied with the greatest legitimacy to these marginalized 
cultural concerns, in which Indigenes fit the Declaration’s intended targets of threatened 
communities.  It provides their rights to practice, revitalise and develop future manifestations 
of their cultural traditions and languages (Art.12,14).  Instead, ethnic nationalists selected 
provisions legitimising their own claims to political power:
87 
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. [Art.3] 
Ethnic leaders thus drew on and fostered Indigenous identities based on rights to political 
control.  Translating self-determination into Indigenous control of the state in Fiji is difficult 
to substantiate given that the Preamble of the Declaration clearly calls to elevate previously 
subordinated Indigenous peoples to  equal status with other peoples.  The Preamble also 
explicitly opposes interpretations denying rights of self-determination to other peoples.  
                                                 
86 The Sun (29/08/01:10), for example, reported that Methodist Church members had raised a staggering $F2,000,000 for its 
Annual Conference. 
87 This seizes on the novelty of the Declaration, not in previous international Indigenous rights documents, describing 
Indigenes as peoples, thus self-determination applies to them (Thompson 1997:793) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 69 
 
 
Guaranteeing political power to a particular race also undermines equality and democracy 
upheld by this UN Draft Declaration (Art.45). 
The contested validity of translating self-determination into guaranteed Indigenous 
control of the state does not detract from the effectiveness with which local actors are 
supporting their political strategies by particular deployments of international rights 
discourses.  Nor does it detract from the potential of these processes to structure political 
identities around national Indigenous power.  It has, however, circumvented consideration of 
the power structures within which Indigenous culture interacts with Christianity, capitalism 
and liberal values on a daily basis.  These concerns were tenuously linked to national 
Indigenous power, despite the recent history of ethnic nationalist governments singularly 
failing to translate rule into micro-level Indigenous cultural empowerment and language 
teaching.  In power, typically  English-educated, urban-based Indigenous elites tend to 
subscribe to a modernisation paradigm, oriented away from the micro-concerns that supported 
their instalment.  More importantly, linking Indigenous cultural rights to political control 
(including coups) undermines potential to forge consensus in Fiji’s polity.  Culture and 
language concerns are dismissed with the aggressive paramountcy claims of those who 
represent them.  They could instead bridge the political divide by claiming legitimacy in 
liberal minority-rights paradigms.
88  Therein, ethnic groups are entitled to protection because 
the cultural frameworks within which people make meaning are prerequisites for members to 
enjoy equal opportunities to live meaningful lives (Thompson 1997:789; Kymlicka and 
Straehle 1999:72).  Equality requires recognition and protection of cultural groups; it cannot 
legitimately be deployed to undermine them. 
E.  Deploying Paramountcy over Land 
The UN Draft Declaration (Art.26) provides for Indigenous ownership and control of 
traditional lands.  No political parties in the 2001 campaign questioned Indigenous land 
ownership, guaranteed in the 1997 Constitution (Sect.185).  However, the potential of 
Indigenous Fijians to develop, control and use these lands, now amounting to more than 90% 
of the country, was a major political issue.  The main Indo-Fijian parties held different 
positions.  The NFP leader argued that Indigenous-owned land should be considered a 
fundamental national resource, “that must be made available for the d evelopment of the 
nation and for all the people.” (Interview: Singh 31/07/01)  The FLP (2001a:12-3) sought 
tenancy access to idle land, but emphasised empowering land owners to optimally utilise their 
occupied lands.  This approach to technical and capital assistance for landowners was 
supported by the FAP (2001a: 3), PANU (Interview: Bogileka 27/07/01), and acknowledged 
by the GCC Chairman as potentially benefiting Indigenous Fijians (Interview: Ganilau 
23/08/01).  Land paramountcy is less a question of land rights than what Indigenous Fijians 
can practically gain from them; as even some ethnic nationalists admit, this is not an ‘Indian 
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issue’ at all (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01).  One intra-Fijian aspect of the land issue is massive 
inequality of landholdings among Indigenes, with traditional mechanisms to redistribute land 
suppressed by colonial-era codification (Overton 1992:329).  These disparities mean that 
nearly 40% of leases are to other Indigenes, however Overton (1992:338) argues that this 
cleavage has not been translated into intra-Indigenous rural class ideologies. 
With the establishment of the NLTB in 1940, Indigenous Fijians transferred the 
management of their lands to a statutory body.  They were persuaded to this by high chiefs in 
the colonial administration, serving state economic interests in better administration of 
agricultural and particularly cane leases (Lal 1992:134-5).  The NLTB has subsequently 
controlled leases under legislation entrenched at independence, that fixes lease rentals, terms 
and durations.  Not only does the NLTB extract a 20% share of arguably already ‘pitifully’ 
low rentals (Davies 2000:9), 30% is divided between three levels of chiefs before the 
remainder is shared among not necessarily egalitarian landowning  mataqali (Lawson 
1991:246).  The NLTB is highly politicised, less mediating inter-ethnic political economy 
conflicts than promoting political instability.
89  It discouraged renewals of expiring 30-year 
leases during the FLP government, aggravating inter-ethnic tension  (Tarte 2001:530-1).
90  
The NLTB has now decided it is in the interests of Indigenous Fijians to farm themselves, 
thus even landowners wishing to renew leases are forced to resume control.
91  Recent 
compensation cases have revealed the NLTB Manager to perceive the NLTB as the owner of 
native lands; a situation he sought to engineer during the 2000 crisis through a much criticised 
‘Deed of Sovereignty’ transferring land ownership to the NLTB (Sun 01/09/01:2).  As a 
presentation of landowners to one political party argued, “Fijians are landowners in name 
only.” (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01; see also Overton 1992:326) 
Indigenous political parties typically argue that the NLTB should be strengthened, and 
legislative control of land changed to increase returns to owners (SDL 2001a:8; SVT 2001a:2; 
Interview Vakalalabure 25/07/01).  The leader of the ethnic nationalist DNT, however, 
suggested that the NLTB is the problem (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01; Times 08/08/01:12).  Dr 
Dewa argues that land control should be decentralised to mataqali, to return to Indigenous 
owners their sense of land power and to enable them to ‘practice their ownership’.  He claims 
the absence of clear land titling, the inaccessibility of NLTB leases, and conflicts over land 
ownership mean that commercial banks will not accept native lands as security for mortgages.  
This prevents owners from raising capital on their land to invest in and develop it.  Opposing 
state paternalism, he contends landowners should negotiate their own leases and develop their 
own land; any failures being valuable aspects of being able to learn.  He argues: “If we make 
a mess, we won’t always…It is the landowners’ right to make wrong decisions, why should 
others make the mistakes for them?” 
                                                 
89 A number of NLTB officials were candidates for the MV in the2001 elections (Times 20/07/01:3). 
90 Prasad et al (2001:6) estimate that over 1,200 leases to Indo-Fijians were not renewed from 1999-2000. 
91 The ‘Close-Up’ program (FijiTV 13/08/01), interviewing NLTB Manager Maika Qarikau, also revealed that landowning 
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The NLTB, however, remains apparently unassailable.  The DNT stood alone among 
ethnic nationalists and Indigenous parties in criticising the NLTB.  The ease with which 
opponents rallied popular protest against Chaudhry in 2000 for proposing to alter land 
utilisation policies, that may have contained NLTB power, exemplifies the political dynamite 
sparked by Indo-Fijian criticism.  Not only does the state have an interest in this de facto 
control of land, the rental division is also extraordinarily lucrative for upper levels of the 
chiefly hierarchy functioning as a landed aristocracy (Norton 1990:26).  Indigenous public 
servants within the NLTB appear beholden to its interests, rather than to broader Indigenous 
interests in rural development.  Political economy, however, is only part of the explanation for 
NLTB power.  Norton (1990:49-50) argues that the NLTB, along with the Fijian 
Administration of regional representative councils up to the GCC, has historically provided 
the basis for solidarity among Indigenous Fijians.  These institutions integrate the diverse 
Indigenous population into a national order, the NLTB forming part of this set of Indigenous 
institutions offering a ‘consciousness of collective honour’.  Without obscuring vested NLTB 
interests promoting this cultural construction, it explains why Indigenes rationally rally 
behind the institutions through which they have historically been mobilised and which 
symbolise their collective strength.  As Overton (1992:338) argues, however, the NLTB has 
represented Indigenous interests but has denied the actual landowners real power over their 
land. 
Land not only symbolises Indigenous unity, but is central to intra-Fijian struggles for 
chiefly power and resource wealth.  These were glaringly obvious during the 2000 political 
crisis where, within a week of the coup, the inter-ethnic conflict providing its rhetoric was 
sidelined by intra-Fijian power struggles (Ratuva 2000:53).  Intra-Fijian dynastic, vanua and 
confederacy tensions involve numerous socio-economic, political and symbolic issues.  Not 
least are the ascent of Indigenes from particular Provinces in the state and patterns of uneven 
development during colonial and independence eras (Prasad  et al 2001:5).  Increasingly 
divisive loyalties are associated within the uneven distribution of natural resources and market 
resource values.  As Rabuka (Interview: 02/08/01) explained of intra-Fijian rivalry: 
It is competition…It is jealously or envy.  The perception of the unfair distribution of what, 
perhaps, was universally Indigenous – the resources we had.  We had all the land belonging to 
us.  You occupy that part, we occupy this part  – the benefit from both we share.  [In the 
colonial era] People swore on the Bible that my land is from that tree to that river etc., we 
became boxed in to those areas, a group of boxes all related to a chief – people who happened 
to have the best fortresses at that time would then realise that land was useless for sugar cane 
and tourism – when we stopped fighting we had a useless piece of territory. 
The distribution of benefits from differentially valued resource endowments shared within 
different sized mataqali, is critical in intra-Fijian rivalries.  These contest what aspects of 
resource control remain with the state – thus rents are open to competition – and what are 
captured directly by their Indigenous owners.  A trend toward the latter may reduce state 
exploitation of landowners and the stakes of political competition, but may also exacerbate 
regional inequalities based on fixed natural resource endowments.  These contests are closely 
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increase mataqali land control are part of a power-struggle to increase representation of large 
landowners from Viti Levu in a GCC historically dominated by high chiefs from the Eastern 
Islands (Interview: Dewa 14/08/01; Interview: Ganilau 23/08/01).
92  Whilst uneven 
distributions of resource rents and chiefly struggles fragment Indigenous politics, Indigenous 
Fijians continue to lack the means to benefit from their land paramountcy.  Were they able to 
generate economic returns outside the NLTB, the ideological symbolism of Indigenous 
institutions may gradually be more difficult to sustain (see Berman 2000:20-1).  Livelihood 
dissatisfaction, however, remains a reservoir of potential instability that can be harnessed by 
Indigenous leaders, however little it relates to its inter-ethnic rhetoric. 
F.  Conclusion 
This chapter has explored divisive and cohesive aspects of contemporary political 
dialogue in Fiji.  Individual equality and Indigenous paramountcy claims were placed on 
common ground as constructions of political rights.  Whilst not capturing all deployments of 
these concepts, this framework elucidates critical differences in their ideological constructions 
of society and the historical timeframes in which they judge the fairness of rights claims.  The 
identification of difference within a common framework provides a basis for negotiability.  
Avoiding clarity on the foundations underpinning political rights claims offers strategic 
advantage to ethnic political entrepreneurs, however.  It provides flexibility for mobilising 
voters while appealing to potential coalition partners, and scope for altering political demands 
over time.  Critics challenged ethnic nationalists in the campaign to specify what content of 
paramountcy would satisfy them, to avoid ongoing expansions of claims (Interview: Lini 
14/08/01).  The criticism, however, is no less applicable to proponents of equality who take 
their conception of rights as self-explanatory because of its status in international human 
rights discourse.  They thus avoid clearly specifying the relationship between political and 
socio-economic equality, and between individual rights and ethnic group recognition.  
Without a common framework for dialogue, the ideologies of paramountcy and equality 
cannot engage and negotiate with each other.  They will thus continue to appear to present an 
intractable contradiction undermining the formation of an inclusive national polity. 
By exploring particular aspects of paramountcy claims, it is possible to demonstrate 
how the genuine Indigenous concerns underpinning them are compatible with broadly 
interpreted equality.  In each of the cases of affirmative action, cultural protection and land 
control, the rhetorical use of claims by elites was distinguished from the experienced 
disadvantage or insecurity of the wider Indigenous population.  Addressing these 
disadvantages and cultural threats is not only compatible with equality, but demanded by it.  
This requires a broad understanding of equality, recognising that effective political equality 
requires an inclusive economy,
93 and the existence of cultural frameworks within which 
                                                 
92 The highest chiefly mataqali traditionally owned little land, with agricultural mataqali provisioning them.  Colonial rule 
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individual choices are meaningful.  The translation of  Indigenous grievances into elite 
political claims and vehicles for competition, however, detracts from potential consensus on 
Indigenous concerns with non-Indigene political parties.  This potential is also constrained by 
extreme Indo-Fijian translations of political equality into identical individual treatment by the 
state.  Reaching political consensus in Fiji demands more than identifying common social and 
economic concerns, however.  As Fiji’s land issue exemplifies, recognising the symbolic 
meanings of institutions is critical before they can be made to better serve Indigenous Fijians.  
This argument, that to serve as a foundation for political inclusion in Fiji, equality must 
incorporate welfare, cultural and symbolic concerns, parallels Norton’s (1990:xi) argument on 
class-politics: 
[A] strongly inter-ethnic political organisation [will] succeed only by accommodating general 
economic and social welfare issues with the more politically potent ethnic concerns and not by 




CONCLUSION: PARAMOUNTCY AND EQUALITY 
IN POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN THE FIJI ISLANDS 
A.  Towards an Inclusive National Polity 
Political rights claims based on ideologies of paramountcy and equality are critical in 
contemporary struggles for power, resources and justice in Fiji.  These concepts are deployed 
by ethnic elites to underpin their demands and justify their actions.  They also structure the 
political identities of Fiji’s citizens, identities that impel and constrain the behaviour of 
political leaders (Norton 2000b:90).  An ethnically ‘divided’ polity should not be taken as 
given, to be managed by an imposed political regime (contra Horowitz 1993:25); rather, the 
polity and regime interact to continually restructure each other.  The ideology of Indigenous 
paramountcy has been used to justify and has shaped the form taken by the overthrows of 
democracy in 1987 and 2000 that have seriously undermined Fiji’s development.  The 
ideology of individual equality has underpinned and shaped resistance to the coups, both 
through political party opposition and civil society protest.  The latter’s strength, in the 
context of respect for judicial authority in Fiji, was exemplified by pro-democracy protests 
vital in upholding the 1997 Constitution.  Political dialogue also reconstructs political 
identities, and thus possibilities for building an inclusive polity.  National identity, as Ratu 
Joni Madraiwiwi argues, is currently weak: 
Our respective cultures have affirmed our respective identities at the cost of keeping us at arms 
length from each other…our sense of nationhood, that sense of belonging to a place and to 
each other as one people has never fully developed. [Cited in Times 30/06/01:34] 
Mayer’s (1963:ix) lament approaching independence is still true: Fiji lacks even an accepted 
common name for its citizens.  Absence of an inclusive polity enables political actors to draw 
on differential identities to support their claims to power and political exclusion, further 
undermining social cohesion. 
Paramountcy can be understood as a political rights claim whose fairness is adjudged 
within a historical timeframe.  Its rhetoric of restoring political power to the Indigenous 
people ceding sovereignty to Britain would return Fiji to a 1990-style Constitution, 
entrenching an Indigenous parliamentary majority.  This would undermine common 
citizenship rights, not only of non-Indigenes denied participation in selecting the government, 
but also Indigenes supporting democracy and not identifying politically with paramountcy or 
Indigenous leaders (Lawson 1993:18).  Remedying historical injustices against Indigenous 
Fijians cannot involve abstracting from 130 years of enormous change in Fiji’s demographic, 
political economy and ideological systems.  The opportunity to integrate Indigenous and 
democratic governance structures was not taken at independence, but is currently offered by 
the 1997 Constitutional recognition of the GCC.  The GCC is now developing the funds and 
expertise to attempt national competence in its advisory role (Interview Ganilau: 23/08/01).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 75 
 
 
The centrality of paramountcy to political identities means the concept must be addressed, not 
dismissed.  As Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (2001) argues: 
Objectively, the i nterests of indigenous Fijians appear adequately protected.  However, 
inasmuch as a significant number of Fijians seem to consider their interests are insufficiently 
safeguarded, there is a problem.  Perception is reality: they see, therefore there is a problem. 
This centrality of paramountcy to Indigenous identities means it can be drawn on as a 
resource to integrate Fiji’s polity.  If defined as a protective principle, to prevent the 
subordination of Indigenous interests, it is compatible with the equal p olitical rights for 
citizens that are necessary for political inclusiveness.  This goal of political inclusion need not 
be incompatible with maintaining separate Indigenous institutions offering security or 
symbolising status, including communal seats that may fragment national political interests 
but avoid potential democratic exclusion of ethnic groups (Horowitz 1993:31).  Using 
protective paramountcy as a foundation for an inclusive national polity offers a principle 
delineating Indigenous institutions that support national integration from those perpetuating 
separation and Indigenous priority. 
Political equality is necessary for building an inclusive polity, but it is not a sufficient 
foundation.  Whilst pretending universality, it can be deployed for sectional interest.  Uneven 
geographic, educational, occupational and earnings distributions among Fiji’s ethnic groups 
provide scope for ostensibly non-discriminatory policies to have differential ethnic impacts.  
This can be harnessed positively to alleviate inter-ethnic inequalities within broader 
development policies, for example rural development that disproportionately assists 
Indigenes.  It can also mask socio-economic exclusion and attract resentment for the concept 
of ‘equality’ itself.  Its use is illegitimate where political equality constructs private sector 
generated inequalities as merited, or where class-based action favours formal or unionised 
labour that disproportionately represents one ethnic group.  Moreover, equality forms a 
foundation for political participation and inclusiveness only if it mandates policies promoting 
socio-economic inclusion, equity and a minimum level of wellbeing.  In a multi-ethnic polity, 
inter-ethnic socio-economic equity is fundamental to perceptions of fairness and thus the 
potential for citizens to identify with ideologies of political equality (Stewart 2001:45).  
Equality is compatible with affirmative action programmes that differentially affect ethnic 
groups to alleviate disadvantage.  Affirmative action should, however, be grounded on social 
welfare philosophies not ethnic priority, with entitlement from membership of the polity, not 
a particular ethnic group.  Inclusive of the disadvantaged in all communities, it should avoid 
reinforcing the significance of ethnic boundaries.  Focusing on affirmative action must not 
obscure the enormous potential for even-handed good government in Fiji to reduce inter-
ethnic inequities, nor assume that socio-economic inequities are the only sources of inter-
ethnic friction (Horowitz 2001: 677).  Equality is essential for inclusiveness, but its political 
deployment should be treated as critically as that of paramountcy. 
Indigenous rights need not be incompatible with equality nor impede political 
inclusion (Spoonley 2002:4).  Extreme positions from ILO Convention 169 and the UN Draft 
Declaration promote exclusion, however.  Ethnic nationalist translations of self-determination 
into Indigenous political hegemony are as flawed as opposing attempts to de-legitimate any 
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Reading the Declarations according to their purposes – to elevate disadvantaged Indigenous 
peoples to equal status with the broader community – provides a basis for identifying aspects 
of Indigenous livelihoods meriting protection because they are threatened in contemporary 
society.  Assistance for teaching and practicing Indigenous languages, music and oral history 
are only starting points.  The right to develop future manifestations of Indigenous culture 
(UNHRC 1994:Art.12) underlines the importance of empowering Indigenes in processes that 
are transforming their customary political, economic and belief-structures.  These processes 
are played out in daily encounters with the effects of national political institutions and global 
economic forces and value-systems.  Strengthening national Indigenous institutions need not 
mitigate Indigenous insecurities arising from their present disempowerment in these localised 
processes.  Moreover, once secure of national leadership, Indigenous elites have frequently 
demonstrated ambivalence to grass-roots cultural empowerment.  Recognising group rights 
for Indigenous and other communities offers a means to integrate into national society 
citizens identifying with ethnic groups.  It also bolsters individual political rights, by 
supporting the cultural frameworks within which these citizens imbue their lives with 
meaning.  Fiji’s changing demography, increasing the Indigenous majority, makes group 
rights  vital.  Indigenes must be accorded special rights not because they could not use 
population and parliamentary majorities to implement equivalent policies, but to prevent such 
arbitrary discrimination using majority power.  Special rights should instead emanate from 
agreed principles.  Indigenous and group rights offer such principles to protect Indigenous 
culture, and minority groups against democratic rule. 
B.  A Brief Comparative Perspective 
Important characteristics of political dialogue in Fiji’s struggle to build an inclusive 
polity come into sharper relief against political contests in similar states.  Fiji is frequently 
compared to Mauritius, Guyana and Trinidad because of their analogous colonial histories of 
Indian indenture, differential economic integration of ethnic groups, and contemporary 
politicised ethnic divisions (Carroll 1994:302; Norton 1977:143; Despres 1975a:88).  Guyana 
and Trinidad demonstrate the difficulties of forging and sustaining multi-ethnic identities, 
with political party systems in both degenerating from class to ethnic ideologies (Jayawardena 
1980:443; Horowitz 2000:311).  Mauritius also parallels Fiji, with class-based Labour parties 
becoming vehicles for sectional ethnic interests (Carroll 1994:312).  Their significant contrast 
with Fiji, however, is that all major ethnic communities in these states descend from 
immigrants (Norton 1977:143).  Competing groups in Mauritius accept equality of rights and 
do not make priority claims (Carroll 1994:314-6).  While Afro-Caribbean peoples in Guyana 
and Trinidad do pursue claims from prior inhabitancy, neither has successfully constructed 
and drawn on the resources of Indigenous identities so potent in Fiji’s politics.  Instead, 
political debates pursue and assess policies according to ethnic proportionality, more closely 
approximating Roosens’ (1989:14) framework of ethnicity as establishing  equivalency 
between groups.  They also show that prior inhabitancy does not inherently lead a group to 
pursue Indigenous claims (Carroll 1994:316-7).  This underscores the importance this thesis 
has placed on tracing the historical construction of Indigenous claims to paramountcy.  It also 
directs comparison to Malaysia, whose political dialogue parallels Fiji’s confrontation 
between demands for Indigenous priority and individual parity (Horowitz 2000:201; Norton 
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Particular parallels between Bumiputra and Indigenous Fijian political ideologies have 
been highlighted in the argument of this thesis, from the origins of Malay ‘special rights’ in 
British colonial ideologies of protective trusteeship to the construction of independence as a 
bargain of Chinese citizenship for Malay political leadership and socio-economic advance 
(Wyzan 1990:52; Alamgir 1994:70-1).  Malaysia’s 1969 ‘race riots’ were constructed by 
Indigenes as evidence of Malay disaffection with socio-economic exclusion and threats to 
their political control.  Circumscribed political freedoms preserving the hegemony of 
incumbent Malay rulers and ethnically based affirmative action could then be justified as pre-
empting national disintegration (Faaland  et al  1990:12-3,25).  Indigenous Fijian protests 
during the 1987 and 2000 coups are similarly constructed as warnings of state disintegration 
should non-Indigenes rule or the socio-economic status of Indigenous Fijians not be urgently 
improved.
94  These constructions were starkly evident in the 2001 election campaign, the SDL 
(2001a:6) using threats of national instability to justify Indigenous leadership and socio-
economic advance.  Its affirmative action Blueprint (SDL 2001b:3) argued: 
Ensuring the paramountcy of [Indigenous Fijians’] interests and their equitable participation in 
all aspects of life in Fiji is thus a pre-condition for the achievement of long term peace, 
stability and sustainable development in the country. 
Simply comparing Fiji with Malaysia has power implications, however, reinforcing 
Indigenous constructions of the causes and solutions of Fiji’s struggles to build an inclusive 
polity.  Malaysia is used to strengthen analysis of the salience of ethnic cleavages in Fiji, and 
exemplify how antagonism can be mitigated by Indigenous-dominated consociational 
democracy and aggressive affirmative action.  Horowitz (2000:402) argues, however, that 
Malaysia’s ruling coalition emerged in non-replicable circumstances; the SDL’s recent un-
constitutional exclusion of the FLP from cabinet in Fiji demonstrates that Fiji lacks the 
requisite conditions for power sharing.
95  Malaysian affirmative action may support the 
importance of socio-economic inclusion to political stability, but it also exemplifies the 
capture of ethnic based programmes by elites.  The focus of its New Economic Policy on 
Indigenous advance in the public service, commerce, professions and capital ownership has 
disproportionately benefited an emerging Malay middle class and increased inequality among 
Malays (Khan 2000:99; Wyzan 1990:68-9).  Adam (1998:110) argues ‘inter-ethnic equality’ 
has simply reproduced the class structure found in the broader society within the Bumiputra.  
This thesis has argued that Fiji’s replication of Malaysian affirmative action has similarly 
promoted an Indigenous middle class sensitive to non-Indigene competition, reliant on state 
privilege and supporting paramountcy as an ideology of Indigenous priority preserving its 
privileges.  Indigenous capital and land returns have disproportionately benefited elites, who 
then resist reform of state structures and rural production relations.  Additionally, ethnically 
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exclusive affirmative action will accord less with the needs of Fiji’s society as inequalities 
among non-Indigenes grow: middle class emigration means the Indo-Fijian community in 
particular is increasing polarised between large entrepreneurs and a landless class (Prasad et 
al 2001:6). 
C.  Future Directions for Politics and Research in Fiji 
Fiji offers insights into processes constituting the inclusive political communities that 
are vital to development in multi-ethnic states.  Recent decades of crisis have increased the 
importance of constructing an inclusive national identity in Fiji, and frustrated this endeavour.  
Instability has precluded the possibility enjoyed by Malaysia of economic growth funding 
extensive affirmative action (Emsley 1996:43).  Reducing inter-ethnic socio-economic 
inequality in Fiji must instead rely on politically more demanding redistribution, requiring 
political negotiation (Ratuva 2001:24).  Fiji’s open public space for debate has enabled 
political actors on both sides of the ethnic divide to contest attempts to increase ethnic 
exclusion in political dialogue and government practice.  Ideologies of Indigenous 
paramountcy have played critical roles challenging pretensions to universality of particular 
deployments of ideologies of equality.  These, in turn, were critical resources for resistance to 
the 2000 coup, enabling the retention of the 1997 Constitution as a foundation for political 
inclusion.  The strength of Fiji’s judiciary and respect for it has proved vital in opposing 
political exclusion.  The degree of contest in domestic political dialogue over the construction 
of ethnically and religiously exclusive ideologies cannot be overestimated, contests often 
most fierce within ethnic groups.  Development will not, however, necessarily promote the 
cause of political actors seeking inclusion based on equality.  The more the state becomes a 
vehicle for structuring educational and economic opportunities according to ethnicity, the 
more reliant are emergent elites on ethnically exclusive ideologies and practices (Ratuva 
2000:56). 
This thesis has shown how particular meanings of equality and paramountcy can 
found an inclusive national polity respecting all citizens and attuned to the importance of 
protecting Indigenous culture and socio-economic wellbeing.  The 1997 Constitution offers a 
basis for this endeavour in Fiji.  Built on fundamental individual equality, it extends beyond 
formal political equality to mandate affirmative action for disadvantaged sections of the 
population and acknowledge group rights for cultural communities.  It recognises Indigenous 
rights to land ownership, natural resource returns, protection of customary institutions and 
paramountcy, preventing Indigenous interests from being subordinated.  As Indigenous 
parliamentary majorities become more secure with  demographic change, incumbents have 
less motivation to tamper with this foundation (Interview: Lal 06/09/01).  The Constitution 
may facilitate inclusiveness, but is insufficient to guarantee it.  Fiji has political leaders 
advocating inclusiveness but, as  the 2001 campaign demonstrated, lacks a significant 
population segment identifying with their ideologies.  Instead, leaders articulating ethnically 
exclusive claims resonated with existing political identities, both reflecting and influencing 
identification with extreme meanings of paramountcy and equality.  In the wake of ethnic 
polarisation from the 2000 crisis, ethnic appeals triumphed on both sides of politics.  
Supporters often expressed awareness of elite self-interests pursued through these ideologies, 
but identified with them nonetheless.  In political dialogue, Indigenous privilege thus QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 79 
 
 
continues to rival a conception of equality prone to promoting sectional interests.  
Considerable inter-ethnic social interaction and clear socio-economic bases for  class-
consciousness have not been translated into significant multi-ethnic political identities 
(Norton 1990:106).  Nor are intra-ethnic fragmentation and its ‘additional social reference 
points’ for identity formation being harnessed for inter-ethnic coalitions (Melson and Wolpe 
1970:1126).
96  Ethnic leaders and their adherents continue to construct conflicting histories, 
frameworks for understanding the present and visions for the future of Fiji.  Ideological 
discord on the past, present and future seriously undermines the construction of a common 
citizenship and potential for societal cohesion. 
Political dialogue in Fiji is structured by interactions between ideologies promoted by 
political actors, and between these and wider political identities.  Political outcomes, however, 
are not purely the products of the overarching designs of actors (Carr 1961:45).  Rather, they 
result from complex interactions between political dialogues and institutions with their own 
imperatives. This research has emphasised how  historical and institutional contexts shape 
political dialogue and the potential for an inclusive polity.  These critical institutions in Fiji 
include Indigenous land ownership and leadership structures, and ethnic closures in the public 
sector, police, military, professions and private enterprise.  These institutional closures are 
part of processes of competition for political, economic and symbolic resources in Fiji; they 
are not simply objects that policy can manipulate.  They are also part of processes 
reconstructing political identities in unfolding contexts.  The next important research question 
is thus how the activities, interests and strategies of these institutions interact with political 
dialogue and the receipt of ideologies by supporters to facilitate and constrain particular 
developmental outcomes. 
                                                 
96 See also Brass (1991:340), Horowitz (2000:598) and Mayer (1963:164) on the potential for intra-ethnic cleavages to spur 





A.  Introduction 
This appendix critically reflects on my techniques for researching political dialogue in 
Fiji.  It demonstrates how my awareness of techniques and their underlying methodological 
theory affected the research design and practice.  It provides the context within which my 
research occurred, vital to interpreting the evidence gathered and assessing its reliability.  
Finally, this critical analysis suggests improvements for future research design and practice in 
similar fields.  These insights are provided through exploring the methodological theory 
influencing my techniques for approaching documents, semi-structured interviews and the 
broader fieldwork experience.   The political and ethical issues of researching politicised 
ethnicity in Fiji are also outlined.  These sections follow a sketch of the circumstances of my 
fieldwork and a review of the approaches of other academics. 
The timing and ten-week duration of my fieldwork component was fixed by Oxford’s 
academic schedule.  Hoddinott (1992:72-4) argues that the rigidities of research design 
imposed by time constraints make conclusions more tentative.  Further, research questions are 
partially defined by the possibilities of research schedules  – my topic influenced by the 
fieldwork coinciding with Fiji’s elections – rather than a prior purpose defining an optimum 
schedule.  These constraints were mitigated by my retrospectively using a four-month 
previous residence in Fiji as a ‘preliminary’ visit (Hoddinott 1992:74-5).  It provided practical 
knowledge reducing time spent on logistical tasks, and a network of colleagues and friends 
offering invaluable personal and research support.  These friendships, where I would 
otherwise have felt alien, afforded the confidence necessary to generate research encounters 
and infuse them with sufficient rapport to make them valuable (de Laine 2000:39).  My prior 
visit, coinciding with the 2000 coup, was also an intensive introduction to political actors, 
issues and attitudes.  It provided my research interest and helped define my topic.  Whilst 
local actors did not generate my topic according to their needs (Ravuvu 1976:73), it did arise 
from the awareness I encountered during the coup that unresolved conceptual clashes between 
paramountcy and equality undermined Fiji’s development.  English is used by government, 
business and most media, however many aspects of political activity, popular media and 
social life are conducted in Fijian  or Hindi.  My limited capacity to access these spheres, 
alongside the limited validity of short assessments of grass-roots political activity, influenced 
my focus on formal elite political dialogue. 
Academics researching ethnic politics in Fiji use techniques from multiple disciplines, 
according to their theoretical positions.  Lawson (1990; 1991; 1992) combines 
anthropological, historical and political insights to identify instrumental uses of ethnicity 
according with her class-based analytical framework.   This required archival research, 
fieldwork interviews and analysis of official publications, political speeches, newspapers and 
secondary academic texts.  Samy (1976a; 1976b) and Cameron (1987) also emphasise QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS90  Page 81 
 
 
political economy determinants of ideologies, drawing on data linking ethnicity to capital-
labour relations.  Kelly (1998) and Kaplan (1998) apply anthropological analysis to political 
discourse, relating historical and contemporary texts to political acts.  Ravuvu (1991) 
expounds an Indigenous view o f political history linking anthropological and historical 
interpretation.  He criticises research constrained by Western conceptual frameworks: 
Time and time again we come across researchers who are keen to ask a great number of 
questions – most of which are nonsensical, harassing and embarrasing [sic], but who are not 
prepared to listen with patience and understanding.  All that interests them are the answers and 
information that fits well into the concepts or models they have set out to prove and 
establish…contributing to already distorted information about the peoples of the Pacific. 
[Ravuvu 1976:75] 
My learning to avoid this critique is analysed below.  My approach parallels Norton’s (2000a) 
multi-disciplinary study of the 1999 election.  Gathering historical, anthropological, 
sociological and economic perspectives on this political process involved methodological 
integration – analysing newspapers, academic literature, electoral campaigning, discussions 
with citizens and electoral results.  I placed significant emphasis on semi-structured 
interviews, partly according with my focus on elite dialogue.  Partly also, I sought to engage 
with the perspectives of political actors through personal encounters, rather than excessively 
deconstructing reported dialogue according to a theoretical framework.  The different 
techniques accessed different issues and offered alternative perspectives on single issues 
(Moore 2000:13; Warwick 1993:281). 
B.  Theoretical Underpinnings of Research Techniques 
The methodological theory underpinning my research draws insights from 
interactionist approaches that suggest limits to positivist assumptions (Silverman 1993:91).  
Interactionists regard research as an encounter where both parties determine their behaviour 
accounting for their perceptions of the other (Foddy 1993:19-21).  Consequently, responses 
researchers perceive vary with how respondents perceive the role and purpose of the 
researcher and questions.  They also vary with how respondents perceive the context of the 
encounter and the researcher’s view of respondents.  Positivist
97 notions of bias do not capture 
the complexity of these processes (Silverman 1993:107; Foddy 1993:13).  I thus regarded 
research encounters partially as processes generating meaning.  Rather than being separable 
from research, my identity and beliefs shaped it (Denscombe 1998:208-9).  I saw my self as a 
resource in generating and interpreting evidence.  The research scripts would not be identical 
if a different researcher undertook the project, however much my schedule unfolded from 
reasoned decisions according to a specified research purpose and methodology (Denscombe 
1998:213).  These scripts must therefore be interpreted according to the context of their 
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production and the perceptions of the actors involved (Silverman 1993:107). This 
interactionist aspect remains in tension with the extent to which research provides authentic 
insights into respondents’ perceptions of their realities (ibid).  I thus regarded research as 
simultaneously offering insights into the political perceptions of respondents, and producing 
new meanings according to the context of the encounter.  The insights I gained are partial 
reflections of respondents’ attitudes, neither directly accessing their existing perceptions nor 
unrelated to them: their and my existing perceptions enabled and constrained the process of 
making meaning in the research encounter (Giddens, cited in May 1997:14). 
Just as methodological theory structured my approach to research techniques, so 
theories of ethnicity structured my research design.  Adherence to the constructivist theory
98 
directed my research to the social, political and economic contexts in which the ethnic group 
has historically come to be defined (Young 1993:23-4; Vail 1989:11-2).  From historical 
literature and contemporary politics I explored processes continually reconstructing ethnic 
groups and their ideologies.  I focused on elite dialogues as an aspect of the construction of 
ethnic ideologies, understanding them as structured by and structuring their social, political 
and economic contexts.  The approach was necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on 
anthropological insights into politicised ethnicity, political economy contexts of political 
dialogue and historical analysis to elucidate contemporary political processes. 
C.  Documents as Research Resources 
In the context of my time-constrained fieldwork and uneven aptitude in the relevant 
disciplines, documents afforded otherwise unattainable depth and expertise (Denscombe 
1998:158-9; May 1997:157).  Secondary historical and anthropological literature provided 
academic analyses of archival records and ethnographic research not achievable within my 
timeframe (Hoddinott 1992:74).  Socio-economic statistics and electoral results offered 
particular types of evidence on inequality and political allegiance.  Newspapers and news-
magazines afforded background reports on events, actors, issues and the campaign.  They also 
provided a means to triangulate other evidence, often revealing differences in the attitudes of 
a party’s candidates not apparent in party manifestos and interviews.  Without time to survey 
grass-roots opinion, historical texts on resistance and protest, newspaper reports on campaign 
support, and electoral results offered some perspective on my  elite discourse focus (Tosh 
1991:85).  They contextualised elite politics, indicating how dialogues were received by 
potential adherents.  Political manifestos were particularly useful portrayals of elite 
constructions of equality and paramountcy. 
Documents can be understood as interpretations of social and political life that also 
reflect the practical requirements for which they were constructed (May 1997:157,163).  I 
read historical, anthropological and other academic texts in light of an author’s theoretical and 
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political adherence, and relied on them according to an author’s credibility and 
representativeness (May 1997:170; Tosh 1991:154).  I read official statistics in light of the 
straight-forwardness of measuring particular concepts, and the institutional imperatives, 
interests or discretionary decisions involved in their construction (Denscombe 1998:164-5; 
Silverman 1993:68).  Inequality statistics could be constructed in numerous ways, given 
alternative definitions of ethnic categories and income, and political interests emphasising 
inter-ethnic rather than intra-ethnic inequality.  Electoral counts are also partially subjective, 
particularly the delineation of informal from formal votes.
99  Newspapers were read as both 
reflections and constructions of reality, and interpreted in the context of owner and editor 
political biases, audience, advertisers and the imperative of making stories (Denscombe 
1998:161).  The priority, content and exclusions of reports reflected the outlooks of the 
journalists I met: typically favouring ‘global’ values of multi-racialism, equality and 
democracy.  Political manifestos were analysed for the meanings of equality and paramountcy 
they were seeking to construct.  The contexts of manifestos were vital in these analyses: their 
intended voter and coalition-partner audiences, availability in different languages, priority and 
exclusion of issues, the ethnic bias of graphic images and parties’ wider political persuasions.  
This reading is the first stage of documentary analysis (May 1997:165); assessing the received 
meaning and semiotics was beyond the purpose of my research.  Manifestos, party speeches 
and candidate interviews were compared for insights from their inconsistencies (Moris and 
Copestake 1993:47).  A tension remains in simultaneously treating documents as constructed, 
and recognising that they provided some perspective on an experienced reality (Moore and 
Vaughan 1994:xxiv). 
D.  Semi-structured Interviews with Key Informants 
Interviews with senior political actors were c entral to my research of political 
dialogue.  This accords with constructivist theory, emphasising ideologues in processes 
continually reconstructing ethnic consciousness.  My aim was to interview experienced 
candidates or officials from each party contesting the elections, to access a broad spectrum of 
well thought-out attitudes.  To randomise the selection process beyond sampling each party 
would have defeated this purpose.
100  The campaign context meant respondents were focused 
on the issues I researched.   Some campaigns precluded research interviews, but without 
systematic bias since tight, professional schedules of large parties offset the near impossibility 
of contacting small parties lacking party infrastructure.  I did not consider government 
approval for my research as giving me any right to demand time from people.  My interview 
set covering 13 of the 18 parties
101 relied on good fortune in reaching candidates generous 
enough to be interviewed.
102  I unnecessarily feared that ethnic nationalist hostility  towards 
                                                 
99 The importance of these processes is demonstrated by the Fiji Labour Party court challenge to the delineation of formal and 
informal votes, set to overturn several seat results (Times 15/02/02). 
100 Of the more than 500 candidates standing for the 18 parties, many had no political expertise, experience or even interest 
beyond obliging party leaders seeking to improve their appearance of national coverage. 
101 Four of the five remaining parties were minor; the fifth I covered through party materials. 
102 Where interviews were facilitated by mutual acquaintances, I was conscious of how this influenced my research.  I thus 
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answering to foreigners might bias my sample, however only one of four ethnic nationalist 
parties was missed, it because key officials were arrested for treason.  I also interviewed 
political leaders who brought in the 1997 Constitution, and the actors who formulated it.  
Being foreign reduced my interview access through social networks, apparently offset by 
increasing access from my separation from the structures of either main ethnic group.
103 
Semi-structured interviews were most appropriate for my  research purpose and 
schedule.  In-depth insights into the meanings people attach to political concepts and their 
understandings of major political debates are not drawn out by structured interviews.  Being 
able to interview people only once, particular issues had to be covered in each interview thus 
precluding depth interviewing.  Semi-structured interviews provide this coverage and suited 
elites used to efficient use of their time, whilst enabling respondents to discuss their views in 
their own conceptual frameworks (Bernard 1995:209-211).  They also reflect my preferred 
conversational style, facilitating discussion without obstructive pre-set wordings, question 
orderings or irrelevant topics (Moore 2000:122; Silverman 1993:95).  Technique aside, I 
could not have subjected senior political actors to rigid interview schedules, uninteresting for 
them and implying I thought myself in charge.  Practice improved my ability to order and 
select topics according to relevance, preceding discussion and respondents’ r emaining 
patience (Bernard 1995:209-210).  Such development during the research process is 
inevitable; my techniques and conceptual understanding continually improved, defying strict 
comparison between interviews (Denscombe 1998:216). 
Reflecting interactionist insights, I was critically aware of how my age, gender and 
nationality might influence interviews (Denscombe 1998:208; Moore 2000:17).  Some 
respondents explicitly associated me with Australia or Britain, neither positive given their 
respective ‘bullying’ of Fiji and colonial legacy of ethnic conflict.  In my general demeanour 
and explanation of my research purpose, I attempted to disown arrogance by conveying my 
genuinely-felt humility given respondents’ experience, expertise and time generosity.  Each, 
inevitably, held preconceptions of my ‘Western’ attitudes to Fiji’s politics.  It is more difficult 
to seek explanations of concepts people take as self-evident universally (equality), than those 
they recognise as particular (paramountcy).  Their preconceptions of me were partially 
correct; I required several weeks of listening to recognise years of accumulated commitment 
to individual human rights, democracy and class-analysis of Fiji’s ethnic politics.  
Respondents’ relative authority meant they frequently challenged preconceptions they 
detected in my questions, reducing the impact of my preconceptions on responses (Foddy 
1993:54).  In later interviews I more fully engaged with all attitudes, an engagement now in 
tension with the detachment apparently required to compare viewpoints I had previously seen 
as internally valid in respondents’ life-worlds (May 1997:115). 
My interview techniques also drew on interactionist insights.  I explained where I was 
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from, what I was researching, why, and the value of e ach respondent’s views, to assist 
respondents to construct me and the research encounter as I intended, to increase the 
helpfulness of responses (Foddy 1993:21).  I could have better explained the purpose of 
particular questions so their interpretations of my aims would be accurate and answers more 
helpful (Foddy 1993:70-2).  What I feared, however, was suggesting ‘appropriate’ answers by 
such explanations.  To predict how respondents constructed me, I searched from their 
behaviour and responses to understand why they agreed to be interviewed, and how they 
perceived my purpose.  Their interest in politics already established (Silverman 1993:92), I 
still attempted to understand their priorities among political issues before I imposed mine of 
paramountcy and equality.  Silence and neutral interjections encouraged detailed responses 
(Bernard 1995:214-18).  Many interviews tackled emotive issues and, over time, I managed to 
open discussions of issues not raised voluntarily  – particularly Indigenous perceptions of 
Indo-Fijian racism  – by indicating my prior awareness of them (Bernard 1995:219).  
Interviews were recorded if respondents agreed, or hand notes transcribed immediately where 
they did not.  Although the completeness of transcripts thus varies, I could distinguish no bias 
in the political stances or seniority of those rejecting recording. 
To analyse interview transcripts, I read them in the context of their production 
(Silverman 1993:94).  Not assuming interviews were directly comparable, given their 
different contexts, question sets and lengths,
104 I sought the broad meanings actors ascribed to 
paramountcy and equality (May 1997:111).  I recognised transcripts as partial reflections of 
respondents’ attitudes, and partial constructions in an interview encounter.  For example, 
asking open-ended questions did not guarantee that people’s answers would directly represent 
their own conceptual frameworks (Silverman 1993:95).  From open-ended questions, 
respondents’ constructed my purpose and their own referents for answers on the basis of the 
research encounter (Foddy 1993:37-52).  Simply by doing research I intervened in their lives, 
to some extent prompting their thinking about issues in ways they may not otherwise have 
done (Mikkelsen 1995:271; Moore 2000:16).  The processes of encoding and decoding 
depicted in Figure 2 provide scope for interpretations, perceptions and context to significantly 
influence the scripts produced and my subsequent interpretation of them (Foddy 1993:22).  
My analysis aimed to faithfully represent the meanings respondents attached to paramountcy 
and equality, remaining aware that meanings were partly generated by the research.  I gauged 
the validity of my interpretations through comparison with alternative perspectives from 
political speeches, newspaper quotations and party manifestos. 
E.  Learning in the Broader Context of Fieldwork 
Documents and interviews were part of a broader learning process encompassing my 
whole experience in Fiji.  Recognising how informal research experiences offer alternative 
perspectives on formal research products, I attempted to maximise such opportunities and be 
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conscious of how they affected my perspective on formal research.  Whilst it is impossible to 
be critically aware of all the experiences leaving traces of ideas, my detailed diary encouraged 
such critical reflection.  Informal discussions with friends, taxi drivers, my netball team, other 
university students, people in pubs and while staying with village friends – whether roaming 
over politics or not – offered numerous insights into beliefs, priorities and livelihood struggles 
(Bernard 1995:209).  Simply living in Fiji provided intuitive understandings affecting 
 
Figure 5: Interactionist Model of the Interview Encounter 
[Source: Foddy (1993:22)] 
 
my interests and perspective on formal research experiences (Denscombe 1998:216).  People 
communicated in English with me in informal settings, however fluency in Fijian and Hindi 
would have offered richer experiences.  We negotiated between their preferring to alter their 
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customs.  Fieldwork was a life experience, not a process where I – the researcher – extracted 
information from research subjects on their lived experiences.
105  Several mentors played 
critical roles in the development of my ideas; I remained both conscious and appreciative of 
these influences, examples of how my research was a learning process undertaken through 
relationships with people. 
Interpreting and analysing e vidence began alongside fieldwork.  Diaries and 
discussions with friends drew together key observations, their interconnections and emerging 
themes, and subsequently influenced my research direction (Moore 2000:144).  Reflective re-
reading of my diaries enabled me to re-capture these influences on my research, avoiding 
abstracting too far from its context in the search for critical distance when interpreting 
evidence.  In reducing the research experience to a thesis, I attempted to elucidate the 
complexity and nuances of the issues being explored to be faithful to my evidence, rather than 
oversimplifying and over-interpreting (Denscombe 1998:213; Warwick 1993:328).  I have 
attempted not to extend conclusions beyond my evidence, although the interpretive process of 
analysis offers no fixed distinction between valid conclusions and hunches (Warwick 
1993:329).  Denscombe (1998:212) argues for including researcher biographical details in 
analyses, offering a reflexive account of how the self impacts on the research and empowering 
readers to do likewise.  Reflected in Chapter I, this is seemingly in tension with academic 
disengaged analysis (May 1997:115).  This tension perhaps less reflects my difficultly in 
transcending the personal, and more my unease with abstracting evidence from its contextual 
production. 
F.  The Politics and Ethics of Research 
Ravuvu (1976:73) calls for foreign researchers in the Pacific to reject research driven 
by academic ambition or disciplinary theory, in favour of topics of significance to  local 
people.  In following my perception that cleavages in Fiji’s political discourse impede its 
development, I did not respect this aspiration.  My official government approval is hardly a 
substitute for locally-defined research, given the disjuncture of interests within the state let 
alone from the population.  My perception was, however, grounded in a lived experience in 
Fiji.  Ravuvu’s call begs the question of, on behalf of which section of a national population 
one should research?  In the field of n ational politics, this translates into for which vested 
interest to research?  My topic, according to Warwick’s (1993:36) definition, is political 
because it potentially affects “the ability of individuals or groups to impose their will, to 
pursue their interests, or to be seen as legitimate authorities.”  Studying political attitudes, 
issues and contests in a polarised polity is also inevitably controversial (Warwick 1993:318).  
To address the political implications of my research, I have attempted at least to faithfully 
represent evidence, reflecting on the processes generating it and comparing it to public 
sources to avoid exposing extreme claims incongruous with respondents’ generally expressed 
views.  This comparison suggested, however, that respondents did not condition views to 
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avoid offending me (Bernard 1995:234; Bulmer 1993:210).  People rarely sought anonymity, 
perhaps because public figures are accustomed to dissemination of their views.  Beyond these 
cautions I have not, as de Laine (2000:204) suggests, protected respondents or groups they 
represent against possible harmful uses of my research if it is used to advance political 
agendas.  In political contests it is regrettably obvious that any document may be 
misinterpreted and selectively quoted for political gain (ASAC 1999). 
Deciding to research politicised ethnicity in Fiji involved a judgement that it was an 
ethical endeavour (Bernard 1995:220).  During research, I discussed with interview 
respondents who I was, where I was from,
106 what I was researching and what contribution 
they were making (ASAC 1999).  They all had experience of the purpose, methods and 
outcomes of social research (Warwick 1993:327).  In informal conversations related to 
politics I also explained why I was in Fiji and what I was studying.  It tended to elicit rather 
than suppress responses.  Formal and informal interviews focused on publicly discussed 
political issues, avoiding embarrassing or invasive topics (Warwick 1993:327).  Political 
actors were fully conversant with these; in informal discussions people could avoid politics 
entirely, if they preferred.  I treated respondents with respect, less because it is ethically 
appropriate (Warwick 1993:326) than because it was genuinely felt.  All Fiji citizens have 
longer and deeper experiences with their politics than have I, and I appreciated their insights 
enormously.  An ethical limitation of my research is that I did not complete my thesis 
sufficiently early to seek responses to my findings from more than a few people who 
informed the research (de Laine 2000:104; Moore 2000:124).  They have therefore not had 
the opportunity to test whether they identify with it (Denscombe 1998:214), a flaw I would 
like to redress both in future work.  Having contributors identify with the product could 
enhance the aim of the thesis: seeking bases for consensus in political dialogues on 
paramountcy and equality. 
G.  Conclusion 
This exposition of my research process critically analyses the context in which the 
evidence was generated, and suggests improvements for future, extended work.  I would 
prefer competency in Fijian and Hindi, expanding my focus beyond elite political discourse 
by gaining richer understandings of political attitudes through vernacular media and 
campaigning, and informal discussions.  Greater field-time could extend research into how 
political discourses are received by potential adherents (May 1997:165), particularly through 
officially endorsed and feasible study in rural villages and settlements.  Broader pre-departure 
reading may have enabled me to be more aware of my own preconceptions about politics in 
Fiji, and my own accumulated commitments to human rights and democracy.  Stricter 
prioritisation of research materials according to an exact question at the outset could have 
made the research process more efficient.  I might have benefited from heeding Moore’s 
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(2000:16) caution against thinking that understanding increases with more information, when 
in fact the reverse can be true.  These reflections are relevant to interpreting this thesis as well 






Anthony, Felix. 24 July 2001: Suva. [President, Fiji Trades Union Congress.] 
Beddoes, Millis M. 22 August 2001: Suva. [Leader, General Voters Party, former 
Chair, ‘Fiji First’ pro-democracy coalition.] 
Bogileka, Meli. 27 July 2001: Lautoka. [Registered Officer, Party of National Unity.] 
Dewa, Fereti. 14 August 2001: Suva. [Leader, Dodonu Ni Taukei Party; included a 
presentation by landowners of mahogany forests.] 
Duncan, Ofa. 16 August 2001: Suva. [Media Liaison Officer, New Labour Unity 
Party.] 
Ganilau, Ratu Epeli. 23 August 2001: Suva. [Current Chair, Great Council of Chiefs; 
former Commander, Republic of Fiji Military Forces.] 
Kanailagi, Rev. 7 August 2001: Suva. [President of the Methodist Church.] 
Koroi, Jokapeci. 22 July 2001: Suva. [President, Fiji Labour Party.] 
Koroi, Rev Josateki. 7 August 2001: Suva. [Former President of the Methodist 
Church.] 
Lal, Brij V. 6 September 2001: Canberra. [Former Member, Constitution Review 
Commission; current Professor of Pacific History, Australian National University.] 
Lini, Hilda. 14 August 2001: Suva. [Manager, Pacific Concerns Resources Centre.] 
Madraiwiwi, Ratu Joni. 26 July 2001: Suva. [Respected High Chief, Roko Tui Bau; 
former Justice of the High Court.] 
Rabuka, Sitiveni. 2 August 2001: Suva. [Former 1987coup leader; Former Chair, 
Great Council of Chiefs.] 
Rasoki, A. 27 August 2001: Pacific Harbour. [Leader, Fiji National Democratic Party 
(candidates not accepted for the election for failing to provide the requisite deposits/petitions 
to the Fiji Electoral Office when required).] 
Ravuvu, Asesela. 10 August 2001: Suva. [Chair of the SDL’s Constitution Review 
Commission; academic author on politics in Fiji.] 
Reddy, Jai Ram. 3 September 2001: Lautoka. [Former Leader, National Federation 
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RFMF (joint interview). 29 August 2001: Suva. [Colonel George Kadavulevu, Chief 
of Staff of the RFMF Strategy Unit; Commander Timoci Tuituba Koroi, Chief Staff Officer, 
Directorate of Military Resources; Sam, Head of Military Intelligence.] 
Sadole, Asesela. 29 August 2001: Suva. [General Secretary, Great Council of Chiefs.] 
Sami, Beni. 6 August 2001: Lautoka. [Candidate, Girmit Heritage Party; Coordinator, 
Girmit Centre camp for internally displaced persons.] 
Sanday, John. 9 August 2001: Suva. [Leader, General Voters Party.] 
Sikivo, Mosese. 15 August 2001: Suva. [Deputy Permanent Secretary, Fijian Affairs 
Board.] 
Singh, Attar. 31 July 2001: Suva. [Leader, National Federation Party.] 
Speed, Adi Kuini Vuikaba. 8 August 2001: Suva. [Leader, Fijian Association Party.] 
Tabu, Taniela. 13 August 2001: Suva. [General Secretary, Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua 
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